

by extending supply routes. And in this situation, plants located closer to the western border of the USSR would be very useful.

Now let us remember that after the war Stalin sent many Soviet specialists to the countries of "people's democracy". And the experience of Yugoslavia showed that they tried to pursue a policy that not all

where it takes into account the interests of the host country.

Historians paid little attention to this. But here is what Doctor of Science N.V. Zagladin wrote on this issue in his book "HISTORY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY" (M.: 1990):

*"In Eastern Europe,*

*metallurgical complexes operating on raw materials and fuel*

*imported from the USSR, and products supplied to the USSR.*

*Such an ugly, deformed development was not mutually beneficial or even unilaterally beneficial to the USSR: it was - unique in*

*history of the case - mutually beneficial. So slow*

*they moved from the exchange of finished products to the*

*coordination of national economic plans and the implementation of joint projects" (p. 139).*

So, it was UNFAVORABLE for both sides! But everything continued to build and operate. For what?

Yugoslavia tried to discuss this issue further

at the time of its appearance and in response received a complete break with the USSR and accusations of fascism. But Stalin, of course, was afraid not only of economic independence. Behind it, in general, an independent policy was visible. And he could not allow this, if he was seriously preparing a new war.

In mid-1996, in one of the programs of D. Volkogonov from the TV series "SECRETS OF THE OLD SQUARE" it was about the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. In it, the general noted Stalin's numerous and persistent proposals to the communist leaders of the Eastern European countries to build military factories.

Or at least assembly (and what to assemble from will be supplied from the USSR). *(Stalin always usually recommended: "You stop asking us for weapons. Create own factory, aircraft factory, artillery plant, we will help. Assembly, we will send the engines, and you assemble the planes and the like "*

[words by D. Volkogonov]). In particular, he gave the example of how Otto Grotewohl asked Stalin to send an orchestra to some German national holiday. *"Stalin chuckled: "Music is good. I thought, you ask for a weapon. The army is more important"... Then the symphony orchestra went there, but Stalin said, that music is good, but the army is more important. words are simple, but very symbolic. Stalin thought as before the end of his days in the spirit of the Comintern.*

If the new allies of the USSR would refuse to develop  
If we were to build our economy according to Stalin's plans, then everything necessary for the advancing Soviet troops would have to be imported thousands of kilometers away! This is when every ship and long-range aircraft is registered! Certainly, the introduction of an occupation regime could serve as a way out here. Evidently, this was what was going on with respect to Yugoslavia. The remaining countries of the "peace camp" "voluntarily" became allies of the USSR. But it was necessary to prepare and opponents. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

## WHO STARTED THE COLD WAR?

For a long time, Soviet propaganda aimed the peoples of the USSR at readiness for a possible war with various imperialists. At the same time, it was said that after the victory in 1945, the Western leaders broke off the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union and very quickly began to prepare a new war. And only a few

The eternal efforts of the Soviet people to restore the ruined economy averted the inevitable. But in addition, it was explained that the enemies of the USSR did not wait and are not waiting for the start of a new "hot" war with folded hands, they organized and are waging a "Cold" war in order to weaken the Soviet Union as much as possible. Historians were of the same opinion.

For example, between August and December 1988, The pages of the Pravda newspaper published several articles by different authors:

- the first - L. Bezymensky, V. Falin "Who unleashed the Cold War" (August 29);
- the second - J. L. Geddis (USA) "On the past for the sake of the future";
- third - O. Rzheshhevsky (no name) (both October 31);
- fourth - Bernard Greiner (Germany) "Not all cats are gray" (December 30).

In 1989, all of them were included in the collection "PAGES OF THE HISTORY OF SOVIET SOCIETY (facts, problems, PEOPLE)".

In the first article, a lot of space is given to the description of the declassified AMERICAN plans for waging war against the USSR, which were developed in the USA in 1944-1949. They are cited as the main evidence of the aggressiveness of the United States and the need for a post-war response by the Soviet Union. The well-known political observer of the Pravda newspaper Yuri Zhukov writes about this in the book "USSR-USA: A ROAD LONG IN SEVEN YEARS, or A Story about How Soviet-American Relations Developed" (M.: Politizdat, 1988).

Yuri Zhukov notes that post-war American plans for waging war against the USSR were declassified in the late 1970s. In particular, they were published in 1978 in New York by Columbia University Press under the title CONTAINMENT. DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN POLICY AND STRATEGY (1945-1960)".

In other words, in the period 1945-1953 the public neither in the USA nor in the USSR knew anything about them! And there simply could not be any "retaliatory measures" to such plans! Now, if almost immediately after the adoption of another secret aggressive plan in the United States, it was published in Soviet newspapers, but protest was expressed by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, then in all subsequent years it would be quite fair to mention such a plan as proof of both the "aggressiveness" of the United States and the "retaliatory measures" on the part of the USSR.

But the irony of fate lies in the fact that information about one American secret military plan was still published during the period of its secrecy. But not in the Soviet mass media, but in the American magazine Colliers in the famous issue of 10/27/1951. It was a special "fantastic" number, which told and



showed in great detail how the United States and its Allies intend with atomic weapons "crack down" on communism once and for all and occupy the USSR. Its cover showed an American soldier in a helmet with a rifle at the ready, against the backdrop of a map of the Soviet Union, which marked the cities that would be subjected to atomic bombing. Yu. Zhukov writes that the description of the war against the USSR was a popular exposition of the Drop Shot plan (1949). Only the dates were changed - the magazine said that the war would begin not in 1957, but already in 1952. The editors themselves hinted at the existence of this plan, indicating that when preparing the issue,

whether materials received from the military were used specialists.

Its summary (from an article by **Ya.** Bezymensky and V. Falin, as well as from a book by Yu. Zhukov): the Americans planned 200 targets in 100 cities of the USSR for 300 atomic and 29,000 tons of conventional bombs. 75-100

atomic bombs were assigned to disable Soviet strategic aviation at airfields. Aircraft were the main means of delivering charges. Of these, the long-range ones were supposed to fly from bases in the northeast of the United States through about. Greenland. In this case, it was possible to bombard almost the entire European territory of the USSR up to the western coast of the Taimyr Peninsula. Other long-range bombers from bases in Alaska were supposed to fly to targets in Siberia and the Far East of the USSR up to the meridian along the eastern coast of the Taimyr Peninsula. Medium bombers were planned to be used from bases in Western Europe, North Africa and Japan. Readiness according to the "Drop Shot" ("Day-D") plan was scheduled for Sunday 01/01/1957.

This is understandable, since before that time it was necessary prepare the "main executors" - strategic bombers B-52. And in the chapter on airplanes already

it was said that this case was long. And no matter how American designers, engineers and workers were in a hurry, the serial production of the B-52 began in 1954, and they began to enter the troops from 1955. Moreover, judging by the data from the reference book, about 90 pieces were made per year. That is, in 1952, the Americans could not start any war with the USSR. You can also recall that the hasty design of the B-52 in the United States began in 1949 AFTER the explosion of the first atomic bomb in the USSR.

From 1945 to 1955 the main American long-range bombers with piston engines remained the means of delivering atomic bombs. And although there were many of them, they could not be used us against an enemy with enough jet fighters. Under these conditions, bomber crews turned into suicide bombers. Moreover, most of the aircraft could be shot down long before the planned targets, which was clearly shown by the war in Korea. In other words, before 1957, the United States could not attack the USSR due to technical inadequacy. And no matter how many targets for the atomic bombing the Americans chose, no matter what attack plans they created, they could only be carried out if the USSR had no air defense systems and very few troops, which was not observed. And this should have been understood not only in Washington, but also in Moscow.

There is another historical fact showing that the secret military plans of one country cannot be used by historians to explain some actions of the leadership of another. These are Soviet-German relations in 1940 and 1941 until June 22. Was there a secret plan in Germany at that time to attack the USSR? Was (the famous "Barbarossa")! And the Soviet Union at the same time was developing plans for waging some kind of war on its western borders. About it

some issues of VIZH for 1992 ("DID THE USSR PREPARE A PREVENTIVE STRIKE?" (No. 1, 4-5) ;

A. Vasilevsky, a former specialist of the General Staff of the Red Army of that time, writes directly and frankly in his memoirs ("THE MATTER OF ALL LIFE").

Was there a Cold War between these countries? Did not have! There was even a treaty of friendship and a border! There was active trade, the exchange of delegations of specialists stov, etc.

Moreover, by June 13, 1941, the Soviet leadership had a mass of intelligence information proving that the German troops would attack any day (not to mention the text of the Barbarossa plan itself). The German ambassador himself announced in advance the exact date of the beginning of the war! But for some reason, TASS, in its famous statement of that day, considered that there was no threat to the USSR! Incredible! German tank divisions deployed their guns on the very Soviet-German border, aerial bombs were laid on the ground, and

local residents, military hospitals were hastily preparing

but the Soviet leadership does not see anything threatening at all! After all, this is not waving paper newspapers with Churchill's speech across the ocean, but the preparation of a mass of enemy troops on their own border?! And no Cold War?!

For many years, Soviet historians explained this the weakness of the Red Army, which was in the process of reorganization, which forced Stalin to delay the start of hostilities as much as possible. But any literate military man can see that the reorganization of troops is a constant process. Military

technology is constantly being improved, new types of weapons appear. And for the defense, the troops should be

comrades at any time and with any available weapons. That is what the General Staff exists for, in order to correctly manage the process of reorganization and not weaken the defense, especially at the borders. The true reason for the military defeats in 1941 and the absence of a Cold War with Germany turned out to be different.

hom.

But this is not my topic. In our case from 1941, it is useful to recall the ratio of readiness of troops both future belligerents and the propaganda work to cover them. Then the troops of the probable enemy (the Germans) not only had a secret plan, but also implemented it in practice (they went to the initial border area and prepared a surprise attack). And Soviet propaganda was FORBIDDEN to say anything about these preparations. (Although there is evidence that in the immediate vicinity of the date of June 22, 1941, Soviet ideologists sometimes began to hint at the "bad" behavior of the Germans, especially in the army, but this does not change the overall picture.)

As shown above, post-war explanations for such behavior are not entirely satisfactory. On the other hand, some researchers insist that the Soviet troops at that time were engaged in

the same as the German ones - advanced to the border starting areas for a surprise attack. This reason may well explain the passivity of the Soviet ideologists. Otherwise, after all, one could run into mutual accusations: "And you yourself are like that!"

Ultimately, it turns out that the declassified after many years, the secret plans of one state cannot serve as evidence of any "retaliatory actions" of those countries against which they were drawn up. We must look for other explanations.

To do this, it is useful to consider the question: at what

conditions of propaganda can we talk about someone's aggressive preparation for war?

These conditions can be one of two:

- the country does not want to fight, the troops are engaged in the planned preparation of defense, and the neighbors are deploying their armies, withdrawing them to their starting areas, carrying out mobilization;

- the leadership of the country wants to fight, but it is not very convenient to attack first, and the neighbors do not want to start a big war with large possible losses and keep their armies in "winter quarters" in peaceful states, while at the same time performing various defenses

nye activities.

Post-war Soviet ideologists, and then historians, unconditionally insisted that for the USSR after 1945 only the first of them existed: the Soviet Union is the most active fighter for peace, while

bloodthirsty imperialists are preparing a new world war.

And in all the works devoted to the Cold War, the USA, Great Britain and "their accomplices" were indicated as its founders. And for its beginning, Soviet historians took Churchill's speech in Fulton (USA). For example, the BRIEF POLITICAL DICTIONARY (Moscow: Polit izdat, 1988, p. 451) says:

- *"Cold War" (hereinafter "H.V.") - the term was used after the Second World War to characterize the policy of the imperialist states in relation to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Politics "X. century" was dictated interests of the most reactionary forces in the United States and other Western countries... Open announcement by the West "X.v." the speech of the English politician W. Churchill in Fulton (USA) appeared to the world of socialism March 5, 1946, in which, in essence, the program of the 10th century was outlined. In 1947, he also spoke*

*with the project of creating a Western European military alliance against the USSR ... For "H.V." characteristic: threat use of force, striving for dictatorship, economic blockade and subversive activities against the socialist states, intensifying the arms race and military preparations in every possible way, striving to use the achievements of science and technology for military purposes, the creation of aggressive blocs and alliances, fanning the anti-communist propaganda, acquiring the character of "psychological warfare". "X.v." and the foreign policy concepts and doctrines generated by it - politics "from the position forces", "rejection of communism", "balancing on the brink of war" and others - were dictated by the interests of the most reactionary monopoly circles in the capitalist countries. As a result of the policy of "H.V." for a long period, international tension persisted, the threat of a new world war ... "*

For reference, the term "Cold War" was first used by American financier and presidential adviser Bernard Baruch during a debate in the US Congress in 1947 ("THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA", Vol. 3, 15th edition, 1986, p.444).

Churchill delivered his speech on March 5, 1946. But it turns out that on February 22 of the same year, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, J. Kennan, sent a "long telegram" of 8,000 words to Washington. L. Bezymensky and V. Falin mention this in their article . They write that J. Kennan "figured out" the intention of the USSR to destroy the harmony of American society and proposed to turn the Soviet Union into a scarecrow, to reduce all relations with it to a minimum. However, it does not indicate that

served as a source for the "calculations" of the American

diplomat. There must have been some reason that led him to such conclusions? It's hard to believe that the chargé d'affaires was "out of his mind."

More frankly, D. Volkogonov writes about this in his book TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY (pp. 480-481):

*"Churchill's speech was preceded by a 'long telegram' from the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, sent to Washington, in which he gave twisted interpretation of Stalin's February speech. J. Kennan argued that the Soviet leaders consider the third world war 'inevitable' ... Stalin's speech in February 1946 at the election meeting - quite calm and even the peace-loving West perceived almost like you call..."*

After such confessions, objectivity requires getting acquainted with the original source itself, i.e. with Stalin's speech. He uttered it at the pre-election meeting of voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on February 9, 1946. It was published in the newspaper Pravda the next day - in the Sunday issue of February 10 (on the day of the elections themselves).

During that election campaign, as usual, several of the most prominent top leaders were nominated in many constituencies, often in tandem with another candidate, and for some reason in January 1946, although the elections were scheduled by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as early as 10/6/1945. But one candidate had to run in only one constituency. Therefore, they had to make a choice, about which the "open letter" was printed in the Pravda newspaper. After him, from the end of January, pre-election meetings began to take place. At the beginning of February, the Pravda newspaper (perhaps in others too) published speeches by candidates from the highest leadership of the Soviet Union. And the closer the election day, February 10, came, the

a higher place in the state hierarchy was occupied by the one whose speech was printed. Thus, Stalin's speech turned out to be the last and was printed on the day of the elections themselves.

He began his speech by pointing out that 8 years have passed since then, half of which was during the war. Stalin then analyzed its causes. He said that according to Marxist scientific theory *"the capitalist system of the world economy is fraught with elements of a general crisis and military clashes, that in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our time does not occur in the form of a smooth and uniform advance, and through crises and military catastrophes.* Then Stalin says that there might not have been wars *"if there had been the ability to periodically redistribute raw materials and sales markets between countries in accordance with their economic weight - in the order of the adoption of agreed and peaceful solutions. But it can't be done under the present capitalist conditions of the development of the world economy".*

Having put forward such an idea, Stalin backed it up with facts from history. First, he recalled the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy, which resulted in the First World War. And then he recalled the second, which led to the Second World War.

After that, Stalin turned to the results of the war for the Soviet Union. The main one he noted was simply victory. But then he listed its terms. to them from

attributed:

- the victory of the Soviet social system, which turned out to be *"quite viable and stable form of organization of society";*
- the fact that *"the Soviet social system proved to be more viable and sustainable than*



*non-Soviet social system, ... the Soviet social system is a better form of social organization than any non-Soviet social system.*

*build";*

- a complete solution of the national question in the USSR, where *"the national question and the problem of the cooperation of nations are resolved better than in any other multinational state";*

*the might of the Red Army.*

But victory could not be achieved without preliminary preparation of the whole country for active defense, i.e. without the necessary level of economic development. To this Stalin attributed the industrialization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. Then he solemnly listed how much of what weapons had been produced, after which he moved on to plans for the future.

The main objective of the new five-year plan for

He called the years 1946-1950 the restoration of the affected areas with the overlapping of the pre-war level of production. And in the future it is necessary to surpass the pre-war level three times. *"Only under this condition can we consider that our Motherland will be guaranteed against any accidents."* (Stormy applause.)

As you can see, Stalin did not call for war directly. He only seemed to recall the "scientific conclusion to scientific" Marxism about the periodic crisis of the "worst non-Soviet" social systems, which "necessarily" lead to world wars. And then he simply listed the crises that had already taken place (the first and the second), the result of which was precisely the world wars, the last of which had just ended. And then he recalled that such "bad

there are still other states, thus hinting that another crisis is not far off (with a corresponding continuation in the form of a world war).

From this statement, Stalin quite naturally deduced the main task of the development of the Soviet economy - "to guarantee the country against any accidents." More understandably, this means the priority development of the military-industrial complex. There can be no other understanding. And no promotion

welfare of the citizens of the Land of Soviets was not mentioned in the speech. This goal was, as it were, relegated to the distant future, at a time when there would be no "bad" capitalist countries left on Earth. But completely

one can clearly see the idea that while on there are "non-Soviet" countries on the planet, the main task of the USSR is to produce many tanks, aircraft, shek, machine guns, millions of cartridges for them, etc.

Thus, Stal's election speech can be called "rather calm", but it is difficult to classify it as "peaceful". And what could be distorted by the American envoy J. Kennan, arguing that

Do Soviet leaders consider a third world war "inevitable"? Yes, they do. Stalin spoke about this almost directly, shaping this idea, however, not by his own opinion, but by the "scientific theory of Marxism."

And how could the West accept the offer of the first the leader of a major power to triple its industry, especially the military? How completely peaceful?

Indeed, Stalin's speech was printed in huge circulation in the main Soviet newspaper. Diplomats of other countries could read it not only in Moscow. There should have been comments. And they appeared. In Pravda for February 17 (there had not yet been Churchill's speech at Fulton!) there was published "International Review" signed "Observer". It first cites the commendable opinion of the American columnist Steele, who said: "*Speech*

*Stalin showed that the goals of the Soviet Union for*

*key to industrial development and the world. Despite the distortions of Stalin's statement by American newspapers, this speech reflects the intentions of the Russians to restore the economy for peaceful purposes.*

*And then the review says: "You can't ignore Steele's statement, which was confirmed by the Christian Science Monitor, about the distortion by some American newspapers of the speech of Comrade. Stalin. It's easy to guess that in this unseemly field strives first queue of the Black Hundred seal of Hearst, unfolding another unbridled anti-Soviet campaign. It must be noted, however, that the the same way of distorting the speech of Comrade. Stalin slipped and the notorious Walter Lippmann, whose prominent the American publicist Willard aptly called "his own big businessmen an ex-socialist."*

*Walter Lippmann distorted and distorted the speech of Comrade. Stalin. He declared that in the USSR there would allegedly be no measures taken to improve the living standards of the population and that the industrial construction program The USSR is nothing more than ... "a program for the rearmament zheniya".*

*Lippmann distorts the facts in order to justify his position as the herald of a new arms race directed against the USSR. Not only is he calls on the United States to start an intensified arms race, he recommends that, under the auspices of the United States, the countries of Western Europe and Asia be drawn into this adventure, for alone, they cannot provide for the main armies of democracy"... All these imperialist plans should serve to "oppose the Soviet Union" ... "*

Incidentally, Churchill also analyzed Stalin's actions in his speech at Fulton. D. Volkogonov in the book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" writes about it this way (pp. 480-481):

*"The speech of the former premier was extremely belligerent... Churchill warned that the 'Red threat' hung over Western democracies... (that) 'from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic descended over the European continent iron a curtain'. Here the former prime minister was close to the truth. Immediately after the war, Stalin carried out a number of energetic steps aimed at reducing all contacts with the West.*

Soviet historians for a long time practically did not remember Stalin's speech. But here is what is written about her in the journal "History of the USSR", No. 1 for 1991, p. 161 (in the article by M. Belousov "M.M. LITVINOV ABOUT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR"): *"In the USA there were extremely negative the statements of I. V. Stalin in his election speech on February 9, 1946 that "capitalist the world economic system contains elements general crisis and military clashes"... As follows from the notes of J. Forrestal, then the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, even the member of the US Supreme Court, known for his liberal reputation, W. Douglas called Stalin's speech "a declaration of the third world war ", and Forrestal himself repeatedly referred to it in support of his thought that "the coexistence of democracy and communism is impossible.*

However, after Churchill's speech in Fulton, the interaction between the leaders of the USA, Britain and France with the USSR did not stop. The international tribunal in Nuremberg continued. Meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA, England and France were being prepared to develop peace treaties with Germany's former allies. The US has been cutting its military and defense spending. JL Geddis (USA) in his article "ABOUT THE PAST FOR THE FUTURE"

(PRAVDA, October 31, 1988) notes that President Truman *"was optimistic about the prospects for making agreements with Stalin."*

The fact that Churchill's speech in Fulton could not be the beginning of the Cold War is directly noted by N.V.

TII":

*"Of course, Churchill's speech caused a great response in the world. However, it does not seem to be entirely accurate. define it as the beginning (or official declaration) of the Cold War. In Fulton, the ex-premier spoke, who, neither before the war nor after it, did not hide his antipathy towards the USSR ... It was necessary to take into account that the views of Churchill were rejected by the majority of the British in the elections of 1945, and Fulton Truman did not agree with the assessments of the former British Prime Minister. distanced myself from them the Labor cabinet of Great Britain" (p. 141).*

Further, Zagladin hints that an important role Stalin himself played in Churchill's speech, and echoes his statements from the March 1946 issues of the newspaper Pravda, for example: *"There is no doubt that Mr. Churchill's orientation is to war with the USSR.*

And only in September 1946, Truman's opinion changed to the point that *"his hopes for cooperation finally collapsed."* Then Truman squashed

tried to classify the report of his military assistant

Maritime Affairs Clark Clifford *"with a very critical assessment of how the Soviet Union treated its obligations under agreements during time"* (this information is given in the article "On the Past for the Name of the Future" by J. L. Geddis.)

In the book "USSR-USA ..." about Clifford's report, write

Sano in more detail. It turned out that he, too, was declassified and published in the already mentioned book "CONTAINMENT. DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN POLITICS... (1945-1960)". Yu. Zhukov writes:

*"Of particular interest is the this collection report "American relations with Soviet Union" presented to the President 09/24/1946, prepared by a specially created board led by Clark M. Clifford. This the report was preliminarily agreed with the state military secretary, military and naval ministry, Joint Chiefs headquarters, the director of counterintelligence and other officials and departments. How was it put in this report, the question of the development of relations with the USSR after the war? The authors begin by lamenting the alleged Soviet threat to the United States. As if the leaders of the Soviet*

*Unions believe that "war with the United States and other leading capitalist nations is inevitable", and therefore "increase their military power", expand the sphere of Soviet influence, preparing for the "inevitable" conflict. And then the authors of the report with the utmost frankness state*

*developed by them the concept of preparation and maintenance war against the USSR in the order of "response to the Soviet threat."*

The fact that Stalin himself declared the inevitability of a medium crisis in the capitalist countries with a subsequent war, has already been mentioned above. But he said it on February 9th. Churchill spoke at Fulton on 5 March. In February, comments on Stalin's speech were printed in the Western press. And Truman's hopes for cooperation with the USSR for some reason "collapsed" only in September! Did anything happen in international life during the period

from March to September 1946? Happened! And not even from March 1946, but from 1945!

First, there were complications in the relationship. USSR with Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy. Secondly, in 1946, meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers were held (from April 25 to May 16 and from June 15 to July 12 in Paris), and from July 29 to October 15, a peace conference was held in the same place in Paris with the participation of delegations from 21 countries .

Problems in relations with Turkey arose at the beginning of 1945, when on March 19 the Soviet government denounced the treaty of friendship and neutrality with this country dated 12/17/1925, "as not corresponding to the new situation *and in need of serious improvement.*"

I must say that this is a strange wording. If some new problems arise in relations between countries, then a joint commission is usually created to solve them, which either develops proposals to improve the existing treaty (for example, through the method of additional protocols), or can propose a version of a new treaty. No denunciation of the old is required. If

applied, it can be considered as provocation 1st class.

And any first-class provocation suggests, that the other side should take some steps in the direction necessary for provocateurs. So by beamed.

The Turkish side, of course, was worried about wanted to know the reasons for this attitude and offered to start negotiations. They took place in Moscow in June 1945. The issue was the conclusion of a new treaty of friendship. The Soviet side, as a precondition, offered Turkey to return to Georgia and Armenia their territories in the Caucasus (regions of Kars, Artvin and Ardagan). In addition, the Soviet

The crown proposed to revise in the direction of strengthening the rights of the Soviet Union the convention on the Black Sea straits, concluded in 1935 in the Swiss city of Montreux. And only after that Stalin was ready to sign a new friendship treaty with Turkey.

But that

The Russian government did not agree and complained to England to Churchill.

Naturally, these questions became the subject of discussion at the Berlin (Potsdam) conference in the summer of 1945. But at it, Stalin did not seek a final decision on Turkey, but at least the consent and support of England and the United States of their "fair" demands. Including for the transfer of these issues to the decision of the Ministerial Council of Foreign Affairs (Council of Foreign Ministers).

The British and US delegations were first explained the Soviet territorial claims against their southern neighbor by the need to conclude a new treaty of friendship. Then Stalin tried to draw an analogy with Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. But the Allies declared that there was no "Curzon Line" in the Caucasus. Then Stalin explained that these lands were lost in 1921 due to the weakness of the Soviet Union. But that would be a FALSE! And Churchill and Truman knew it.

On the contrary, Türkiye in 1921 was in a very desperate situation. In 1919-1922, the little-known Greco-Turkish war was fought. The Entente countries promised the Greek government significant territorial increments at the expense of its eastern neighbor. In this regard, the Greek troops landed in Izmir and by the summer of 1921 advanced deep into Anatolia (central Turkey) to the Sakarya River, almost to Ankara. Istanbul, of course, was also occupied. Under these conditions, power changed in the country, which was taken over by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, headed by Kemal Atatürk. It needs

was given in help, try to get which could



only in Moscow, since all the other European countries were either her opponents or were in a state of defeat, like herself.

Moscow provided assistance - a significant amount of weapons, ammunition, equipment and money (over 10 million rubles in gold). On March 16, 1921, an agreement between the RSFSR and Turkey "On Friendship and Brotherhood" was signed in Moscow, and on October 13, 1921, agreements were concluded between Turkey and the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia. And as everyone can understand, getting acquainted with that situation in detail, at that moment anything could be demanded from her government in payment. Why Lenin did not take advantage of this is a separate question, we will not consider it here.

Once upon a time, in the early 70s, I happened to be next to a map of the USSR in the presence of a school history teacher. After running my hand along the border in the Caucasus and simply asking about the loss of Kars, I suddenly heard from him a strange opinion that Lenin had given up the Kars region himself. And he somehow argued this idea

shaft, but I don't remember the details, but the main idea remembered.

Be that as it may, having received help and stopped the Greek armies in 1921, the Turkish troops went on the offensive and by the end of 1923 liberated the country (10/23/1923 they entered Istanbul). And in December 1925, a new treaty "On Friendship and Neutrality" was signed between the USSR and Turkey.

Knowing such history, it is not serious to say that in 1921 Turkey took advantage of someone's weakness. This is reminiscent of a provocation. And the question arises: why did Stalin need to complicate relations with her in 1945? Soviet ideologists did not want to answer him. Moreover, on May 30, 1953 (already after the death of the tyrant), the Soviet government abandoned

their demands on Turkey. Including about the straits (having recognized the Montreux Convention).

And what did Stalin not like about it? The convention allowed only Turkey to control the passage of ships through the straits. At the same time, peaceful ships could pass freely at any time. And the Soviet Union could conduct military freely only in peacetime. In the event of war, this depended on the decision of the Turkish government.

evidence.

After Stalin's death, such conditions suited the Soviet Union quite well, but during his lifetime after 1944 For some reason, this order turned out to be unacceptable. Stalin compared it with the rights of the Japanese emperor and sought to revise it, including through the deployment of Soviet troops on the straits. The Western allies did not agree to such a decision. And the persistent claims of the USSR on these issues later resulted in the creation of American military bases in Turkey, which, in turn, served as a reason for accusing the United States of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. So who provoked whom?

In addition, it turns out that at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin also tried to consider the question of Tangier, a city and port in northwestern Africa, at the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1940 he was captured by Spain. Stalin proposed making the Tangier zone international by taking it away from Spain. A good reason for this would be to accuse the Franco government of complicity with the Nazis. But the Western allies in Potsdam did not agree to this. They admitted that the USSR may have claims against Franco for sending the Blue Division to the eastern front. But they stated that he had not committed any hostile actions against the Anglo-American forces.

And also at the Potsdam Conference of the Soviet The Delegation repeatedly raised the issue of "under

kiln territories", which meant the colonies of Italy in Africa. By that time they were all occupied by England (as a result of fighting). Moreover, Churchill specifically emphasized that ALL the colonies of Italy were liberated precisely by the troops of Her Majesty, to which he received a sarcastic remark from Truman with a clarifying question: "ALL?" (apparently, remembering the American aid to England). But then the US president showed no interest in this topic. Churchill was surprised that anyone else present was interested in this situation, and refused to discuss it in detail. Ultimately, the issue of the Italian colonies was referred to the peace negotiations that took place in 1946 (and in which the USSR "fought" with Italy for the longest time!).

If one line connects the Black Sea straits, northern Libya and Tangier, then one can see Stalin's concern for free access to the Atlantic Ocean. But why did he need it after a cruel war? For prestige? What is there to argue about, if there were no problems for civilian ships - swim wherever you want. We could only have problems with warships and

in wartime.

But it is also possible to pass into the Atlantic Ocean from the Baltic Sea (but also through a number of straits). Did Stalin care about this path? At the Potsdam Conference The situation with the northern straits was not considered, but there is a two-volume book "ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE USSR", volume (book) one, 1917-1950 (M.: 1967). It gives a short list of various events, including the dates of signing of various treaties. Looking through some articles about 1946, I came across a message about signing in July-August of two treaties between the USSR and Denmark (on trade and navigation). By themselves, this information, of course, does not say anything. But after them, on September 3, a message was printed

TASS about the protest of the Soviet government against the attempts of the US government to interfere in trade negotiations between the USSR and Sweden on the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement (signed on October 7, 1946). "Aha! - I thought, - apparently, Stalin is working on ensuring access to the Atlantic Ocean from the Baltic Sea! But then there should be an agreement with Norway!" And indeed, the book is followed by information about the signing on December 27, 1946 of an agreement between the USSR and Norway on trade and payments... So what bothered Stalin in the mid-1940s? The establishment of a long and lasting peace on earth?

The next significant event in international life after Potsdam was the Paris peace negotiations, which Soviet historians did not like to recall.

The head of the Soviet delegation to them was Molotov, United States - Secretary of State Byrnes, Great Britain - Bevin, France - Bidault. Roy Medvedev's book *THEY SURROUNDED STALIN* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990) contains an interesting memoir by diplomat Charles Bohlen:

*"...Molotov was a magnificent bureaucrat... He made requests without caring what was being done a laughingstock in the eyes of other foreign ministers. Once in Paris, when Molotov delayed the agreement because he stumbled over procedural questions, I heard him repeat one phrase for four hours: "The Soviet delegation will not allow to turn the conference into rubber stamp - and rejected all attempts by Byrnes and Bevin bring positions closer."*

Roy Medvedev adds: *"In the sense that he tirelessly pursued his goal, he can be called a skilled diplomat. He never spent*

*natural politics, Stalin made politics; Molo*

*Comrade put it into practice."*

Yuri Zhukov was then at these meetings in Paris as a special correspondent for the Pravda newspaper. In his book, he does not list in detail what issues were discussed, what was proposed by various delegates.

tions; only notes that the negotiations were "extremely slow. Literally on every article of the draft peace treaties that were being discussed,

sharp disagreements ... The newspaper "Vois de Paris" reported, that the United States intends to base its policy on the idea of "dividing the world into two camps" — one group of states will be headed by them, and the other by the USSR. People are well aware that the division of the world into two camps are fraught with the most dangerous consequences up to the unleashing of a third world war with the use of atomic weapons ... Someone behind the scenes is again trying to disrupt the negotiations,

in order to further open the way to separate agreements between the Western powers and their dependents states on a post-war settlement. And this would begin a break in cooperation with the Soviet Union and a return to that tense international the situation that existed in the 20s and 30s ...

In the course of the discussion at the meetings (peace conference) and in the procedural commission, a demarcation takes place: who is with whom and who is against whom. On one side of the delegation of the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, ... on the other - the USA, England, France and the countries that sent military contingents to the Western Front... September 23

In 1946, the first session of the UN General Assembly was to resume work in New York. It had to be postponed ... In the Luxembourg Palace, intensely, sometimes all day long, they worked

commissions charged with considering

*draft peace treaties. Only October 7, 1946 (they) with numerous amendments, clarifications and addenda were referred to plenary meetings. The final stage lasted another 8 days. He took place in the same tense atmosphere of confrontation between the United States and its supporters, on the one parties, and the Soviet Union and those who supported his delegations, on the other hand... At the conference, could you not agree only on a peaceful settlement with Italy. This was done at the third session of ministers Foreign Affairs in New York (4.11-12.12.1946). As a result, peace treaties with all the former allies of Nazi Germany in Europe were signed in Paris on February 10, 1947.*

By the way, about Italy. Of course, in connection with the participation of Italian troops in the eastern campaign of the Germans, the USSR could have different claims to this country. But judging as described above, during the negotiation the ditch was something that the West could not agree to. This apparently concerned the fate of the Italian colonies in Africa. Zagladin confirms in his book that back in 1945, at a conference in Potsdam, Stalin made a proposal to establish a guardianship regime over Italy's colonial possessions in Africa (which

did not rule out the granting of the corresponding territories to the USSR). And he notes that Soviet diplomacy, despite the more than cool reaction of the West, repeatedly turned to this issue later. The "consequence" was precisely the negotiations on a peace treaty with Italy.

Why did Stalin need colonies on the southern coast of the Mediterranean? It is possible that, among other things, to increase pressure on Turkey so that it agrees to the deployment of Soviet troops on the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles (with the rationale for a more guaranteed supply of Soviet troops in Libya).

However, Stalin never received a colony in Africa. But at the beginning of 1946, a conflict situation arose around Iran, in the northern half of which Soviet troops had been stationed since 1941. A brief review of these events is given by Zagladin in his book on p. 140-141.

The fact is that the Soviet and British troops that were in Iran to prevent its capture by the Axis powers had to be withdrawn. When the threat had passed, there was no reason to delay them. If the Soviet Union did not plan something in this region, then no complications could arise. But in December 1945 (still in the presence of Soviet troops) in Iranian Azerbaijan,

established the national government by proclaiming  
neck autonomy and readiness to recognize only those  
measures of the central Tehran government that do not contradict its laws. In  
addition, reforms of the people's democratic

sky type, including the partial transfer to the peasants of landowners and state  
lands. At the same time  
but unexpectedly, Iranian Kurdistan proclaimed national autonomy, where similar  
reforms began.

I would like to draw your attention to the similarity of the situation in the Ira  
during this period to the future situation in Korea. This is clearly visible! What kind of  
world peace are we talking about, if already in 1946 Stalin was impatient to create  
a hotbed of tension! Fortunately, he did not manage to develop it then. The Western  
powers assessed the possible consequences in time, correctly seeing behind them  
the preparation of the USSR for the dismemberment of Iran through the  
"reunification" of Azerbaijan and the creation of an independent Kurdish state  
allied to the Soviet Union. Considering that the Kurds lived both in Turkey (to which  
the USSR had territorial claims) and in Iraq, finding

London then regarded the policy of the USSR as creating a threat to the main areas of oil production in the Near and Middle East. The question of Iran was raised by Western diplomacy at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, and then submitted to the UN for consideration. From the United States through secret channels

followed by the first ever threat to use nuclear weapons if the USSR did not respect the territorial integrity of Iran. For reference: On July 9, 1945, the Transcaucasian Military District was divided into two: Baku (Azerbaijan SSR and Dagestan ASSR) and Tbilisi.

The crisis around Iran reached its peak in March 1946 (when Churchill's speech was made). But then the Soviet troops began to withdraw from there. However, the planned plans were not abandoned completely. In April, the USSR signed an agreement with Iran on the creation of a mixed Soviet-Iranian society for the exploration and exploitation of oil fields in northern Iran for a period of 50 years. In June, the central government of Iran signed an agreement with representatives of the democratic government of Iranian Azerbaijan on granting local autonomy to this province. (05/06/1946 The Baku and Tbilisi military districts were again united into one Transcaucasian military district.)

*"The West was not slow to launch a counterattack. In August large British forces deployed to Iraq troops who, in order to provide moral support deployed along the border with Iran. Central The United States immediately provided military assistance to the government of this country. At the end of 1946 the Iranian troops entered Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, liquidating their autonomy. As a result, in In 1947, Tehran terminated the agreement concluded with the USSR*



*decision on the joint exploitation of oil resources" (Zagladin's book, p. 142).*

But the escalation of tension, in the course of which, in fact, the front lines of the third world war were already outlined, continued. In 1946, relations between the USSR and Turkey became even more aggravated. In a note dated August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union no longer proposed, but demanded from it a revision of the regime of the Black Sea straits on the basis of agreements only on the Black Sea

powers.

The Turkish government has once again rejected clause on joint defense. In response, Soviet diplomacy stepped up pressure on Ankara. On September 24, 1946, the government of the USSR demanded to accelerate the revision of the regime for the passage of ships through the Black Sea

Do you.

Naturally, such actions of the Soviet Union strongly resembled the policy of the USSR towards Finland on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939. In addition, the ruling circles of Western countries were concerned about the events in Greece, where the Communists, refusing to take part in the elections, organized

nyh under the control of the British and Americans, began at the end of 1946 an armed struggle for power. It was well known that the insurgent forces were receiving aid from Soviet allied Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. To consider this issue in December 1946, a commission of the UN Security Council was created, but it

did not come up with any results.

Thus, the complication of the world situation immediately after the war happened not so much because of the "crisis of capitalism", but because of the participation of the USSR in them, because the Soviet Union "pushed" them. But this could only be done on purpose. And the main "architect" of such a policy was Stalin. However, his bet on crises in the capitalist

the world with the subsequent world wars was not a post-war invention. It has been the core of the entire policy of the Soviet leadership since the 1920s. It began to take on special significance from the middle of the 1930s, by the end of which it became in general the determining condition for the activity of the USSR both within the country and on the world stage.

In 1991, the journal ZNANIE-SIPA (Nos. 6 and 7) published an article by M. Buromensky, Ph.D. In it, the author explains that in August 1939 there was no change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (due to the signing of the Soviet-German treaty):  
*"... In fact, the 1939 non-aggression pact was not the result of any then an unexpected turn in the foreign policy of the USSR... To look for a turn means to look for another*

*politics. The treaty was a natural continuation of the foreign policy of the USSR of the two previous decades and is significant only in that, starting with him, she became frankly immoral. After there was an agreement with Germany on friendship and borders, there were joint military parades with the Wehrmacht on occupied lands, congratulations to Hitler on capture of European capitals. Only June 22, 1941 put an end to all this ... "*

Buromensky writes that Stalin generally denied peaceful way of carrying out socialist revolutions. And the emergence of revolutionary situations was necessarily associated with wars, especially world wars. Accordingly, the entire foreign policy of the USSR consisted in "balancing over the abyss." Moreover, it was continued in domestic policy to prepare its own population for possible participation in the coming battles.

So, already in the "SHORT COURSE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CPSU(b)", forward

published in the autumn of 1938, it was stated that the world war had already begun! The fascist ruling circles of Germany, Italy and Japan fought in it against the capitalist interests of England, France and the USA. Including it was explained that the Spanish war was waged by the fascist states against England and France!

And how much has changed in this matter in 1945?

One group of aggressive states suffered defeat. But the capitalist system remained. Moreover, the main industrially developed countries continued to be capitalist: England, France, the USA, Italy, Japan, most of Germany. That is, the problem that Stalin wanted to solve, at least in Europe, was never solved. Therefore, there was no reason

to change the pre-war foreign and domestic policy.

And for this it was necessary to CONSCIOUSLY refuse the policy of cooperation with the United States and other Western allies established during the war. Which is what has been actively done. Moreover, even then there were people in the USSR who were able to draw just such a conclusion. For example, Maxim Litvinov, former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the 1930s and former Soviet Ambassador to the United States in 1941-1943, who in June 1946 He was also the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In the already mentioned article by M. Belousov "M. M. LITVINOV ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR" (in the journal "History of the USSR", No. 1, 1991) states that on June 21, 1946, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union

W. Smith sent Top Secret Telegram No. 861.0016-2146 to the Secretary of State of the United States. In it, he reported that on June 18, a correspondent for the American Columbia Bro

Adcasting System" Hotellett interviewed Litvinov. But since Litvinov was very frank, Hotellett did not use the information he received.

tion for the press, and gave it to the American ambassador. Here are some quotes from this telegram:

*"Discussing the international situation, Litvinov said that there was nothing good in the future, and, according to in his opinion, the differences between East and West gone too far and cannot be reconciled. When asked about the reasons, he replied that, from his point of view vision, based on the ideological concept, prevailing here (in the USSR), according to which a war between communist and capitalist worlds is inevitable... He said that he was an outside observer and was pleased with his non-participation... Hotellette asked if there would be less suspicion, which, apparently, more motivate Soviet policy, if the West had not expectedly given in and agreed with all the demands of the Russians, say, on the issue of Trieste, Italian colonies, etc. (at the Ministerial Council talks and the peace conference), would this not tightness. He said that this would lead to the fact that the West would then be faced with the next series of demands ... Litvinov on his own initiative expressed the idea that nothing could be done within a totalitarian state to change it... At the end of the conversation, Litvinov emphasized that that he is a private individual and expresses his personal views." (In July 1946 he was released from work at the Foreign Ministry.)*

Thus, by September 1946, US President Truman already had enough information both about the direction of the Soviet foreign policy and about the practical actions of Soviet leaders and diplomats. But it took a few more months before he

openly spoke with his assessment of the actions of the Soviet Union in his message to the US Congress of March 12, 1947 (which later became known as the "Truman Doctrine" and which Soviet propaganda

long used as evidence of the aggressiveness of the United States and the need for "retaliatory measures" of the USSR).

Truman devoted the main place in his message to the situation around Greece and Turkey and described it as creating a threat to US security. He stated that inaction on the part of Washington would have far-reaching consequences in both East and West. The President asked for congressional sanctions on the allocation of aid to Greece and Turkey, including the

ku to these countries of the American civil and military leg staff. Thus, for the first time, it was recorded that US security interests required the "containment" of the USSR and its allied forces.

At the same time, the course towards the split of Germany and, apparently, Austria was also visible. In particular, the United States, Britain and France proposed dividing Germany into separate regions - "lands", which then were to form a federation of German states. And the USSR was categorically against this idea and insisted on the restoration of a unified German state. At the same time, negotiations on the German and Austrian issues

dragged on.

Subsequently, the policy of intractability of the Soviet Union led to the fact that peace treaties with Germany and Austria were never prepared during Stalin's lifetime, and the United States was forced to conclude a separate agreement with West Germany. Here it is appropriate to recall the fact that Stalin refused to sign the peace treaty that had been drawn up with Japan.

Did he not understand that such actions serve only one thing - the cause of forcing international

no tension? Was it really impossible to agree on compromise options? After all, everyone admits that any signed agreement, even if it

does not fully satisfy the parties by signing it all the same, many times better than the absence of speech, especially on important unresolved multilateral issues!

Actions of the USSR in the international arena after Stalin's death shows that there may not have been a post-war confrontation in the peace treaty negotiations. This is proved by the Soviet Union's attempts to put its signature on the peace treaty with Japan. But the United States, after all the "bullying" of international

international policy declared a categorical rejection, because of which the Soviet government was forced to sign an armistice, which turned out to be worse than it would have been in the case of the treaty. Moreover, it was necessary to "caress" the Japanese, promising to return the two southern Kuril Islands to them. In addition, after the death of Stalin, a peace treaty with Austria was developed and signed.

This shows that prior to March 1953, most international proposals from the United States and their allies for some reason turned out to be unacceptable to the USSR. And after that date, many of them became quite suitable, although the arms race intensified

the confrontation between the superpowers continued.

By the way, in March 1953, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Vyshinsky was demoted to Deputy Minister of this department and permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN. And after his death on November 22, 1954 (in New York during the dictation of his speech for a scheduled meeting of the General Assembly), another diplomat was appointed from the USSR to the UN from the USSR. (And on that day there was a slight embarrassment. In the chair of the Soviet mission to the UN, an American

microphone. The Americans determined that something had happened to the Soviet delegation, called by phone and offered help. The Soviet mission was surprised, assured that no help was needed, but Vyshinsky could not be saved - his heart gave out.) V. Molotov was again appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in 1953. The removal of Vyshinsky from the post of head of the Foreign Ministry can be regarded as a step by the USSR towards reducing international tension.

Vyshinsky was a proven conductor of the most odious steps of Stalin's policy. In addition, he could deliver long propaganda speeches. He became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1949, succeeding Molotov, who was also a proven conductor of Stalin's policy. However, in 1949, Stalin, for some reason, needed a very good propagandist as head of the Foreign Ministry. Vyshinsky coped with this task. His speeches to the UN General Assembly were

so long that they did not fit in one issue of the Pravda newspaper, they had to be printed in several issues (with a continuation).

But if you take a closer look at the foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union at that time, then the emergence of such a need is quite understandable. Indeed, when the countries of the West made not entirely frank international actions (for example, the creation of NATO), their diplomats did not feel very comfortable if they had to give intelligible explanations about this. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership, headed by Stalin

also took steps that were not entirely clear: it refused to sign an agreement with Japan, disrupted negotiations on the preparation of peace treaties with Germany and Austria, openly assisted the Chinese Communists in the civil war in China, established an "iron curtain" in Europe, etc. And also it was necessary somehow

misrepresent North Korea's attack on South Korea. In these conditions as head of the foreign policy department the Soviet Union just right needed a master propagandist dist.

At present, few people are already familiar with the role of Vyshinsky in the events of the Stalin era, so It makes sense for him to dwell on some stages from his biography (according to the TSB, 3rd ed., 1971, v. 5 and the book by A. Vaksberg "QUEEN OF EVIDENCE. VYSHINSKY AND ITS VICTIMS", Moscow: 1992). He was born on December 10, 1883 in Odessa. Since 1903, he joined the Mensheviks. Even before the revolution of 1917, he graduated from the law faculty of Kyiv University. In 1920, on the recommendation of Stalin, he was accepted as a member of the RCP (b). In 1925 (not without the participation of Stalin) he was "elected" rector of Moscow State University. On December 25, 1927, Academician V. M. Bekhterev, an outstanding neurologist, psychiatrist and psychologist, suddenly died, being healthy, vigorous and full of strength before his death. Subsequently, assumptions about his murder were published, based on circumstantial evidence. The funeral was entrusted to the rector of Moscow State University Vyshinsky.

In 1928, Stalin appointed him to the post of chairman of the Special Judicial Presence (and not the court, since Vyshinsky was not a judge, but for some time was fond of the practice of law). This body was required by Stalin to conduct the first openly orchestrated "Shakhtinsky" trial with execution sentences (although there were still few executions at that time - five of the 53 defendants). Then Vyshinsky for some time became Lunacharsky's deputy in the Narkompros (People's Commissariat of Education).

In the autumn of 1930, he participates in a new falsified trial of the Shakhtinsky type. Then 8 people were judged, the main of which turned out to be a prominent scientist, professor at Moscow Higher Technical School, one of the



of the first Soviet economic plan (GO ELRO) - Leonid Ramzin (he was also the main provocateur). For Vyshinsky, this trial turned out to be a kind of exam, which he successfully passed.

In May 1931, Vyshinsky moved to new positions - the Prosecutor of the RSFSR and the Deputy People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR. In June 1933, after the establishment of the All-Union Prosecutor's Office, he became Deputy Prosecutor of the USSR.

Clever and cunning Vyshinsky figured out Stalin's tactics: in words and paper to advertise the demo

cratic legal institutions, and under their cover it is really possible to do the opposite. Stalin, on the other hand, was convinced of his insight and devotion - this was the key to their union. Stalin really needed a legal justification for his lawlessness. Vyshinsky willingly

he clicked on the social order and helped him not only with deeds, but also became the greatest theoretician of the "legality of the class struggle." It was he who actively introduced into investigative and judicial practice (especially extrajudicial "triples") the idea of substantiating the guilt of the accused by the testimony of the accused themselves ("the queen of evidence"), and how to get them - it has already turned out

a matter of technology, for example, by the method of many hours

keeping the person under investigation in a sitting position on a stool without a top cover or lowering

heads of the person under investigation into a spittoon filled to the brim (these and many other examples of methods for obtaining "confessions" are shown in detail, for example, in Robert Conquest's book "GREAT TERROR"). Moreover, Vyshinsky expounded new ideas in his books and textbooks on issues of state and law ("SU DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR" (1939), "THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE IN SOVIET LAW" (1941), etc.). However, the authors of the third edition of TSB believe that *"in the theoretical works of Vyshinsky soder*

*serious mistakes are being made which ... have led to serious violations of socialist legality" (vol. 5, p. 574).*

But sorry, lawbreakers are usually criminals. So Vyshinsky was a theoretician of criminals? But his ideas could not be introduced into the practice of investigative and judicial bodies without the consent of the highest state leaders, in particular Stalin. It turns out that the chief of the criminals was Stalin? And how can it be called in one word? (For example, from the Italian language?) But more specifically, we will consider the methods of dealing with the Stalinist system with its own citizens later in a separate chapter, but for now let's return to the biography of you

Shinsky.

From June 1935 to June 1939 he worked at the post Prosecutor of the USSR. His name began to flash in the reports of newspapers and radio, entering into daily use. All the high-profile open falsified trials of the late 30s took place with his

financial participation, including as one of the directors. Moreover, if we compare the lists of figures of the October Revolution of 1917 and the lists of the

those who took place in the processes where the Prosecutor of the USSR Vyshinsky was the public prosecutor, then according to it turns out that the socialist revolution was accomplished by Lenin and Stalin, together with a huge army of police agents and foreign spies of all major capitalist countries. "Scum", "stinking carrion", "dung" - this is how Vyshinsky called those driven to the ska

mug of the defendants, former associates of Lenin, top leaders of the party and government, old Bolsheviks who had been in tsarist hard labor, in prisons and exile. And at the end of the proceedings in the cases of "enraged dogs" he demanded "to shoot all

up to one! (Which was done almost immediately, without any appeal.)

But by the end of the 1930s, terror against its own reached the level necessary for Stalin. New high-profile lawsuits were no longer required. Stalin shifts his main attention to the international arena, and Vyshinsky leaves the post of prosecutor.

In 1939, having received the title of academician, he goes to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Government of the USSR (he held until 1944). And in 1940 he became Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Foreign Affairs. In 1949, as mentioned above, raise it

whether in office up to minister.

The professional Soviet diplomat, Doctor of Historical Sciences V. L. Israelyan wrote about the methods of his work in the international arena in the journal NOVOE VREMYA, No. 41, 1988 (VYSHINSKY'S PROSECUTOR'S DIPLOMACY). Here are some quotes from

his articles:

*"Vyshinsky was not trusted, for official, friendly contacts, so important in diplomacy, with they did not suit him... Vyshinsky loved "public" diplomacy... At the 4th session of the UN General Assembly, he delivered 20 speeches, on the 5th - 26, on the 6th - 22. His speeches were, as a rule, long, some of they lasted 2-2.5 hours, or even more ... Vyshinsky branded, nailed to the pillory, humiliated, ridiculed. The controversy he started was confrontational. Vyshinsky, after in essence, he cared not so much about finding a mutually acceptable compromise, but about condemning the enemy ... [This fully applies to all the initiatives of the Soviet Union of that time]. By introducing, for example, UN proposal for a Peace Pact, Vyshinsky in his speech, he basically exposed NATO, the Marshall Plan, the policy of the USA and England, along the way*

*Mindanovite, and only at the end he reported on a new proposal of the USSR ... Moreover, the main emphasis was based not on a new constructive idea, but on a proposal to condemn the United States and Britain for preparing a new war. As a result, the proposal of the USSR led only to acute political confrontation ... A tendency to accusatory language, bordering on outright rudeness, to "terrible words" ... were in the very nature of Vyshinsky... Of course, such epithets as "mad dog", ... "pathetic bastard" and others, which he generously lavished on political processes in the USSR, at international forums he did not dare to put into circulation. But the "zealous warmonger", "rude falsifier", ... "vile slanderer" met in his speeches*

*all around... He declared that the head of the Australian delegation had cited facts that "are bazaar gossip and lies worthy of the famous Baron Munchausen", the speech of the Canadian delegate "was a cascade of curses and hysterical cries", the head of the Belgian delegation*

*utter nonsense." Vyshinsky allowed insulting attacks not only against direct participants in the negotiations, but also to the states they represented... [Drawing a picture of the world, he used only two colors - black and white]). Everything that pertains to the Soviet Union is excellent, excellent... As for the economic*

*situation in the West, it was characterized not otherwise than ... "deteriorating", "pre-crisis" ... The Englishman Shawcross said the following about Vyshinsky's style: "When the Soviet delegation extends the olive branch of peace, it does so in such an aggressive*

*others have a desire to accept it."*

In conclusion, V. L. Israelyan makes an interesting

conclusion that *"the style and essence of politics cannot be so divergent. Disrespectful remarks, ridicule politicians, their slander, ... are incompatible with the intention to establish good-neighborly relations with the states they represent. Swearing has never promoted, and cannot promote constructive cooperation."* In other words, Israelyan hints that Stalin's plans did not include friendly relations with a number of states. And Vyshinsky implemented such a policy with great success. And with a very great talent, as he had many ways

very important for a diplomat, politician and statesman. Andrei (Andrzej) Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky was an excellent orator, he knew three languages excellently (Russian, Polish, French), two more worse - English and German. Even before the revolution, he studied for a professorship at Kiev University (but was expelled for revolutionary activities, in particular, in 1908 he had to spend some time in the Bayil prison in the same cell with Stalin, and they often argued, since Vyshinsky was Menshevik). Some colleagues note Vyshinsky's amazing ability to immediately dictate documents of any degree of importance with such literary literacy that even immediately to print! (It was he who wrote the draft of Molotov's speech on the radio on June 22, 1941.) After a business trip to Latvia in the summer of 1940, he became deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs, and from the end of 1943 spent a lot of time on business trips abroad. Stalin trusted him very much. For example, immediately after the end of the war in 1945, Vyshinsky found himself at the head of a top-secret commission, which in the documents did not even have a specific name ("Government Commission for the Nuremberg Trials", "Commission

this for the leadership of the Nuremberg Trials" [!], etc.). Its main goal was to prevent under any circumstances from public discussion of any aspects of the Soviet-German negotiations, especially the existence and content of the secret protocols to the 1939 treaties. (Vyshinsky traveled to Nuremberg many times.) And it was not for nothing that he sat at the same table in Karlshorst with Marshal Zhukov during the signing of the German Surrender Act on May 8, 1945.

But on the other hand, all his life he was afraid to please after his victims of the 30s. All his life he had to adapt, intuitively feeling what was required of him. He could change his mind to the exact opposite, but to Stalin he

dealt, as a rule, with two draft documents, foreseeing solutions. In the UN, he could lie without being embarrassed. Ironically, his birthday (December 10) was declared International Human Rights Day by this organization. And Israelyan in his book gives the following result of his activities as the chief diplomat of the Soviet Union: *Vyshinsky's "prosecutor's diplomacy", along with other manifestations of the personality cult, helped to create the "image of the enemy." In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Gallup polls showed that most Americans believed that*

*soon they will be at war with the USSR."*

This was also facilitated by the inflating of the atomic danger in the press. In the USA at that time, not only textbooks for adults were published (such as "WHAT TO DO TO SURVIVE UNDER THE ATOMIC BOMB?"), but even atomic alphabets for children (A - atom, B - bomb).

Thus, the international situation in 1949 was already quite tense, passing into the state of the Cold War, which was growing through the efforts of both sides. But if Soviet historians

lead it from the speech of a "private person" (Churchill) in Fulton, Zagladin, for example, proposes a different periodization. He believes that *the* events from the summer of 1945 to the summer of 1947 can be called the period of preparation for the Cold War and writes: "The reason *for the final break, for the split of the world into two camps, was the conflict, political and With*

*US promotion of the "Marshall Plan" and the sharply negative attitude of Soviet diplomacy towards it.* This is also indicated by the year of the first use of the term "Cold War" (1947). Therefore, not all

so simple with that time, in contrast to the official explanation that existed for a long time. Za Gladin tried to change it in his book A HISTORY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY (1990). As far as 1945-1955 is concerned, he

Chennault considered in a new way in the chapters:

*"Who unleashed the Cold War?";*

*"Formation of a "peace camp";"*

*"The origins of the crisis of the military-bloc policy";*

*"On the edge of the nuclear abyss".*

They well and truthfully describe the history of socialist-capitalist international relations of those years. But it remains to be regretted that Zagladin did not see the true reason for the post-war Stalinist policy - the preparation of a new world war.

On the one hand, he notes that *"as the tension in relations between the USSR and the USA increased, more and more harsh formulas were used to characterize the "imperialist camp". Thus, G. M. Malenkov in 1949, in a speech dedicated to the 52nd anniversary of the October Revolution, attributed to the United States the intention to create "through violence and new wars of the world American empire" (p. 149). But then Zagladin explains that "tension in relations with the outside world turned out to be necessary for*

*maintaining the viability of the power structures that developed under Stalinism. At the same time in Stalin and his entourage were not interested in a war with the capitalist world" (p. 152).* A strange conclusion, considering that after Stalin's death much of domestic and foreign policy was revised. And this was done by the same "power structures"!

It should be noted that, anticipating his conclusion, Zagladin made a very brief overview of Stalin's domestic policy, giving a large place to terror in it. But in it, he saw only an element of the guide to saving who did not connect him with the covert mobilization program. In this book, a detailed review of terror with some conclusions will be given in the next chapter.

But Truman made a more realistic conclusion. On November 24, 1948, he approved National Security Council Directive 20/4. It stated that *"... the communist ideology and behavior of the USSR clearly show that the ultimate goal of the leaders of the USSR is world domination. US politicians were called upon to limit the power and influence of the USSR to such limits that he can no longer pose a threat to peace, national independence and stability of the world family of peoples"* (Zagladin's book, pp. 149, 150).

Unlike the leadership of the United States, Stalin not only carried out defense measures, but also ACTIVELY led the preparations for a new world war. And much more thoroughly, more systematically and against the backdrop of countless propaganda statements about the struggle for peace. At the same time, many measures were taken that provoked the West to complicate the international situation. In particular, in the summer of 1948, the Soviet Union established a land blockade of West Berlin in connection with the monetary reform carried out in June in the western sectors of occupation.



Germany. This step of Stalin once again created a threat to peace. The Americans organized an "air bridge". But their planes could be shot down. To che

Mu this could lead, even terribly imagine. And although the blockade was lifted in May 1949, international life deteriorated once again.

Stalin's attitude also speaks of the preparation of the war. to the UN Convention on Genocide and the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War.

December 9, 1948 The UN General Assembly under adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. And on August 12, 1949, the following four conventions for the protection of victims of war were adopted in Geneva:

- on improving the lot of the wounded and sick in the army;

- on improving the fate of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, from the armed

nyh forces at sea;

- on the treatment of prisoners of war;

on the protection of the civilian population in time of war.

All of them were signed by the Soviet Union in December 1949 (with minor reservations). But they were ratified only in March-April 1954! ("COLLECTION OF LAWS OF THE USSR AND DECREES OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME GO SOVIET OF THE USSR (1938-1975)", 1975, M., Izvestiya SDT USSR, vol. 2). Moreover, if in this "COLLECTION OF LAWS OF THE USSR ..." the Decree of the Supreme Council (SC) of the USSR on the ratification of the Geneva Conventions is given on the date of 04/17/1954, then in the third edition of the "BSE" it is said that the Geneva Conventions were ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Council USSR 04/17/1951! Typo? Or an example of an attempt to hide the unseemly behavior of the Soviet Union?

IN THE "LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY"

(M.: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1987) states that *"ratification" is the final approval of an international treaty by the highest body of the state.*

*It is embodied in two different acts: international legal and domestic".*

According to the first, "ratification" is the most authoritative establishes the final consent of the state to be bound by the ratified treaty. Internally, "ratification" gives

thief norms of domestic legal strength.

In other words, until 1954 the Soviet Union did not expressed his final agreement with all of you the above conventions. And they did not have domestic legal force for the USSR.

In this regard, when trying to accuse the Americans of violating the conduct of the war in Korea, Soviet propaganda had to recall the Hague Conventions of 1907 (in particular, in the Pravda newspaper from the end of 1950), and not those that were signed by the Soviet Union.

just a year ago.

And now it turned out that the issue of the Hague Conventions for the USSR at that time was also not resolved! The fifth volume of the TSB of the third edition (Moscow, 1971, p. 608) provides information about two peace conferences held in The Hague, about the laws and customs of war - 1899 and 1907. In 1899, 3 conventions were adopted: "On the Peaceful Settlement of International Clashes", "On the Laws and Customs of War on Land", "On the Application of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 10.08.1864 to Naval Warfare". In 1907, 13 conventions were already adopted, but their list is opened by the same "On the Peaceful Solution of International Clashes". The Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land is listed fourth.

The encyclopedia goes on to say that they all reflect

they reaped the level of military technology of the contemporary period. And the USSR recognized them to the extent that they do not contradict the UN Charter. However, in the second volume of the "UKRAINIAN SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA" (Kyiv, 1979, p. 420), the year of recognition of the Hague Conventions by the Soviet government is indicated - 1955!

Under what conditions is it not profitable for the state to recognize such documents? Only in one case - if an offensive war is envisaged, in which, among other things, heavy losses are expected both for servicemen at the front and for the civilian population. (For example, of the 9 million Korean dead, 84% were civilians.)

Indeed, a soldier can defend his land without any conventions. But if he is on foreign territory under difficult conditions (bad weather, shortages of supplies, encirclement, semi-encirclement, fierce head-on battles, etc.), then the presence of ratified conventions can have a weakening effect. Under these conditions, under the influence of skillful

enemy counter-propaganda may well appear the whole idea of surrender.

And the ground attack on the United States, by the way, Soviet troops could only lead in the very disgusting conditions of the Far North and the Arctic: through Alaska, the northern territories of Canada, the islands of Iceland and Greenland. (More specifically, the conversation about such plans will go further. Here, as a proof

We can recall what General Ostroumov wrote about the Stalinist task of creating 100 front-line bomber divisions: *"The geography of the search for air divisions' bases expanded every day.*

*Increasingly, operational groups of specialists flew to future base areas, including*

***northern coast, Chukotka, Kamchatka. Target -***  
*studying the possibilities of accommodating aviation, preparing*

construction of ice and stationary airfields, creation of reliable bases.”)

And about the attitude of the Stalinist government can be brought to international conventions specific documents (from the selection by N. Lebedeva "KATYN VOICES", the magazine "NOVY MIR", 1991, No. 2, p. 213):

**"STATEMENT OF DOCTORS AND PHARMACISTS -  
PRISONERS OF WAR STAROBELSKY CAMP**

**BERIA AND VOROSHILOV**

**Citizen Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR**

Doctors and pharmacists of the Polish army, concentrated in the prisoner of war camp in Starobelsk, Voroshilovgrad region, among 130 people (104 doctors and 26 pharmacists), allow themselves to tell you, Citizen Commissar, the following:

All doctors and pharmacists were caught by the Soviet troops in the performance of their medical duties, whether in hospitals or in military units. Based on the international Geneva Convention governing the rights of physicians and pharmacists during hostilities, we ask you, citizen commissar, either to send us to one of the neutral states (United States of North America, Sweden), or

send us to the places of our permanent place  
residence.

Starobelsk, October 30, 1939 ... (TSGOA USSR, fund 1, V / P, inventory 1a, d. 1 (Special case), sheet 173-174. Typescript). [A similar letter was sent to Marshal Voroshilov]. (TsGOA USSR - Central State Special Archive of the USSR.)

There is a note to this document in the article:

“... On November 4, the head of the Starobelsk camp, captain of state security A. G. Berezhkov, turned to Co

*prunenکو [Head of the NKVD USSR Directorate for Prisoners of War, Major] with a request to send him one a copy of the Geneva Convention "for your information and guidance in our practical work. They answered him: "The Geneva Convention of Physicians is not a document by which you should be guided in practical work. Be guided at work directives of the NKVD Directorate for Prisoners of War" (TsGOA USSR, f. 1 V / P, op. 2e, d. 10, l. 5, 73).*

By the way, not only doctors and pharmacists recalled international rules. And according to international laws, the USSR in 1939 should not have had any problems with the former servicemen of Poland. N. Lebedev, anticipating a selection of documents, writes (p. 208):

*"... About 130 thousand (Polish military personnel) were detained as prisoners of war by parts of the Red Army and operational detachments of the NKVD. And this despite that the USSR did not declare war on Poland. Under international law, the sole purpose captivity - to prevent the military personnel of the enemy army from their further participation in hostilities. But by the beginning of October (1939), the [military] operations were over. So for captivity Polish soldiers and officers had no legal grounds. Internment was also illegal... The transfer of prisoners of war from under the tutelage of the army to the NKVD" (within which 8 distribution camps were created for 10 thousand people each. The fate of the detainees turned out to be different, including in April-May 1940 15,131 people were shot or, according to other sources, 21,857) .*

And what was Stalin's attitude towards the citizens of his country? This is what the next chapter is about.

## WHERE MAN BREATHE SO FREELY.

The Soviet mass media actively tried to introduce the idea that the Soviet system was the most humane in the world. Songs, movies, books were written about it, newspapers wrote about it, and so on.

However, over time, the truth about the terror during Stalin's rule gradually made its way to the people. But most of the materials were devoted to the events of the thirties, especially the pre-war period *stood out*. The post-war years usually received less attention. Even in Robert Conquest's two-volume book "GREAT TERROR" (Riga, "Rakstni eks", 1991), only one small chapter is devoted to the period after 1945 ("*On the old rails*").

Moreover, in almost all studies on asking about the reasons for such an attitude of the leadership of the country We usually respond to our own people with Stalin's desire to achieve the unquestioning obedience of all to one (his) will. And also to eliminate any, even the smallest manifestations of the opposition. The English writer George Orwell even built many plot events on this in his famous novel "1984" (written, by the way, in 1948, i.e. after the war!). In the same novel, another theme of the Stalinist period is used - war (recall the slogan from it: "War is peace!"). However, in the novel they are

but do not intertwine.

And since the tasks of subordinating everyone to a single will and eliminating the opposition were solved in the 30s, the terror after 1945 is usually regarded as a simple continuation of the "usual" internal dictatorial policy. And no special attention is paid to its connection with the preparation of the war.

But do they really have no connection with each other? By Are we thinking whether it is possible to prepare hotbeds of tension and wage wars for many years with a peaceful mode of operation of one's industry and a peaceful attitude towards one's population? Or vice versa: is it really necessary to carry out terror against one's own with a completely peaceful attitude towards neighboring states and without any military training?

Everyone knows that under modern conditions it is impossible to successfully (victoriously) wage war without great preliminary preparation. In the pre-war years, the theorists of the Red Army worked out a list of necessary measures to be carried out in peacetime, the so-called "hidden mobilization." But it is a very complex and costly undertaking. It makes no sense to start it just like that. If the leadership of a country went for this, it means that it is planning a "hot" war in the future in perfect sense.

If we take a closer look at the actual sequence of events in the economy of the USSR on the eve and during the war, it turns out that the tightening of working conditions began not AFTER the attack of the Nazi troops, but BEFORE IT! And it was impossible to do this successfully without a preliminary launched terror. By the way, elements of terror were also widely used in Germany in domestic politics. And they also began before the subsequent militarization and aggression against neighboring states.

In addition, the lack of "supervision" over one's

rather than the threat of anti-war speeches during the war, especially if it lasts for a relatively long time. A clear example was shown by the First World War, when the activities of various parties led to the collapse of the monarchical regimes in Russia and Germany. Therefore, the conditions of terror not only help to force the population in the rear to work 12 hours,

but also prevent the emergence of various anti-war movements.

Thus, the policy of terror against their own can serve as an indicator of the real intentions of the leadership of a particular country in foreign policy. Inside the Soviet Union for use elements of terror, the Stalinist leadership increasingly used since the late 20s. But especially this process began to gain momentum from 1935, after the assassination of Kirov in December 1934 and the issuance of a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which allowed the accelerated consideration of criminal cases with the abolition of the possibility of defending and challenging sentences. It turned out to be in close proximity to the beginning of a big war, both according to Stalin's plan (07/06/1941) and according to the actual beginning (06/22/1941). Moreover, during the war, terror against "free" citizens of the USSR decreased, and the death penalty was even formally abolished. But after 1945 they did not abandon terror against their own people! Let's remember the title of the chapter from the book by Robert Conquest - *"To the old rails"*! And finally, mass terror within the USSR was stopped only after 1953!

Of course, from the late 1920s to the early 1950s, such an attitude towards one's own within the Soviet Union is rightly associated with the personality of Stalin. N. Khrushchev talked about this a lot at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. But the true reason for which Stalin took such actions remained unclear. This is sometimes explained by his "bloodthirstiness" or by the fact that he was



mentally ill, paranoid. True, for a long time I personally did not find a serious substantiation of Stalin's "non-normality", and met only a mention of this idea. And for some reason I was sure that Stalin's "case history" could not exist at all. But

suddenly I find it, and in one of the most popular publications - the circulation of this particular work turned out to be over 2 million copies. We are talking about the previously cited novel by Vladimir Uspensky "PRIVATE COUNSELOR TO THE LEADER", published by the "people's magazine" "ROMAN-GAZETA" (1992, No. 8-9). In it, the author, in the words of the protagonist of the book, quite seriously and in detail explains what the great dictator was ill with (pp. 7-8):

*"For many years I have been both practically and theoretically studied his illness, its symptoms and course. Different It manifests itself differently in people. Physicians know from at least three options. One of them, the most severe when the disease is continuous and hopeless. This is stable schizophrenia. Second: Seizures more or less periodic, in any case they can be anticipate, sometimes even stop. And, finally, the most common option: the disease proceeds weakly, secretly, a person is no different from healthy people, forgets, or even does not know about it the cross that bears. Seizures or "bursts" as they are called by specialists, they happen very rarely, under the influence of extraordinary mental shocks. Iosif Vissarionovich just had something similar.*

*What are the manifestations? ... Stiffness of movements, speech. Seemingly unreasonable outbursts of rudeness, cruelty. Or, on the contrary, excessive tenderness. fast, not weighted decisions, orders, as they say - "in the mood." It is very difficult to communicate with patients during the period of paranoiac disorder ... We must protect such people, of which there are many:*

*let them believe in us, in our care for them - this is very promotes recovery. With the so-called "ambulatory schizophrenia" they do not need hospitalizations. Scientifically speaking, "negative symptoms tend to compensate."*

And then the author clearly calls Stalin an "incomplete" schizophrenic. But V. Uspensky needed long discussions about his illness not in connection with the tragic events in the USSR since the late 1920s, but to justify Stalin's actions at the end of June 1941,

when he retired for a while.

Indeed, at the difficult moment of the enemy invasion, the departure from work of the very first leader, who "tied" the entire pyramid of power to himself, threatened with grave consequences. But Stalin retired

not for long, according to V. Uspensky - for the period of treatment from an attack that arose due to "unforeseen events that struck." But it has already been discussed above how "unforeseen" the fall of the Nazi Wehrmacht was. This is firstly, and secondly, until the medical commission recognizes the person as mentally ill (which leads to the legal status of "incapacity"), until then the person

considered normal and legally responsible for their actions. And no matter how some authors tried to discuss the problems of Stalin's illness, he was not officially recognized as sick, was not deprived of the status of "capacity", i.e. he is responsible for his decisions. In addition, Stalin communicated for many years

with revolutionaries since pre-revolutionary times nor, therefore, some of its qualities (which should include health problems) should have been known for a long time. For example, Robert Conquest in the first volume of THE GREAT TERROR (p. 192)

gives the following opinion of "one of the oppositionists" about Rykov:

*"For two decades to be with Stalin in an illegal party, in decisive days to carry out a revolution together with him, for ten years after the revolution to sit at the same table in the Politburo, and after that not knowing Stalin is really the limit!"*

On the one hand, many people knew him. But as it turned out, no one knew him very well. How about showing No proposed research, in achieving some goals, Stalin was quite logical and persistent, one might even say brilliant. But he was very secretive and therefore there could not be any "secret advisers from those who personally knew him" in nature.

But, drawing attention to the personal qualities of Stalin, it is useful to get acquainted not with his chronic diseases, but with character traits. For example, Robert Conquest in the book "GREAT TERROR" devoted a separate (third) chapter ("ORGANIZER AND INSPIRATOR") to the character of Stalin, in which not a word is said about his illnesses, but based on the memoirs of many associates, it is concluded that Stalin had excellent great memory, a strong will to the extreme, a rough sense of humor, was incredibly secretive, never told what was on his mind, especially in relation to political goals. Will, secrecy and good memory were complemented by good endurance. Combined with the experience of political work and the ability to understand people (one might say, at the level of instincts), they allowed Stalin to become an unsurpassed player in political maneuvers (including intrigues). He never took irreparable steps until he was absolutely sure of their success. But confidence could become the reason for his strongest perseverance, bordering on stubbornness. And incredible patience and calmness

Vie could be interrupted by sharp manifestations of discontent and even rage. However, this character is quite

is typical for players leading large risky games, and is not necessarily inherent only in mental patients, although one kind of "chronic illness" can be noted in him - short stature (about 160 cm). And one of his most important passions is very much you.

share the lust for power.

By the will of fate, having found himself among the top leadership of a great country, he achieved the highest actual position and made great efforts to strengthen his power. But the mass terror in the USSR in the 1920s and 1950s cannot be explained solely by the personal qualities of one person. The Russian tsars also had enormous power, but almost none of them were fond of wanton massacres of their own subjects with large-scale fooling. But it can be noted that the Russian tsars had hereditary power, it was not always necessary to defend it in the fight against comrades-in-arms. One of the relatives could kill - yes. Therefore, in order to preserve personal power, one can limit oneself to extreme measures only in a certain circle of interested persons. Stalin, however, not only organized terror throughout the country, but was the inspirer of all its economic and foreign policy. Therefore, the reasons for the Stalinist

terror cannot be sought only in the personal qualities or illnesses of its inspirer. Even Robert Conquest, who wrote a monumental work on the Stalinist terror, cannot determine what Stalin's true motives were. But in the chapter on his character, he cites an interesting fact from the life of a former Soviet rocket specialist, Professor Tokaev, who has lived in the West since the late 1940s.

In his book ("STALIN MEANS WAR", London, 1951, p. 115), Tokayev, according to R. Conquest, *"recalls several meetings*

*top Soviet leadership in connection with projects*

*intercontinental missiles. He brings the words  
Stalin that the project under consideration for  
makes it easier to talk to the great shopkeeper  
Harry Truman and squeeze him as much as necessary. After that,  
according to Tokaev, Stalin turned to him and made a "curious  
remark": "How  
You see, we live in a crazy time." about no one  
one of the Soviet leaders is not aware that he would express  
anything in a personal conversation other than  
direct and cynical desire to crush the West..."*

Strange, but for some reason none of the official historians do not see the relationship between the terror of the 1930s and 1950s and Stalin's desire to "crush the West". More often you are moved by the thought of the need for cheap labor. Here, for example, is a quote from the article "STATE TERROR IN SOVIET RUSSIA. 1923-1953 (SOURCE SOURCES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION)" (candidate of historical s B. Popov, DOMESTIC ARCHIVES magazine, 1992, No. 2, C. 20-31):

*"Against whom directed its mass terror  
a new state?... Firstly , a relatively low percentage of repeat  
offenders (16.6%  
before the war and 9-13% in the postwar years) speaks of  
the absence of "criminal inclinations" of the people and  
reflects the uninterrupted work of the repressive  
assembly line, constantly replenishing the camps with new labor.  
And this was the main thing... Thirdly, the mobilization of men to  
the front doomed women to  
hard physical labor. The proportion of women among those  
convicted after the end of the victorious war doubles (from 17.2  
to 31.1-39.5%) "-*

But the whole history of mankind has shown the inefficiency of slave labor (or those same prisoners)! All the more so since the dates in the very title of my quoted article show that this argument (cheap labor) somehow ceased to be important after 1953.

On the other hand, let us recall that any war presupposes a deterioration in the standard of living of the bulk of citizens. And vice versa, the higher the level of well-being and observance of human rights, the less the consent of the population to part with them, especially the willingness to die decreases. But the higher the technical level of weapons, the more troops will be destroyed. And in a nuclear war, losses in general should be in the millions. Thus, a sharp drop in living standards can lead to unrest in society. And in order to avoid them, it is necessary in advance

conduct appropriate training.

In addition, the "covert mobilization" itself leads to a deterioration in well-being and to violations of human rights: this is an increase in the duration of the working time, and any restrictions on the existence of non-military structures (music, culture, higher education, high development of medical care, especially in the countryside), etc.

Under these conditions, terror against one's own becomes one of the main elements of "hidden mobilization." It solves several problems at once. He allows:

- force people to endure any suffering;
- force people to work where they are told, and do to do what is indicated;
- ensure that people agree to work for low salary (in the "freedom") or generally free of charge (in camps);
- to provide important military construction and production facilities with working hands (especially at the expense of free prisoners);
- to achieve a sufficient quality of work (at least in military production);
- to ensure the readiness of people to die on the "free" front and, most importantly, in the event of an OFFENSIVE war on FOREIGN territory! My

normal people usually defend the land without compulsion. It may be required for fights ABROAD!

Accordingly, it is possible to pay less attention to the well-being of people (anyway, many of them will die due to various circumstances). Conversely, it is possible to direct the economy entirely to preparing for war.

And now let's digress a little from the post-war period and remember what Viktor Suvorov wrote in the book "DAY-M" about the situation in the economy of the USSR before the war of 1941 (in the chapter "On the gains of October"):

*"In 1939, mandatory norms were introduced on collective farms output: the collective farm is voluntary, but the norm is not do it - plant. On May 27, 1940, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars "On increasing the role of the foreman at heavy engineering plants" broke out ... The foreman at the plant was endowed with rights no less than a company commander foreman ... On June 26, 1940, a new decree "On the transition to an eight-hour work day" thundered over the country. day, for a seven-day working week and the prohibition unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions "... On the same day - another resolution of the Council of People's Commissars "On increasing the norms of output and price cuts"... Decrees come in succession. 10th of August 1940: "On criminal liability for petty theft at work" - camp terms for a screwdriver, for a nut carried away in your pocket ... Each decree 1940 generously poured terms, especially truants... I have heard the discussions of communist professors many times: was not Stalin a paranoiac? Here, they say, there is evidence of his mental illness: he put communists in prisons ... No, Comrade communists, Stalin was not paranoid. Great landings are needed so that after them the decrees of 1940 are introduced, and so that no one utters a word. The Decrees of 1940 are the final translation of the eco*

*nomics of the country to the wartime regime. This is mobilization. The labor legislation of 1940 was so perfect that during the war it was not necessary neither correct nor supplement it ... "*

The appearance of various pre-war decrees is also confirmed by testimonies. Here, for example, is the memoir of L. M. Gurvich from the book "... TO HAVE SOMETHING TO REMEMBER". In September 1940, he received a camp term and was sent to Sevzheldorlag. For a month he had to live in the Kotlas transit camp, which received replenishment by echelons almost daily. *"One echelon - more than a thousand people - came with convicts according to a new decree (we*

*did not know). For swearing and other petty hooliganism planted for a year. They were mostly workers and collective farms.*

*Nicky."*

Thus, it can be noted that the mechanism of terror was worked out in detail before 1941, and it was no longer necessary to invent something new. Even so, any citizen of "the most humane country on the planet" at any time of the day could be arrested for the most insignificant reason, or even without it.

In particular, even after the war, Stalin practiced mass executions according to lists. D. Volkogonov in his book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" notes that they could contain thousands of names. According to the post-war period, there is evidence of the famous Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov in the article "LISTS TO SHOOTING"

(magazine "NEW TIME", 1992, No. 47). He recalls that in July 1952 he was summoned by Alexander Fadeev and offered to sign a similar list with the names of writers arrested in the late 1940s in connection with the Jewish case. Simonov explains that the lists for execution were drawn up according to the professional affiliation of the unfortunate and were sent to the leadership of departments ("in a circle") for signature.



Of course, it would be possible to shoot without any coordination with the departments. But by this method, Stalin achieved even greater devotion from various leaders, who were forced to be afraid of getting into such lists themselves. But not everyone survived. For example, Simonov notes that in the last years of his life, Fadeev developed a clear triangle: office-hospital-sanatorium. In the sense that he periodically took to drink, ended up in a hospital, then in a sanatorium, from where he returned to work for a while until the next drinking bout. And there is a suspicion that the first post-war Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yumashev, was replaced by N. G. Kuznetsov because of a similar reason.

For reference: A. Fadeev was born in 1901, in 1946-1954. was General Secretary of the Union of Writers of the USSR, since 1950 - Vice-President of the World Peace Council, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1939-1956). He committed suicide on May 13, 1956 (three months after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, at which Stalin's personality cult was exposed).

Konstantin Simonov in 1946-1954 was Fadeev's substitute in the USSR Writers' Union, and in 1950-1954 he was also the editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta.

But in any business there are no limits for perfection. Including the mechanism of terror after 1941, changes were made. One of the meanings of this process is noted by V. Popov in the article already cited above: *"The peculiarity of the punitive policy of the state consisted in the creation of special decrees, which not only supplemented the list of "criminal acts", but also **contributed to the increase in crime in the country**".*

Firstly, by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 19.04. 1943, which was not published, a special type of punishment was introduced - hard labor for a term of 10 to

20 years for fascist murderers, traitors, accomplices to the invaders. It was used by courts-martial. But after the war, their role was taken over by the Special Conference, whose decisions were not subject to any appeal. Some sentences to hard labor after 1945 were approved personally by Stalin. (The Special Conference did not long survive it—it was abolished in September 1953.)

Secondly, the role of forced labor increased due to the tight deadlines and huge volumes of work to restructure industry for the creation and production of modern technology. D. Volkogonov writes about this as follows:

*"All the activities of Stalin were subordinated to the buildup of economic and defense power ...  
A significant part of the Gulag was dedicated to defense work. Often government assignments  
many ministers started with the "usual" first step - they turned to Beria:*

*"To Comrade Beria L.P.*

*Considering the exceptional need to build a research base in the east, I ask for your instructions to the Minister of the Interior  
comrade Kruglov on the opening of a TsAGI branch on the site camps from among the prisoners of the Siberian camps in the amount of 1000 people. 07/23/1946. N. Khrunichev.*

*Or even more cynically:*

*"To Comrade Beria L.P.*

*To expand construction, I ask you to organize another camp for 5,000 people, allocate 30,000  
meters of tarpaulin for making tents and 50 tons of barbed wire. 03/22/1947. A. Zademidko" ("TRIOUFM AND TRAGEDY", vol. 2, pp. 484-485).*

Volkogonov managed to meet with one of the two authors of these appeals - Zade midko - and writes that he explained such actions simply: *"the time was*

*like that.*" It was such that the increase in the need for prisoners led to the need to make appropriate changes to the legislation. That is

punishing decrees and resolutions continued to be issued even after the war.

So, in January 1948, Stalin instructed the minister Internal Affairs of the USSR S. Kruglov to think over "specific measures" to create new, additional camps and prisons for special purposes. And he demanded a draft decision already in February, which was developed by mid-February 1948. It said that

"Trotskyists, terrorists, rightists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, white émigrés" should be sent to dozens of new camps in Kolyma, near Norilsk, in the Komi ASSR, Yelabuga, Karaganda and other places. At the same time, the convicts were ordered to carry out *"Chekist work to identify those who*

*stayed free."*

In addition, the administrations of the camps and prisons were allowed *"if necessary, to delay the release of prisoners with the subsequent clearance in the manner prescribed by law"* (Stalin agreed ). (D. Volkogonov, "TRIOUFM AND TRAGEDY", pp. 429-430).

But this statutory violation of the law was not the last. On November 26, 1948, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued on the fate of those who had already served their term, survived and were released. D. Volkogonov gives only his date and a very brief meaning of the FOREVER REFERENCE (p. 636).

And here are the testimonies of eyewitnesses included in the collection "... TO HAVE THE POWER TO REMEMBER" (Stories of those who went through the hell of repressions). M.: Moskovsky worker, 1991).

IN AND. Velmin, a member of the CPSU since 1926. Before his arrest in September 1937, he worked in the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. He gives an approximate classification of the arrested from the point of view of the investigators: *"terry enemies,*

*just enemies, enemy, enemy accomplices, enemy agents, blind performers, etc.*" In the autumn of 1944, he was released from the Kargopolag ahead of schedule, but continued to work there. Then he was arrested again in 1950 (*"like almost all those who were repressed in the 1930s"*). In December 1950, he went by stage from Arkhangelsk to a permanent settlement in Siberia (Novosibirsk region) with the deprivation of all rights and status. *"The exile turned out to be worse than the camp. At the camp*

*at least there is a hut, there are bunks, twice a day give a gruel with a piece of bread. And then no one about you thinks and does not care about you. If you want - live, do not if you want, don't live! There is nowhere to work."* In 1954 life

facilitated, in 1956 they rehabilitated.

N.P. Aleksakhin, a member of the CPSU since 1932. Before his arrest in 1937, he worked as an assistant to the 1st secretary of the MK RCP (b) N. S. Khrushchev. He spent 8 years in camps in Kolyma. After his release, he settled in the town of Strunino, Vladimir Region (102 km from Moscow). In the winter of 1949 he was again arrested. After six months, the prisons announced the decision of the Special Meeting on a living settlement in the Udereisky district of the Krasnoyarsk Territory. There he stayed until rehabilitation in 1955.

year.

To P. Chudinova, member of the CPSU since 1914, until his arrest on 10.04. 1938 worked as 1st Secretary of the Sverdlovsk District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Moscow. Sentence - 8 years in prison under Articles 58-10 and 58-11. Before being released in January 1947, she was in Taishetlag. But they were released not completely, but into exile for 5 years. She settled in the village of Suetikhe (12 km from Taishet). However, in the summer of 1949, she and a large group of exiles were again arrested and sent to Krasnoyarsk. Then they brought them by stage to the village of Motygina, Udereisky District, Krasnoyarsk Territory, where they announced the decision of the Special Conference on the life exile "as previously repressed." Ra

Bot was allowed in the geological expedition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1954 they rehabilitated.

A more detailed analysis of the re-arrest is given by L. M. Gurvich, a member of the CPSU since 1926, arrested in 1938 and sent to Sevzheldorlag, who was entrusted with the construction of a railway from Kotla to the west through Konosha to Cherepovets. In the middle of 1946 he was released "without the right to leave the camp." And then the following happened:

*"In 1949, some strange arrests began. They took those released from the camps, but infrequently, and at first it seemed that these were isolated cases. Was anxiously... In May, it was my turn. Again arrest... The camera of the Novosibirsk transfer turned out huge: more than 200 people fit in it ... There were no criminals, only the 58th article. But quite different than in the past. "Bandera" prevailed, peasants from Western Ukraine ... Quite a pain. The largest group in the cell was made up of "followers" from different regions of Siberia, the Urals, and some other regions ... We did not know then that the entire country had begun a systematic, carefully thought-out operation that didn't pass anyone by seizing the "enemies of the people". She carried out gradually, without haste, without excessive overcrowding of prisons and was calculated approximately for 2-3 years ... Only much later, having learned all on ourselves, the essence of the new massacre became clear to us ... Most of the victims of the 1930s died in the camps. But some part of the conclusions survived. She made only a percentage of the millions crushed by the camps however, the number of survivors was not so very small. But the long-awaited freedom for them was immediately limited by a ban on living in the capitals, the 100 km zone around them, in dozens of others cities. With great difficulty, overcoming all sorts of obstacles, people settled down, came to life. Folding*

*there were new families. The nightmares of the experience seemed to gone into the past. Then the thunder boomed. In 1948 a decision was made. According to him, previously repressed on political charges were subject to life-long concentration in specially allotted most deaf and sparsely populated regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan. Without the direct and decisive participation of Stalin such a large operation could not take place. Whole in its essence, it reflected the Stalinist methods and aggravated the situation in the country even more ... Stalin's exiles were not supposed to receive any allowance. Other there was almost no work except heavy physical work in the places of settlement. Not allowed to work in schools, clubs, at the post office, in most local institutions, not only for exiles, but also for members of their families..."*

The amnesty of 1953, announced shortly after Stalin's death, did not affect the exiles for life, at least not immediately. Then only the criminals were released. Some relief for the exiles came in 1954, and then many were released altogether. But the Amnesty Decree of 1953 has apparently been applied to the release of exiles since 1954. This was written in the memoirs of Professor Yu. I. Chirkov (1919-1988), Doctor of Geographical Sciences. ("IF EVERYTHING WOULD BE SO." M.; Politizdat, 1991).

He was arrested in 1935. In prisons, camps and spent on conditional release until the end of 1945. In May 1951 he was again arrested. The investigator explained the reason for the new arrest as follows: *"There is a decision - all those who were serving sentences under Article 58 again attract, conduct an investigation and, if there are no violations passport regime, giving the right to a new term, send to link.* Chirkov was sent to the Krasnoyarsk Territory for an eternal settlement. In exile, he learned that the decree had been issued in 1948. And according to him not only re-arrested previously released

to freedom, but also immediately automatically sent into life exile those who, by the time of their release, formation ended with camp or prison terms. Chirkov emphasizes that the eternal settlers were actually in the position of slaves at local enterprises, since they had to live and work where the local authorities indicated. Moreover, it was the concern of the exiles themselves to feed and clothe themselves. Yu. I. Chirkov was released on May 28, 1954, with the conviction expunged in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Court of March 27, 1953. But it was, as it were, forgiveness (amnesty). Complete rehabilitation was carried out in December 1955 by a review of the case by the Tribunal of the Moscow Military District on December 8, 1955 "in the absence of elements of a crime."

Thus, the idea heard by Yu. Chirkov back in 1938 in the Kotlas transit point is quite suitable for the post-war period: *"They said as if Yezhov said that the entire population of the USSR is divided into three categories: prisoners, untried and suspects."*

Moreover, about the situation of those who remained on freedom, the Soviet government, headed by Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, did not show too much concern. Especially about the situation in the countryside. N. Khrushchev, in his report on the cult of personality at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, cited evidence that Stalin was going to increase taxes on peasants even more, despite the fact that those who were at that time were already cruel.

Of course, one cannot say that Stalin was not interested in agriculture. However, the measures that undertook, were sent to turn the peasants into unquestioning slaves, to destroy the very spirit of the "free cultivators". But this was not entirely possible. The reason was PRI itself

KIND, not subject to laws and decrees. Apparently, this is why, in October 1946, the Council for Collective Farm Affairs was created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (it was abolished in March 1953) in order to create the appearance of concern for the country's leadership about the countryside. A. A. Ande became its chairman rays.

Although, of course, one of the important places in the subjugation of the peasants was played by various measures of violence. And not only the ominous 58th article of the Criminal Code or pre-war decrees. After the war, new ones came out in addition to them. Here, for example, what message is given in the report of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR

S. Kruglov to Stalin and others dated 09/13/1948 on the results of the implementation by this ministry of the Decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 02/21/1948 and 06/2/1948:

*The collective-farm peasantry is actively exposing at general meetings of loafers and parasites and unanimously decides to deport them to remote regions of the country."*

Penal measures played an important role because at that time there was a very cruel agricultural tax, which involved deductions from all conceivable and unimaginable incomes of the peasants received from all branches of agriculture: the field of vodka, animal husbandry, hayfields, vegetable gardens, tobacco vodstva, crops of industrial and oil-bearing crops, orchards, berry fields, vineyards, etc. The real incomes of the majority of peasants were significantly less than the tax salaries inflated by the financial authorities. His overwhelm led to a decrease in livestock livestock in private farms, cutting down by peasants of their gardens and bushes. They couldn't understand what was happening. Many tried to find the "truth", wrote unanswered letters to the Council for Collective Farm Affairs. These facts are given in the journal "SOVIET ARCHIVES", 1991, No. 4 (article "THE PEOPLE ARE IN A BAD MOOD



THIS IS A FACT..." (Peasant Letters of the Postwar Period), p. 62-71, compiled by V.P. Popov).

In the preface he writes: "... Of great interest is the period after the end of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The whole village was waiting for change, in soul hoping that after the war much will be possible change for the better. Contrary to expectations, the conditions of rural life not only did not improve, but became surpass (in severity?) the years of war hard times. The only real form of survival still remained a "semi-underground" life, double lines of behavior. Since 1950, the number of rural residents, for example, in the Russian Federation became decline steadily, despite compensatory growth after the war. That was the response of the villagers to an emergency grip on the village.

Further in the article, some letters are given that have been preserved in the archives of the former Council for Collective Farms. The best analysis of the state of affairs is made in an anonymous letter from "a group of leaders of the collective farms of the Kirov region", written in October 1948. The commentary says that the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to find its author. Here are some quotes from the letter:

"... We very much wish that an authoritative government commission with for the purpose of verifying the facts. We want to go ahead inform that this commission ... in practice would be convinced of how the ordinary collective farmer lives and what he eats, eking out in his overwhelming majority half-starved existence ... In most collective farms of the region, all the grain is pumped out in the order of bread blanks without leaving grain for seeds without speaking already about the forage fund ... Many chairmen and foremen of collective farms have been imprisoned only for that they gave out grain in excess of 15% of what was handed over to the state, satisfying the minimum requirements

starving collective farmers who could not do even light work ... As a rule, from the new year the collective farmer has nothing to eat, his body is depleted ... If it were not for the household plots, on which the collective farmer is now sowing grain, many collective farmers would die of exhaustion. Having the right to life, the collective farmer is forced to find bread. Goes to the area They don't sell bread there. In agricultural areas, the abolition of the card system is not felt. Previously, bread was sold on ration cards, now it is on lists and only for those working in institutions and organizations. where to go farmer for bread? Only in the regional center - city of Kirov. And they go. There are collective farmers for 60-100 km, to buy one or two loaves of bread... Mood urban workers are no better than rural workers. Dumas and their aspirations are focused on questions: how to buy bread, so as not to remain hungry ... Cost life of the working people of the city is extremely high. Wages received for the average worker and office worker enough for 5-10 days, and the remaining 20-25 days he is on a half-starved ration, not to mention buying clothes... Our suggestions:

1. Reduce grain supplies ...

2. Raise the standard of living of collective farmers. Leave the required amount of bread for the collective farmer. Zain to interrogate the producer of bread and not leave him hungry.

3. Sell less bread abroad, feed satisfy your people.

4. Reduce the tax burden..."

How blasphemous in this connection Stalin's New Year's wishes to the Japanese peasants for 1952 "to be freed from high taxes" look!

But as soon as Stalin died, high taxes were also reduced from the Soviet peasants from 07/01/1953

Yes, according to the Law "On Agricultural Tax" adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 8, 1953 ("Code of Laws of the USSR". M.: Izvestia, 1984, vol. 5, pp. 473-477). According to it, collective farmers began to pay tax at fixed rates from one hundredth of a hectare of land that is in personal use. And regardless of the total amount of income. In addition, many benefits were envisaged and, in general, a "significant reduction" in the final amount of tax (compared to previous years). This can be compared with the transition from surplus to tax in kind in the early 1920s after the Civil War. But 1953 is not formally considered a "post-war year." The Great War for the USSR ended 8 years ago. Why then the state of emergency? Is it only for the fastest restoration of the national economy, as the official Soviet historiography assured? But even that explanation doesn't quite fit. After all, the "economic wounds of the war" were officially "healed" earlier, sometime around 1950. But the "surplus appraisal" continued until 1953. And it is not clear why it was replaced with a "prod tax" if the Cold War and the arms race did not stop. Strange thing: "threat" from Za

For this reason, the Soviet nuclear missile forces are rapidly developing, the Warsaw Pact military bloc is being created (in 1955), and for some reason the emergency situation inside the USSR has ceased?

Now about the workers, about the "improvement" of their well-being. For many years after Stalin, the people retained the memory (including in the form of securities - bonds) of post-war MANDATORY loans for the restoration of the national economy, the payments of which were "frozen" by Khrushchev for 20 years. In the 60s, 70s and early 80s, it was sometimes possible to

hear indignant statements about what, behold,

they say, they signed up for whole salaries, tore them away from themselves, and what did he (Khrushchev) do? Deceived!

But it turns out that the system of government loans is not a post-war invention. They were before the war. It turns out that with their help the Soviet state successfully withdrew part of the money issued to the workers, including for work in a widely used overtime.

In this regard, in the book "Day-M" there is an interesting conclusion: *"And then ... you begin to understand the meaning of the Great Stalinist purge. Stalin needs the best aircraft you, the best tanks, the best guns, and that's all - within the Stakhanov deadlines and in such a way that funds for development don't spend a lot. And here the designers sit by prisons, by "sharagas" ... The deputy recalls Tupolev G. Ozerov: "Volnyag" was transferred to a mandatory ten-hour working day, most Sundays they also work. Confidence in the inevitable war is ripening among the people, people understand this rum..."*

And this is in 1940! Strange thing: the people of the war waited, moreover, as a result of measures taken by the government. But for the government itself, the German attack was unexpected! Then for what kind of war was SUCH preparation made? And why was the same policy pursued after the war? The same loans, the same "sharags", the growth of camps, the hasty development of the best weapons in the world and their production in the Stakhanov period?

But if we remember that in the age of the scientific and technological revolution, new weapons are rapidly aging, then we get an unambiguous answer to these questions - all this was done with the aim of unleashing a new world war in the near future!

And thanks to the atmosphere of the constant threat of arrest for the most insignificant reasons, there were practically no

or unrest among the population. Pre-war corners  
New legislation was supplemented and improved. "As needed"  
issued new decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of  
the USSR. And politi

ka terror was carried out not only for the sake of subjugation  
broad working masses and reducing the cost of their well-being.  
Another goal was pursued - to subdue a large number of  
economic leaders who had significant opportunities to disrupt  
the activities of the central government. Moreover, such an  
opportunity was not just there, it manifested itself in the early  
1930s. And Stalin clearly saw that without a general atmosphere  
of fear it would be very difficult to organize the mass production  
of industrial products for a specific purpose.

at the lowest cost, with the best quality in the world and in the  
shortest possible time. Such products, as already shown above,  
can only be weapons and property for the troops. Moreover,  
under the condition of rapid use for its intended purpose.  
Manufacturing the best washing machine in the world does not  
require frantic deadlines. The washing machine does not quickly  
become obsolete - if only it was washing. But military equipment  
usually tends to quickly become obsolete, and property  
deteriorates, which can lead to failure to complete a combat  
mission if the enemy has equipment of the same quality or

the best.

And if the leadership of the country seriously plans to start a  
big war in the near future, then it becomes necessary to create  
such an atmosphere in society that none of the directors of plants  
and factories can resist any production plans and tasks of the  
government. A developed democracy always carries the threat of  
raising doubts about the correctness of its measures. In the  
context of preparations for an imminent major war, this is  
unacceptable. And such a possibility

ness in the USSR existed until the early 1930s. The story of the "Ryutin platform", which is rarely paid attention to, can serve as proof. Considering the high-profile falsified trials of the 30s, historians paid more attention to the trials of prominent party figures of that period - G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev,

N. Bukharin and others. However, the list of charges brought against him included participation in Ryutin's "conspiracy", although Martemyan Ryutin did not belong to the top party leadership group and was convicted as early as October 1932.

He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1914. In 1924-1928. worked as secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district party committee of Moscow. At the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1927 he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee. Together with Stalin, he participated in the struggle against the "new" and Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition. However, after 1927, he did not agree to the application of emergency measures to the peasantry, in connection with which he was accused of conciliating with the "rightists" and released from his work as secretary of the district party committee. In 1929, Ryutin went as a representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for collectivization to Eastern Siberia (which he knew well, since at one time he took an active part in the formation of Soviet power in the Baikal region). Returning to Moscow, he wrote a note to the Politburo of the Central Committee with information about the facts of violence and excesses in collective farm construction. It angered Stalin and L. Kaganovich (who was in charge of agricultural issues). And although Ryutin soon saw his main thoughts on the pages of Pravda in Stalin's article "Dizziness from Success" and in a letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the fight against curvature mi party lines in the collective farm movement", negative from attitude towards Ryutin intensified. Soon, a statement was received against him in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) with information that he

speaks sharply negatively about the policy of the Central Committee of the party headed by Stalin. It served as the basis for initiating a criminal case on his charge of counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation. But in January 1931 he was released due to lack of evidence. For the last year and a half before his new arrest in September 1932, he worked as an economist in the Soyuz

electro".

In March 1932, being concerned about the widespread gross violations of internal party democracy, the planting in the leadership of party and state affairs of administrative

command methods, he prepared two documents: "Stalin and the crisis of the proletarian dictatorship" and an appeal "To all members of the CPSU (b)". Other old members of the party also took part in editing them - M.

S. Ivanov (member of the party since 1906), V. N. Kayurov (member of the party since 1900) and his son A. V. Kayurov (member of the party since 1914). Then they began to spread their ideas among other communists and found like-minded people. On August 21, 1932, a kind of constituent assembly took place in the village of Golovino near Moscow, at which its participants decided to create a political organization called the Union of Marxist-Leninists. The main goal of its activity for the nearest

In the past, the participants in the new union began to consider the distribution of their documents among the members of the CPSU(b). But this path was fraught with the threat of failure if anyone would inform the leadership of the CPSU (b) about this. And so it happened: on September 14, 1932, the Central Committee of the party received an application against the "Ryutin group", and the next day the leaders of the new "union" were arrested.

For a long time, the documents of the "Ryutin group" were not published until they appeared in 1991 in the collection "REHABILITATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES OF THE 30-50S" (under the general editorship of A. N. Yakovlev). In him

a detailed description of the course of the investigation and the liquidation of the participants in the "union" is also given. But due to the fact that they could not achieve any serious results in their struggle, no special attention was subsequently paid to their activities. But the very fact of the emergence of such a group greatly excited Stalin,

and he remembered it for many years.

First, in the "platform of the Ryutin group" there are many place was given to listing his shortcomings, his desire for unlimited personal power and fear for the fate of the country and its citizens. Of the 12 sections of the "platform", the first four are devoted to an analysis of Stalin's character and methods:

1. *"Randomness" and the role of personality in history.*
2. *Stalin as an unprincipled politician.*
3. *Stalin as a sophist.*
4. *Stalin as leader and theoretician.*

Other sections cited evidence of a crisis both in the party and in the country and called for slow down the pace of industrialization, stop violence against the peasantry and take care of improving the well-being of citizens. And the main condition for getting out of the current situation was considered the removal of Stalin from power. Moreover, the authors of the "platform" do not refuse

were called from the idea of building socialism, communism and world revolution. However, during the investigation The members of the "union" were blamed for calling for the overthrow of Soviet power, and not just for threatening Stalin. But she wasn't the only one who bothered him.

Let's see who was among the founders of the "union" according to positions:

- Head of the group of the People's Commissariat of the RCT of the RSFSR M. S. Ivanov;

- Secretary of the Board of Soyuzmoloko N.P. Kayurova;

- Director of the 26th Moscow Printing House P. A. Gal

kin;



- Professor of the Moscow Peat Institute P. P. Fedorov;
- Director of the trust "Kinomekhprom" Soyuzkino V. B. Gorelov;
- Head of the Department of the People's Commissariat of Supply of the Ukrainian SSR B. M. Ptashny;
- Manager of the Giprokoks association N. I. Vasil'yev;
- his deputy S. V. Tokarev.

Thus, it turns out that in the early 1930s, dissatisfaction with the methods of rapid industrialization manifested itself among economic leaders, on whom the pace of this very industrialization depended in the first place. And this was not the first manifestation of discontent. Back in 1930, similar concerns were voiced by the chairman of the SNK (government) of the RSFSR, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU(b) Syrtsov and member of the CC of the CPSU(b) Lominadze. They enlisted the support of a number of local party secretaries. Both of them were expelled from the party in December 1930. Lominadze committed suicide in 1935.

What did this threaten Stalin with? There was no particular threat to his personal power within the USSR. But the hopes for a world revolution were sharply hampered, the peaceful ways of accomplishing which Stalin did not see at all, hoping only for a new world war. But a world war requires huge costs. From this follows the need

the ability to completely subjugate economic commands

ditch. But this can be done in two ways: by material incentives for both directors and workers (which require large sums of money, which in the event of war can be uselessly lost) or by threats. Stalin chose the second path.

And in order to consolidate and develop an atmosphere of fear, he began to intensify the policy of terror. And the first

blows were carried out against the working masses and against economic leaders at the level of directors of enterprises. A good reason for strengthening police control over the country was the murder of Kirov on December 1, 1934, whose killers Stalin suggested looking for among the former members of the Zinoviev opposition. Two and a half months after

On December 1, 1934, 843 people were arrested by the NKVD in Leningrad alone. But soon the cases of 77 arrested persons (of which 65 were communists)

or in a separate proceeding, which received the name "The case of the Leningrad counter-revolutionary Zinoviev group of Safarov, Zalutsky and others."

Among the defendants on it were students, and housewives, and workers. This created the appearance of the scale and branching of the "conspiracy". But as

The new group consisted of managers or specialists sheets of the main management link, for example:

- Deputy Governors of Lenkozhrest A. I. Alexandrov and V. A. Vinogradov;

- factory manager Zhelyabova S. I. Bogachev;

- Director of the plant "Engine" V. A. Brodsky;

- Head of the office "Soyuztransstroy" N. A. Dmit

riv;

- head of Stroytrest G. M. Dryazgov;

- Manager of the trust "Stroymashina" P. A. Zalutsky;

- Director of "Lensnabtrans" I. S. Kostitsky;

- Director of the bakery No. 12 G. I. Mironov;

- Director of aircraft plant No. 20 I. K. Naumov;

- Head of the Group of Plant No. 103 G.P. Potashnikov

and others.

As a result of the first trial, out of 77 people, 76 were imprisoned in concentration camps or exiled for terms of 4 to 5 years. G. I. Safarov was appointed for expulsion for a period of 2 years. But most of them

later they were shot or died in places of detention (collection "REHABILITATION ...", pp. 123-130).

In parallel with this case, the Moscow Center case was also falsified, in which 19 people were convicted, of which almost all before arrest.

also held senior management positions. But Stalin did not stop there, and by the beginning of the war, the atmosphere of fear had become an element of the ordinary life of every citizen of the USSR. It also continued after 1945, testifying to Stalin's attempts to bring the world revolution closer by unleashing a new world war. In most of the country, the people were subdued and offered no resistance.

However, the residents of the new Western republics and regions of the USSR, who had become acquainted with the "humanism" of the Soviet government before June 1941, did not agree with this. After 1945, they did not meekly wait for their fate, and many of them took up arms. But this is a topic for another, large, separate conversation. Here I propose to read an eloquent excerpt from the memoirs of Yu. Chirkov, quoted above, who served his term in Ukhtizhmlag (or Ukhta Izhemlag) in the Komi Republic:

*"In July 1940, many Poles from the eastern half of Poland, liberated by the Red Army, were transferred to Ukhtizhmlag. In July, the Red Army entered Bessarabia, Bukovina, then the Baltic states... The camp wits predicted the imminent appearance of the Balts and Moldavians on the Ukhta land, and the head of amateur art at Ukhtasovkhoz was already looking forward to staging state farm club of folk dances with the help of future prisoners from the new republics ... Winter (1940-1941 years) was hard to bear in general work. Mortality increased sharply, but labor shortages I didn't feel it: the arrest car was working properly.*

*This winter, they were mainly delivered from the liberated districts: Western Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Balts, Finns, Moldovans ... In early February (1941) a large female stage from Poland. Arrived very late to work (Polish) Jerome saw these poor women and even talked to many of them. They were brought from Lvov. In stages for almost six months. They don't speak Russian, things Don't Have. Even pots and bowls are not for everyone. On him made a big impression by two girls years old 17-18, who were given eight years. (Then they all ended up either in peat extraction or logging).*

Thus, many residents of the new western territories of the USSR could not have a happy future. At the same time, the past war left a lot of weapons on those lands and gave experience in armed struggle. And many did not put it down after the Victory.

But of course, it must be taken into account that not only conscious opponents of the new government, but also people with a criminal past could go into the forests. Or those who are accustomed to a "free" life (i.e., accustomed to getting food and everything else from civilians for free under the guise of fighting against the authorities) could remain in the forests. od However, the Soviet government did not go to any peace negotiations with the rebels. It demanded the unconditional recognition of Soviet power, using a variety of methods to achieve this goal. We will not consider them now, but turn to one more thing.

mu element of terror against their own - mass extermination

to the opinions of entire peoples, mainly from the Crimea and the Caucasus kaza.

Officially, this was explained by the fact that most of the representatives of these nations collaborated with the German occupiers. But that doesn't explain everything. Any person accused of something usually answers himself. And if you count how many people of different national

they went over to the service of the Germans during the war years, then the representatives of the Russians will have not the last place among them. Suffice it to recall the "Russian Liberation Army" of General Vlasov or the large contingent of "policemen".

But what if we look at the places of post-war settlements of peoples geographically? On the territory of the Crimea, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, the Tauride Military District was formed on July 9, 1945 (it was disbanded on April 4, 1956).

Military districts were also reorganized in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia (in 1945, 1946, 1949) until a stable structure emerged in 1953. And in Western Ukraine there were no military districts before the war. They appeared in 1945. (The word "they" here means two districts: Carpathian and Lvov, later (in 1946) merged with the Carpathian.)

The Caucasus and the Crimea were the southernmost sections in front of Turkey, a capitalist ally of the USA and England. And Western Ukraine (and, in general, all the western regions of the Soviet Union) are the westernmost territories of the USSR in relation to the capitalist countries of Europe. In other words, in the event of war, these areas were turned into the rear zones of the fronts for the Soviet Army. And the presence of any opposition in them could interfere with the successful supply of the army in the field. Moreover, armed detachments such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) could turn into a base for enemy landings.

But if with the Ukrainian rebels this thought explains something, then what kind of threat could the Crimean Tatars not pose to Stalin? To answer this question, it is necessary to become more familiar with the eviction policy pursued by Stalin. This can be done well

presenting various documents published in recent years in various editions.

In particular, in the "COLLECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE RIGHT 1991, Nos. 16-17) cites Decree No. 336 dated 06.06.1991 "On the abolition of the decisions of the former State Defense Committee of the USSR and decisions of the Government of the USSR in relation to

Veteran peoples subjected to repressions and forced resettlement" (with the removal of the secrecy stamp). He canceled 47 different decisions of the leadership of the USSR, including:

- 2 decrees of 1936 on the eviction from Ukraine to Kazakhstan of Polish and German farms.

- 8 decrees and resolutions of August-October 1937 on the deportation of Koreans from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

- 10 decrees and resolutions of September-November 1941 about the eviction of Germans not only from the Volga region, but also from other regions of the European part of the USSR.

- Decree of November 6, 1943 "On the procedure for settling the former Karachay Autonomous District of the Stavropol Territory."

- Decree of May 11, 1944 "On the Crimean Tatars".

- Decree of May 29, 1944 "On the issuance of livestock and food natural grain to special settlers - Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Kalmyks in exchange for cattle and grain taken from them in places of eviction.

- Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of November 24, 1948 No. 4367-1726 "On evictions".

- Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 05.29.1949 No. 2214-856 "On ensuring the transportation, resettlement and employment of evacuees from the territory of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR, as well as from the Black Sea coast."

- Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 10.08.1951 No. 14133.

And among the documents published in the journal "HISTORY OF THE USSR", No. 1 for 1992, under the general heading

"40-50s: CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPORTATION OF PEOPLES",  
 "Reference on the number of deportees and special settlers ...  
 (1948-1949)" (p. 130) is given. In it, the first two columns were  
 as follows (changed the sequence of lines and added a  
 comment):

<b>Name</b> special contingent	<b>It was</b> <b>transferred to a special A comment</b> settlement	
Germans	1024722	
Volksdeutsche	5914	"Half-Germans"
Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars	608749	Peoples of the North Caucasus
Crimean Tatars, Bol Gars, Armenians, Greeks	228 392	Peoples of Crimea
Turks, Kurds, Hemshins	94 955	Peoples of Transcaucasia
Kalmyks	91919	Language related to the Buryats (North-Western Caspian region)
Lithuanians	49 331	
Poles (in 1947 they were liberated from the special settlement, but in 1948 they were taken again)	41722	
"OUN"	100 310	Western Ukraine
"Vlasov"	148 079	
"Ukazniki" (by decree of 11/26/1948)	16465	"Repeaters"
"IPH"	1502	"True Orthodox Christians"
Former kulaks	962 251	
TOTAL:	3 374 311	
The amount on the note is:	3332589	(Those excluding Poles)

On November 26, 1994, the program "After the Empire" of the radio station "SVOBODA" reported the following: On July 25, 1944, Beria suggested to Stalin that the Meskhetian Turks and some other peoples of southern Georgia be evicted in order to improve control in the border area. On 07/31/1944, a GKO decree was issued on the eviction of these peoples, but the eviction itself was carried out on 11/15/1944. The Khemshins are called relatives of the Armenians in the program. On February 23 Chechens were evicted (this date was mentioned in many radio and newspaper reports related to the Chechen events after November 1994).

What was wrong with the Greeks? Also massively helped the Germans? Or were their homes in unfortunate proximity to the border? Or maybe to "control" some participants in the Greek civil war?

Eviction was carried out in the Central Asian republics of the USSR, Kazakhstan, Krasnoyarsk Territory and regions of Siberia.

Thus, from 1944 to 1949, millions of civilians were evicted from the Crimea and the Caucasus with its adjacent territories. But eviction from these places continued in subsequent years (judging by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 05/29/1949 No. 2214-856

"On ensuring the transportation, resettlement and employment of evacuees from the territory of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR, as well as from the Black Sea coast").

In terms of language, Karachays, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Transcaucasian Turks (-Meskhetians) belong to the Turkic language family (as do the Turks of Turkey). In addition, from the peoples of the Caucasus, this language family also includes Azerbaijanis. But Stalin did not evict them, at least en masse. It was difficult to do this, since this would have begun the liquidation of the union republic, which was unrealistic. On the other hand, many Azerbaijanis



lives in northern Iran, for which Stalin had special plans (discussed earlier).

The facts show that before June 22, 1941, with the Germans evicted civilians from the border area. Such measures are carried out according to the war preparation plan. If Stalin was planning an attack on Turkey (and Greece), then, naturally, the task of evicting civilians from the Crimea, from the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and from the Caucasus itself (first of all, "sympathetic" nations) arises. To do this before the start of the war would be too noticeable. In addition, the political and economic situation after 1945 did not allow us to accurately determine the time of the war with Turkey. In these conditions

it became important to carry out the eviction gradually, taking into account various formal reasons as much as possible (supposedly mass aiding the Nazis, improving control in the border zone, etc.). true, free the expected areas were settled by a certain number of other settlers. But with them, if necessary, it would be much easier to deal with than with local residents.

In concluding this chapter, it should be noted that the theme of terror does not end there. Since 1949, Stalin "launched" a "preventive purge" among the economic leadership of the country ("Leningrad case"), as a result of which they were shot:

- Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, 1st Deputy

Stalin in the government, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

N. A. Voznesensky (who was called "civilian Zhukov" during the war);

- Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR N. V. Basov;
- Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) A. A. Kuznetsov and others

(total more than 200 people).

Over 2,000 managers have been fired in three years. ("THEY WERE NOT SILENT", compiled by A.V. Afanasev, M.: 1991).

From the point of view of preparing a new war and explicit transferring the economy back to a mobilization state, such a step may well be logical. And at the same time, Stalin "removed" witnesses both of his not the best decisions to start the war (for example, A. A. Kuznetsov was a witness to his fear of surrendering Leningrad to the Germans in the autumn of 1941), and those who led the pre-war transfer of the Soviet economy to martial law and could guess Stalin's true plans after 1948. There is even evidence that he was going to carry out a "purge" among his inner circle and dramatically increase the number of arrests in 1953.

But terror does not exhaust the preparations for a new war. The army must fight. There has already been a conversation about the preparation of aviation and some "special" equipment. But the rest of the troops were also preparing. I follow this head.

## **THE RED ARMY IS THE STRONGEST OF EVERYONE...**

In any story about the army, it is impossible to exclude the use of various military terms, the meaning of which must be well understood. Therefore, the following is an explanation of some of them.

1. Military "subdivisions" include structures from a battalion and below ("companies", "platoons", "departments" and corresponding to them in different branches of the military ("squadrons" and "links" in aviation, "divisions", "batteries", "platoons" for artillerymen, etc.) "Subdivisions" have internal numbering (inside the "unit"): 3rd company, 2nd platoon, etc.

2. "Units" include "regiments" and separate "battalions". They have all-army numbering. For example: the 13th tank regiment, the 99th separate reconnaissance battalion, etc. But this true numbering is secret. In "everyday" life, especially for postal communications, a different, same all-army numbering is used through "military unit" ("military unit"), for example: "military unit 36749", "military unit 20004", etc. . In contrast to the "subdivisions", the headquarters of the "units" have different support and support services. Accordingly, the structure of "units" also includes non-combat units, for example, a regimental band (aka a funeral team).

3. Structures larger than "parts" are called "junctions". These include "divisions", "corps", "group

py" and "army". They also have all-army numbering. For example: 4th Guards Tank Division, 19th Air Army, etc.

4. To ensure the implementation of strategic plans in wartime, "fronts" are created with their own headquarters. They were usually named or a combination of number and name. For example: "Transbaikal Front", "2nd Ukrainian Front", etc.

5. The rules of engagement are divided into rules of "combat work", "tactics" and "strategy" in depending on command level.

6. Theater of operations - theater of operations. That's what they call some territories with special geographic or natural names, for example: Far Eastern theater of operations, West European theater of operations, Marine theater of operations, etc.

7. When they talk about the command of "connections", then they use the term "management", which is understood not only as "headquarters", but also as the commander himself with his deputies, who are not formally included in the "headquarters". The "headquarters" is located under the commander and has its own leader - the "chief of staff".

8. The rules of "strategy", "tactics" and "combat work" are not developed for each military structure, but are of a general nature for all armed forces, regardless of the theater of operations, although there are clarifications for local conditions, but also universal. For example, there are no rules for waging war only in the Alps or only in the Cordilleras. There are clarifications on the war in the mountains, on the plains, in the Arctic. But the general rules of "tactics" and "strategy" in these areas remain in force. Corresponding

Obviously, by their development it is possible to determine the plans of the enemy. For example, Soviet historians are constantly confused when determining the date of transformation of the administrations of some military districts (Baltic, Western, Kyiv) into the administrations of the fronts.

on the eve of June 22, 1941. The exact date is the day June 19. But often it is rounded up to June 22 - they say, there is not a big difference. But sorry, on June 19 there was no German attack! They attacked unexpectedly! Nobody expected their attack! And the fronts - the management structure ONLY FOR WAR - were created earlier! For what? For simple workouts?

9. Generally detailed information about the military districts, biographies of military leaders, and some others were taken from the unclassified SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA, eight volumes of which were published in Moscow in the 70s and early 80s by the Military Publisher

property.

Other concepts will be explained as the topic is presented, which we will begin with a general conclusion: the events in the Soviet Army and the Soviet Navy in the period 1945-1953 also convincingly show that the leadership of the USSR at that time did not just pay attention to sufficient defense from possible

military attack, but was actively preparing its armed forces for an imminent offensive war.

Troops are usually trained in several directions:

- technical;
- operational-structural (the number of units and formations, as well as their deployment in theaters of military operations (TVD) and in the rear area according to mobilization plans);
- combat (the ability of soldiers and officers to conduct combat operations or, as it is called in the troops, the ability to perform combat work and the ability to lead troops);
- moral and psychological (including political).

According to the original plan of this study, all areas of training troops from

survive in one chapter. Moreover, it was planned to pay the main attention to operational-structural. However, a lot of interesting things were also discovered in technical training (especially in 1995-1996), which led to the need to separate it into a separate chapter.

### **Technical training**

Although information on especially important or special types of weapons has already been given in the first chapters, there is interest in touching on this issue again and seeing how, for example, after the war,

there were tanks, the history of which is given in several issues of the magazine "TEKHNICA - YOUTH" for 1990.

The famous T-34 tank was replaced in 1944 by the T-44 tank. Its fundamental difference was a different arrangement of the engine - transverse. This made it possible to move the turret closer to the center of the hull, which reduced the level of rolling for the crew while moving and reduced the length of the tank (with the barrel). There were other innovations as well. Outwardly, the T-44 resembled a hybrid of the chassis of the subsequent model (T-54) with a tower from the T-34. The T-44 was successfully tested at the front and was put into service.

But in 1946, the next model appeared - the T-54 tank, which withstood several modifications (in 1949, in 1951 (two), in 1952 (two) and in 1954).

In 1955, the T-55 tank with anti-nuclear protection appeared, although more improved seals for rubbing parts began to be made already in 1951. From the same 1951, an ejection device began to be used to purge the barrel. This allows you to fire on the move. Since 1952, night vision devices with an infrared searchlight and a TPN-1 night sight were installed, as well as the Cyclone system to stabilize the gun in

two planes and a device for forcing rivers along the bottom up to 5 meters and a width of up to 700 m.

By the way, a few words about the "obsolete combat training" BT-5 and BT-7, which allegedly could not provide no resistance to "medium" and "heavy"

German tanks in 1941 (in the words of Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan and other veterans, which they repeatedly admit in their memoirs). Firstly, I personally do not understand the term "combat training" tank, having experience in serving in a tank regiment. A tank can be either fully combat or fully training (for example, with a transparent tower welded from pipes, or have a rubber cannon and a plywood hull). A "heavenly vym" tank can be made by drilling a hole in its main barrel so that it cannot be fired correctly. Or you can select a few fully combat tanks for training exercises. But at the same time, they will remain combat, only with a smaller technical resource. And according to Marshal Baghramyán

It turns out that the bulk of Soviet tanks in 1941 either had rubber barrels or were made of plywood, but that's NOT TRUE! Almost all tanks in the regiments are BATTLE and are divided into two groups: those that stand in the main boxes for a long

storage with rare trips, and those that are in the mode of constant training (in the Kantemirovskaya division, a special "field" park was allocated for this).

In fact, the latest technical solutions were implemented on the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. And it is not their fault that the factories did not keep pace with the very rapid technical progress in this area of armaments. For example, the BT-5 was used to test a telecontrol system for blowing up pillboxes and engineering obstacles, and in 1936 equipment was tested to overcome water obstacles along the bottom (4-5 m deep). Since 1938

BT-7 tanks were equipped with a TOS telescopic sight with stabilization of the field of view in the vertical plane. The BT-7M was modified with the V-2 tank diesel engine, which had just been mastered by the industry, which was then installed on the T-34.

Since 1946, the T-54 and its modifications in all respects frames were superior to foreign medium tanks, and its gun (caliber 100 mm) was the most powerful. Only 12 years later, the British created a more powerful 105 mm tank gun.

In addition to improving the medium tank, in the USSR the production and modernization of heavy tanks of the IS series ("Joseph Stalin") continued. In the second half of the war, the IS-2 was used in battles, at the very end of the war, the IS-3 appeared with a semicircular flattened turret and a special form of frontal armor (nicknamed the "pike nose"). After the war, this tank continued to be modernized, as hidden defects were revealed.

In 1947, the IS-4 appeared, but it turned out to be heavy (60 tons), which reduced its maneuverability (and in addition, it is desirable that the weight of the tank with the weight of the cargo railway platform does not exceed 60 tons, otherwise transportation through bridges is difficult) . Therefore, they were released a little and sent to the Far East. But in 1948, an even heavier tank was created - the IS-7 weighing 68 tons, with a marine diesel engine of 1050 hp. and a 130 mm cannon. But it turned out to be too heavy, and to

By this time, the military had reconsidered the role of heavy tanks in nuclear warfare. In accordance with the new tactics, medium tanks were supposed to break through the defenses, and heavy tanks, following them, were supposed to hit various enemy targets from afar. Therefore, since 1950, a new, lighter IS-8 tank (weight - 51.5 tons) began to enter the troops. Che



In a few years it was renamed the T-10, which then went through three upgrades (until 1962).

The IS-8 (or T-10) tank was also for some time considered the best in its class. But here the question of a new tactic of their application may arise. Since the advent of tanks, their main role has been considered to break through the enemy defenses. Then, as

development of anti-tank weapons, steel issue

roll tanks of different classes: heavy - for breaking through the defense and medium - both for breaking through, and for supporting and escorting the advancing infantry. But on why, according to the new rules, heavy tanks were to be launched BEHIND the troops going to break through? Above already it is said that this is due to the possible use of atomic weapons. And what does it change? The main thing in the atomic explosions - the destruction of everything within a certain radius from the epicenter of the explosion. It turns out that the task of the medium tanks going first is not to break through the defense, but to take on the consequences of a nuclear explosion! And, of course, they all die. And for this purpose, it is more profitable to use cheaper medium tanks (even better - outdated ones, they will burn out anyway). Well, to capture a radioactively contaminated territory, of course, it is more useful to launch more advanced and more reliable heavy tanks. (And who is to be entrusted with the roar of the medium tanks that go first - the penalty box?) It is this situation that is artistically depicted in the 17th section of the fantastic story by the Strugatsky brothers "Inhabited Island". First, a penal tank brigade on obsolete tanks was sent into the breach. And already behind them were "normal" army tank units on more modern ones. Task penalty

nikov was to provoke the enemy to use atomic weapons against them. In the meantime, they all died. And the army had a chance to break through further. strange coincidence with reality

tactics! But a more detailed analysis of the possible course of the failed war will follow, but for now let's return to the post-war technical preparation.

In addition to tanks and aircraft, much attention is where it was given to other types of main weapons. In particular, the replacement of personal weapons of soldiers began to be carried out, which in the war of 1941-1945 was of two types: rifles and submachine guns (called automatic weapons for short). Non-specialists usually

only the following difference between them: rifles

long and shoot single rounds, while auto mats are shorter and can fire in bursts, which is convenient in close combat. But despite this, for a long time

For some reason, for some reason, the forks were not removed from service until the Kalashnikov assault rifle ("AK-47") appeared in 1947.

In 1992, a military publishing house in Moscow published a very detailed book by A. B. Zhuk "SMALL ARMS (revolvers, pistols, rifles, submachine guns, machine guns)", which contains

only the technical characteristics of various small arms from different countries, but also explains the history  
riya of its development.

It turns out that for a long time the designers of soldiers th firearms were primarily decided for the dacha of increasing the effective range of fire. And this depended on the size of the charge, the length of the barrel and the system of rifling in it, which, in turn, increased the requirements for the locking mechanism. Ultimately, at the beginning of the 20th century, a rifle cartridge allowed a bullet to fly at a distance of up to 3 km. Thus, it was possible to shoot accurately from a rifle at long distances, measured in hundreds of meters (for the Mosin rifle, up to 2200 m). But in this case, it is a single fire that is more effective, i.e. automation is almost unnecessary.

In parallel with the development of long-barreled firearms (rifles), a short

barrel (pistols and revolvers). They were intended for very close combat, when special accuracy is not required. In general, the aiming range of the pistol

years is measured in several tens of meters, and the rifle is very different from the rifle.

But it cannot be said that the designers did not try to create automation mechanisms, which the functionality but can be divided into two types: automatic feeding of cartridges and automatic firing (bursts).

First of all, the issues of automation were solved supply of cartridges, which has been widely developed on models of rifles and carbines. Automation of firing was more successful with pistol cartridges. So began to appear submachine guns ("machine guns"). However, due to the small aiming range

However, they could not completely replace the rifles.

In the USSR in the 30s, the Degtyarev submachine gun ("PPD-34") was produced. But its release until 1939 was very limited, and in 1939 it was completely discontinued. However, close combat during the war with Finland in the winter of 1939-1940 showed the power of this weapon, which was widely used by Finnish soldiers. The Finns were armed with the Suomi submachine gun of the 1931 model. Its characteristics are: caliber - 9 mm, empty weight - 4.68 kg, with cartridges - 7.09 kg, magazine capacity - 50 or 71 cartridges. Outwardly, it was very similar to the Soviet PPD-34, but the magazine held more rounds. As a result, at the beginning of 1940, submachine guns were again adopted by the Red Army.

At first it was the PPD-40 model, and then the Shpagin submachine gun ("PPSh-41") began to be widely manufactured. Their characteristics are approximately the same: caliber - 7.62 mm, empty weight - 3.63 kg, with cartridges - 5.45 kg, magazine capacity - 35 (horn) or 71 (disc). But "PPSh" was easier to make

production, which is why he became the main machine gun of Soviet soldiers during the war. In Germany, the main "machine guns" were also submachine guns (series "MP": "MP-38", "MP-40", "MP-41"), often called the "Schmeisser submachine gun", although it was not theirs. constructor. They all had a caliber of 9 mm, the weight with cartridges from model to model decreased from 4.85 kg to 4.54 kg. They were created by the company "Erma" persona

initially as a weapon for paratroopers, but later

Vii were manufactured by many enterprises and were used in all branches of the Nazi Wehrmacht.

However, as noted above, a small sight range did not allow completely abandoning rifles both in the USSR and in Germany. In the USSR, the modernized Mosin rifle of the 1891/1930 model was produced until 1944. Often it was called the "three-line" according to the old measure of length, which measured its caliber (1 "line" = 2.54 mm, caliber 7.62 mm = 3 "line"). And the PPSH had its drawbacks: it was heavy (even heavier than the Mosin rifle, which weighed 4.5 kg with cartridges) and had insufficient aiming range.

There were two ways to improve this case: somehow increase the accuracy of shooting and reduce the weight submachine guns or come up with something fundamentally new. Designers from different countries practiced both of these areas. In the USSR in 1942, a lightweight "PPS-42" (Sudaev's submachine gun) was created. With cartridges, he weighed 3.63 kg.

A fundamentally new solution was applied the use of an intermediate cartridge, less powerful than a rifle, but more powerful than a pistol. In the USSR, such a cartridge of caliber 7.62 mm was adopted in 1943, after which they began to create new models of machine guns and automatic rifles for it (although at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian gunsmith Fedor

the ditch suggested switching to automatic rifles chambered for 6 mm caliber).

In the magazine "OGONEK", 1993, No. 11, on p. 22-26 nape Chatano interview with designer Mikhail Kalashnikov, the creator of the world-famous automatic machine. He says that he began to design them in 1941 in the hospital, where he ended up after being wounded at the front, where he was a tank sergeant. *"The idea from the point of view of common sense,"* recalls Kalashnikov, *"was adventurous. Not only did I not have a special education, but did not even know how to draw. And therefore not I drew, but I drew the automaton the way I saw it. I also had no design experience, except for participation in an army competition*

*innovators and inventors when I designed a mechanism to account for the operation of a tank engine."* However, as a result of hard work, he made his first machine gun (a submachine gun chambered for the TT pistol) and got with it to the gunsmith-theorist General Blagonravov, on whose recommendation Kalashnikov was sent to serve at a training ground near Moscow, which was the base of *"one from the research institute, which engaged in the creation of small arms.*

Designing the future "AK-47" Kalashnikov began in 1943 and finished in 1947. But other gunsmiths, including General Degtyarev, also made a new machine gun chambered for the new cartridge of the 1943 model. However, the AK-47 was recognized as the best, which was accepted into service, after which for seven years he was listed as a designated. In 1949, Kalashnikov became a laureate of the Stalin Prize.

Of course, it is hard to believe that a self-taught person "from scratch" could come up with a technical model better than many professionals. However, historical the truth is that at that time there was nothing to completely "copy" the AK-47. But for the sake of goals

For this research, it is useful to get acquainted in more detail with the history of the "intermediate cartridge" and weapon living under it in different countries.

First, some technical details about the AK-47. In addition to the model with a wooden butt, there was a variant with a folding one ("AK-47S"). Their total length is approximately the same: 870 mm / 880 mm. The weight of both of them is 3.8 kg (1.65 kg lighter than the PPSH). Magazine capacity - 30 rounds. Sighting range - 800 m. Automation is based on the principle of removal of powder gases. The barrel is locked by **combat**

**mortars rotating around the longitudinal axis of the shutter.**

Caliber - 7.62 mm.

By the way, when I first saw the AK-47 bolt, it struck me with the complexity of its shape, especially the curved cutouts on the sides. And the thought arose: "How could it be so thought up?"

Unlike the USSR, in Germany, the development of an intermediate cartridge was carried out earlier and already in 1942 In 1944, experimental models of automatic carbines "MKB-42 (B)" and "MKB-42 (X)" chambered for 7.92 x 33 caliber appeared. And in 1944, the MP-43 model ("MP -44"). It was called the "assault rifle". Externally, the "MP-43" ("MP-44") were very similar to the "AK-47". The same layout, the shape of the front sight at the end of the barrel and the magazine (horn) were approximately the same, there was also a channel for venting gases (above the barrel) and the widespread use of the stamping method in manufacturing. But the mechanism for locking the bore was different - **by tilting the bolt in a vertical plane**. Because of this, the relative vertical size of the MP-44 was larger than that of the AK-47. And other dimensions were larger than those of the Kalashnikov: length with a butt - 940 mm, weight - about 5 kg. But the capacity of the store was the same -

30 rounds and effective range - 800 m.

In the USA, an automatic carbine (Garanda) under an intermediate cartridge appeared in 1941. Its caliber is 7.62 mm, magazine capacity is 15 rounds (since 1944 - 30), weight is 2.36 kg, aiming range is 300 m. Outwardly, it resembled a light sports gun. This

achieved due to the fact that the shutter did not move vertically to lock the bore, **and rotated around the longitudinal axis. Locking**

**the barrel was made by its lugs.**

The shutter moved due to the removal of powder gases.

In the magazine "TECHNIQUE - YOUTH" No. 12 for 1990 (p. 36-37) it is said that Garand's carbine for an intermediate cartridge was developed by employees of the Winchester concern on the basis of the "normal" M-1 self-loading rifle of the same name, which Garand designed for 10 years (from 1926 to 1936) and which, by the end of 1945, had completely supplanted magazine rifles in the US Army.

Thus, some of the technical solutions used in the AK-47 were already known in the world. Did Kalashnikov know about them? He should have known well, as an employee of a research institute, where information ABOUT ALL samples of small arms from around the world flocked. Moreover, in the USSR of that time, mutual

development of advanced foreign experience, which was already discussed in the first chapters. In 1992, the Military Publishing House published M. Kalashnikov's book "NOTES OF A CONSTRUCTOR-GUNSMAN". In it on p. 141 authors confirm that he *"studied, in particular, with the American designer Garand, when at the end of the war he designed self-loading carbine.*

But in the chapter "Blank Spots..." I already expressed my idea that in the field of armaments, a monopoly on technical ideas could lead to the temptation to unleash a new war, and therefore is unacceptable, and the class

ziya different countries should be approximately the same. Therefore, I see no reason to strictly enforce patent law in this area.

And the purpose of this study is not to cast a shadow on the glory of the AK-47. Knowledge and diligence are needed to create weapons famous all over the world. Kalashnikov writes in his book that after intermediate tests, he guessed in time to combine the bolt carrier with the piston in one piece. In addition

First, a good solution was to combine a fuse, a fire type translator and a protective cover from dirt and dust. Etc. (In particular, information appeared that he was helped by other gunsmiths.) But the matter is different.

In 1945 the great world war ended. There were a lot of small arms in the main participating countries, albeit old models, including captured ones. For the defense **of YOUR TERRITORY**, it could well fit, at least for the next ten years. Germany tried to create an intermediate automaton, but it was defeated, and the winners ruled it. Since 1941, the "intermediate" carbine "baby garand" has been produced in the USA. But he had insufficient sighting range (although 300 m for close combat may well be enough). A new "intermediate" cartridge (T65) for the United States Army was developed as early as 1952, and adopted for service two years later - in 1954, including as the main NATO cartridge under the designation "7.62x51 NATO". But it turned out to be more powerful than the Soviet one, i.e. the weapon created for it is closer to the concept of "automatic rifle" than the "AK-47".

And in the USSR, already in 1943, they adopted a new "intermediate" cartridge and announced a competition for the creation of small arms for it. In 1947, the competition ended, the winning machine ("AK-47") urgent



but is accepted into service with the stamp "secret". Of course, it is easier for soldiers to serve in any conditions (war or peace) with lighter machine guns. But was it really so important to urgently deal with the replacement of personal weapons of soldiers in the post-war period? When defending their land, ground transport is mainly used to move large masses of troops. Under these conditions, "PPSh" could well fit (of which there were mountains). Lighter weapons are important for air transport. The AK-47 was lighter than the PPSH by more than 1.5 kg and was more convenient than a rifle (while maintaining a fairly large aiming range). In short, under the conditions of preparing for war far from supply bases and with the widespread use of transport aircraft, lighter and more uniform weapons can be very useful. And it must be prepared in advance (which, in fact, was done). And before the start of hostilities, such an assault rifle should definitely be kept secret (which was also done).

In vain, M. Kalashnikov, in his interview with the OGONEK magazine, complains that he does not understand why until 1954 his machine gun was considered secret. That's why it was listed that something was being prepared. There are two options here: either it is "normal" to study history (at least in terms of the basic facts), or the period 1945-1953 in general. do not touch! And remain "Ivans who do not remember kinship"!

But let's not digress and see what else after the war in the field of armaments.

After the war, the personal weapons of the officers were also replaced - the Makarov pistol ("PM") was adopted, also as a result of a competition. It turned out to be smaller and lighter than the TT pistol and had other merits. And it was also created under the new cartridge of the 1945 model. It is quite possible that its design was influenced by the 1929 Walther pistol, the design of which, as written in the book by A. B. Zhuk

(p. 234), *"turned out to be very successful, therefore, in a number of countries, it served as a model for the creation of new pistols arranged almost exactly the same.*

We will not consider the situation with pistols in detail, we will only "fix" and move on to the history of another Soviet post-war lightweight weapon - landing artillery systems. An article by S. Gryankin "ASU" was published about them in the journal "TECH NIKA - Youth" in No. 5, 1990.

The abbreviation "ASU" stands for "airborne self-propelled santrnye installations." It turns out that after the war, the design bureau headed by N.A. Astrov, which was engaged in their development, was not disbanded. When designing new models, he was instructed to make extensive use of automotive components and assemblies. In 1949, the ASU-76 was created based on the engine from the GAZ-51E truck. But it turned out to be heavy for aircraft and did not go into the series. By 1951, a lighter ACS-57 was created (the M-20E engine from the Pobeda M-20 passenger car). Its weight is 3.3 tons. In 1954, the ASU-57P floating model appeared. But her

they were not accepted into service - *"there were enough produced ASU-57s and the development of a more powerful technology."*

In 1951, they began designing a new machine (SU-85) - weighing 15.5 tons. The running gear was the same as that of the PT-76 amphibious tank. She was created simultaneously for ground and airborne troops. But the vast majority of installations came to the Airborne Forces. Like all post-war armored vehicles, the self-propelled gun was equipped with night vision devices, a radio station, and BDSH-5 smoke bombs were attached to the back.

The question of why the airborne troops (VDV) are needed is something I don't want to discuss here. I think one thought is enough - the Airborne Forces are needed only when

step. Especially in a surprise attack. And especially with absolute air supremacy.

In

in all other situations, they turn into "golden fittings" - both expensive and bending. So what were you thinking

Soviet leadership, ordering airborne self-propelled guns after a devastating war on their territory? Did you think they would defend their land from external attacks?

From an external attack, something else is better suited: barbed wire; defensive lines with reinforced concrete gun emplacements, filled

guns and machine guns; light grenade launchers

Tiv tanks, etc.

Airborne self-propelled guns somehow do not fit into the defensive policy.

But you can't erase a fact from history - it was! And how were they going to deliver airborne equipment? Including, apparently, on airplanes. For example, on the Il-12 aircraft built after the war, the landing version of which was produced under the brand name Il-12D, or on the Tu-4. By the way, in the Kharkov magazine "AVIO" (1996, No. 5), most of

which is dedicated to the history of this aircraft, there is information about various research works on its use. It speaks openly about the development of chemical munitions for it (except for conventional and atomic). It also reports on attempts to adapt the Tu-4 for the transportation of various cargoes. In particular, a photograph of the attachment of the ASU-57 under its wing in a parachute container is provided.

In addition, large landing gliders were also developed. In the book edited by G. V. Novozhilov "SA MOLETS OKB im. S. V. ILYUSHINA (M.: Mashinostroenie, 1990) says that in 1948, on the instructions of the Air Force, the Il-32 glider was built to transport various equipment and bulky cargo with a total weight of 7 tons or troops up to 60 people. Its towing was planned by the same design bureau built in

1946 by the four-engine Il-18 aircraft (but which, until Stalin's death, was never put into serial production due to the fact that the Tu-4 went into production, which could also tow the glider under discussion). In addition, the heavy landing glider Yak-14 was also created in the Yakovlev Design Bureau (information from A. S. Yakovlev's book "The PURPOSE OF LIFE (notes of an aircraft designer)", Moscow: Politizdat, 1969, p. 487).

It also contains another interesting memory. Us. 469-479 Yakovlev notes that at the end of the summer

In 1952, Stalin decided to instruct two design bureaus (him and Mil) to urgently create new helicopters. A year was allotted for all work (design, construction of prototypes and testing). The designers tried to challenge this deadline, but they were told that "the matter is too neglected", that "unlimited assistance will be provided, but the proposed period of one year is final and not subject to discussion." The designers agreed, and it was signed

government decree.

Yakovlev himself hints at what prompted Stalin to urgently organize the production of helicopters, citing the following information: *"In the 1930s and 1940s, designers Igor Sikorsky and*

*England - the firm "Bristol" ... The first to achieve the greatest success then was Sikorsky, who created a number of small single-rotor helicopters. Some of*

*They were adopted by the US Army and participated in the Korean War. were successful*

*also works by Piasecki. He created medium-lift helicopters. His "workhorse" helicopter found wide use in the US paratroopers. And the first Soviet helicopters were created,*

first of all, for the army.

Yakovlev in 1952 was offered urgently with

build a twin-engine helicopter-car with a carrying capacity of up to 4 tons. Mile - single-engine for 12 people. Work in the design bureau at Yakovlev was difficult. Couldn't for a long time reduce the shaking before they guessed to shorten the length of the blades. The Yak-24 helicopter was presented for state testing in December 1953.

In his book, Yakovlev gives an interesting circumstance related to this helicopter. It turns out that after Stalin's death, the hard deadline for the creation of the Yak-24 seemed to be forgotten. After successful testing of an experimental machine, the designers even had to, as it were, to know that the task was completed, in particular, by Marshal Zhukov, who, at the exhibition of new models of military equipment, accidentally went into the Yak-24 to warm up. Strange. External enemies seem to have remained the same, but much has changed in domestic politics and the economy. "The urgent need suddenly disappeared"? It reminds me of something! But back to the topic of the post-war rearmament.

Extensive research and development work after the war was also carried out on other types of weapons. As noted above, more detailed information about this began to appear from the mid- 1990s (and earlier all this was considered secret). In particular, a large selection of materials was published in many issues of the journal "AVIATION AND COSMONAUTIKA" for 1995 and 1996 (moreover, in cooperation with other editorial boards ("TECHNIKA AND ARMS", etc.). A number of materials were published in the historical series of the journal "TECHNIQUE - YOUTH".

It is neither possible nor necessary to repeat all this in detail here. But there is a need at least

list some special topics over which

Soviet military designers worked with rymi.

In 1947, the development of anti-ship projectile "COMET". She was adopted

or in 1953, although it was launched into the series in 1952. During tests in front of Beria, the COMET pierced the target ship through and through. He liked this. In the journal "AVIATION-COSMONAUTIKA", 1996, No. 1 on S. 46 privo there is a terrible idea for the use of this weapon: *"During the war in Korea, the Politburo considered the question of the use of the first 50 serial Komet missiles against American aircraft carrier formations coast of Korea, for which it was supposed to use two regiments of Tu-4. Technically it was doable, but the offer was rejected because there was the risk of a local war escalating into a world war.*

In addition to cruise anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles of the German V-1 type (Soviet name - "10X") were also developed. As well as winged guided (planning) bombs, work on which was carried out in OKB-2 of the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering.

Many developments were carried out for the navy. *"October 16, 1946, the government (USSR) adopted a program according to which, until 1955, planned to build warships according to new projects, prepared taking into account the experience of the Second World War. Large submarines were also envisaged, which were to operate on ocean communications, block naval bases,*

*conduct operational reconnaissance"* (Journal "TEKHNICA – YOUTH", 1996, No. 2, p. 25 article by I. Bochin "They were called "BUKI"). Once I came across a book by Sergeyev M.A. "SOVIET ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN", from Denmark in 1938.

Then I didn't pay much attention to her.

attention, since at that time he was not yet fond of the pre-war period. But, apparently, this is for their defense in

In 1946, plans began to be made for the construction of ocean-going ships and submarines. Otherwise, such plans can only be called offensive. oceanic under

a boat for the defense of the steppes of Ukraine can fit only in jokes. And how many hundreds of thousands of tons of metal are needed to implement such "defensive" projects? And this after the devastating war, when millions lived in dugouts? And what experience of the war should be taken into account? Maybe it was planned

to install on Soviet submarines the German invention "snorkel" - a device for operating an engine under water, as on German ocean-going submarines?

Although a submarine in the Pacific Ocean is still somehow understandable. Blow up someone's base or ship and back - it seems to be for defense. And what about the project of a submarine transport boat for carrying out tank landings in the Arctic latitudes? (The same magazine, 1996, No. 12, article by A. Shirokorad "TANK DE SANT ON THE POLE"). Landing tank troops from a submarine on foreign soil is somehow not very similar to defense. This only makes sense when it comes! The first project (No. 621) began to be developed in 1948 at TsKB-18, the second project (No. 626) - in 1952.

Thus, after the war in the USSR, various works were urgently carried out to create technical support for combat operations in the Arctic. There were three options: by air (airplanes and landing gliders), by ice (aerosleigh designs had already been tested during the war), or under the ice. Although the last option was worked out, it was practically never implemented (in fact, like the whole main idea - a new world war).

But they tried to do it. There is evidence of this former Soviet submariner, captain 1st rank N. Cherkashin in the article "PIKE AMBUSH" (reprinted in the newspaper "KIEVSKIE NEWS" for 07/05/1996). He himself sailed on a large diesel-electric torpedo boat "BUKI-409" (1971-1994). About the tank project boats he writes the following:

*"And the post-war plans to defeat the United States in the event of an armed conflict were associated with submarines even before the idea arose of placing missiles on them and firing at them.*

*them from the depths.*

*I saw drawings, partly made in metal, of a tank landing submarine, which*

*intended for covert landing on the coast*

*US ten "Thirty-fours" (medium tanks) and*

*to an infantry battalion. Fortunately, these adventurous*

*giants - the miracle Yudo-fish-whales from the tale of the Little Humpbacked*

*Horse - were not built. Released on them*

*funds were embodied in other projects.*

And the fate of Soviet aircraft carriers is not entirely simple. The fact is that in the early 50s the question of their creation

Denmark rose, but they refused to build only after the death of Stalin. (Information of the magazine "TECHNIQUE AND WEAPONS", 1996, No. 1.)

If we also recall the information of the one who fled to the West in the late 40s of a Soviet rocket specialist (from the previous chapter), it turns out that Stalin after the war was very interested in the rapid development

ti the following types of offensive weapons:

- atomic weapons;

- intercontinental missiles;

- intercontinental bombers;

- ocean fleet, including long-range submarines and aircraft carriers;

- equipment of landing troops.

But who was he going to fight? For Europe could only paratroopers and partially atomic bombs would be enough. Why the rest?

The rest could be used only for the war with the United States (which at that time were considered allies). Fortunately for all progressive mankind, the work on these topics turned out to be too complicated and time consuming. But if



aircraft carriers and tank submarines were not made during Stalin's lifetime, the American seaplane "KA TALINA" was mass-produced in the USSR under the brand name GTS ("hydro-transport aircraft"?). Information about this is in one of the issues of the magazine "TEKHNICA - MO LODEGHI" for 1990 in an article about the Pe-8. For a long time I was interested in the meaning of the brand of the Li-2 aircraft. His race was encrypted as "Licensed", i.e. under the brand Li-2 in the USSR, under license, the American transport aircraft C-47 was built. But why Lee-SECOND? Where's Lee FIRST? Was any other aircraft built under license in the Soviet Union? And only once did I see the phrase that the American Catalina and C-47 were mass-produced in the USSR under the GTS and Li-2 brands.

Li-2 left a more noticeable mark in the history of Soviet aviation than the GTS. Maybe there really is no point in considering something? But it depends on what sides.

For example, already mentioned in the "DIGEST" In the fall of 1944, the distinguished Soviet polar pilot, General Mazuruk, with a group of other pilots, specially flew to the United States for four Catalinas. And he notes that there were influential forces that prevented the transfer of this aircraft to the USSR. He even had to turn to a familiar senator for help. In the end, Mazuruk received the planes and flew them to the USSR through South America, the Atlantic Ocean, Africa, Iraq, Iran, the Caspian Sea. Mazuruk speaks very positively about this aircraft. He especially notes that Catalina has a special system of automatic support for low flight altitude. In military language it is called

etsya - "a low-flying target that is difficult to detect by locators." A similar principle has been implemented van later in low-flying computer-controlled cruise missiles. Combined with possibly

With the ability to land on the water, the Catalina could become an aggressor aircraft for underdeveloped territories rich in rivers, lakes, and bays. Well, for example, as in the north of Canada or Alaska. (The maps of Alaska had already been prepared in advance by the pilots of the division under the command of the same Mazuruk). And what is the sudden appearance of a low-flying helicopter over the heads of the troops, I personally experienced myself during divisional exercises in the army. The impression is unpleasant. For a moment I felt like a blind kitten being tried

lis to drown, but missed.

But, perhaps, the Catalina (or GTS) was less common in Soviet aviation because the Be-6 flying boat designed by G. Beriev was launched into a large series in 1946. The act of her testing was ready on March 31, 1946. Then it was in service with the Soviet naval aviation for 20 years. Some of her information:

- maximum weight - up to 29 tons;
- maximum speed - 415 km / h;
- flight range - 5000 km;
- there was an all-round radar and 5 launchers

NIS caliber 23 mm.

In 1947, Beriev was given the task of creating a jet flying boat, but this turned out to be very difficult (the Americans even abandoned such a project). But Soviet designers made the Be-10 jet by the end of the 50s! (Source - A. Grigoriev's book "ALBATROSSES: from the history of hydro aviation", M.: 1989). Incidentally, this book says

It is believed that seaplanes can be a very effective means of unexpected attack  
social adversary.

In addition, the low altitude control system  
summer turned out to be on the most massive Soviet after

military jet bomber - Il-28.

Let's sum up the short interim results. It turns out that in the USSR the process of improving military equipment continued actively after the war. It can be divided into four directions. Firstly, this is an accelerated modification of the existing samples (for example, from 1944 to 1953, 7 models and modifications of the main tank were created). Secondly, the development of fundamentally new equipment (for example, jet aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters) was accelerated. Thirdly, much attention began to be paid to the rapid development of strategic forces (long-range aircraft and missiles, including intercontinental ones). Fourth, even more important was the requirement to reduce the weight, especially of the most mass-produced weapons. Fifthly, special military equipment such as amphibious tanks or combat

exit seaplanes.

Moreover, not only military design work was carried out quickly, but also a rapid release of new types of weapons was carried out with the subsequent replacement of old models in the troops. Here is how it is written about, for example, In the book "RED SIGN DALNEVO STOCHNY" (Khabarovsk book publishing house, 1

*"Based on the experience of the last war, the conclusions of Soviet military science, a reorganization was carried out ground forces, including their complete motorization and mechanization. The number of tanks in combined arms formations has sharply increased. The rifle divisions included tank and self-propelled artillery units, while the rifle corps included mechanized formations. All this, including the adoption of armament of modern types of small arms, artillery systems, communications and engineering technology, significantly increased fire and shock*

*power of our Ground Forces... Other branches of the armed forces, in particular the Air Force, were developing and strengthening just as intensively, units and formations of which were switching over to jet aviation during 1947-1950... In aviation, in air defense units*

*radar and radio navigation aids were widely used... (p. 237)*

*After the end of the war, work began on the creation of rocket weapons.*

*In October 1947, the first R-1 ballistic missile was launched. In 1950, the more advanced R-2 rocket was successfully tested ... (p. 242)*

*held in October 1952 XIX Congress of the CPSU (b) Minister of War of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union*

*A. M. Vasilevsky reported that for seven years after the war, the Soviet Army and Naval*

*The fleet has changed radically. They are equipped*

*new modern weapons, which in their own way*

*quality is much superior to the weapons of the period of the Great Patriotic War" (pp. 239-240).*

And it should be noted that what was new in the army at that time was introduced with maximum secrecy. Recall that the Kalashnikov assault rifle was listed as such until 1954. Or you can look at photos of the military parade on November 7, 1950. Then T-34 tanks were driving along Red Square in Moscow, and the infantry was walking with rifles at the ready (the newspaper "RED ZVEZDA" for 11/10/1950). But it was impossible to completely hide the rearmament of the troops. Here, for example, is what the American Richard Stockwell wrote in his book SOVIET AIR POWER, published in New York in 1956 : *with which the Russians would launch the MiG-15 into mass production was truly unbelievable ... By the end of 1949, fighters*

*MiG-15s could be found in large numbers in East Germany." (This quote is from*

A. Yakovlev's books "SOVIET AIRCRAFT", M.: "Nauka", 1975, p. 138.) (In total, about 20,000 MiG-15s).

However, it can be noted that the creation of new models of military equipment should take place constantly. That is why the state exists to provide defense against a possible attack. But was it really necessary to hasten with extensive rearmament after such a devastating war? It is urgent to develop new weapons and produce them on a large scale.

quantities makes sense only in one case: if there are concrete plans to put it into action in the near future! Otherwise it will become obsolete! In other words, if a country is consciously preparing a new war, then the active modernization of weapons at the level of the world's best models becomes a vital task. And with whom were they going to fight?

For a long time, Soviet historians usually loved note only one fact of accelerated expensive work on the creation of Soviet atomic weapons. At the same time, it was emphasized that this was done to eliminate the US nuclear monopoly. But while the thread urgent modernization of tanks, aircraft, landing gliders, machine guns, self-propelled guns, missiles, etc.? They modernized to eliminate whose monopoly? And if you remember that some of the samples that the USSR had were already the best in the world or had no analogues? (For example, tanks or cannons.) And why arctic submarines with tanks and intercontinental delivery vehicles? And this is called the fight for peace? Indeed, "a continuous palisade of questions"! True, if by the word "peace" we mean

"world space", then everything becomes logical. Defense is usually carried out on its own territory. For it it is much cheaper to strengthen anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, coastal defense and

pursue an active foreign arms control policy (with the release of data on its own army). But a more detailed acquaintance with the facts clearly shows that in the USSR after the war

We spent huge amounts of money on the urgent development of means of attack.

However, they do not fight on their own. People are fighting consolidated into regiments, divisions and other types of subdivisions, units and formations. And they also require preparation. This will be discussed further.

### **Operational-structural training**

For some reason, when describing those years, historians like to pay attention only to Stalin's unfair treatment of some famous commanders, for example, Marshal Zhukov. At first, Stalin tried to arrange a kind of "trial of honor" over him, then sent him allegedly "into exile" - to command the Odessa military district, and then to an even greater "backwoods" - the Urals.

Everything else seems to be of no interest. It seems that nothing special happened. Usual life in the army, which "stands guard for peaceful labor" within the framework of the Ministry of Defense.

However, in the biographies of many generals and marshals in the period up to 1954, one can read strange positions connected either with the "War Ministry", or with the "Ministry of the Armed Forces". Wasn't there a Ministry of Defense?

It turns out that before the unified Ministry of Defense appeared as early as March 1953, it had an interesting background.

On September 4, 1945, the GKO (State Defense Committee) was abolished, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Supreme High Command) ceased its activities. But at that time there were two military people's commissariats: defense

and the Navy. Logically, this is understandable - there was a war, the military had a lot of worries. And the existence of separate people's commissariats for land defense and the navy is quite understandable.

But the war ended, and on February 25, 1946, they were merged into a single People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces (NKVS USSR). From March 1946 it became known as the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS USSR). The step is quite consistent with "peacefulness". The war is over, the worries of the military have diminished, and managers can be reduced a little. The only thing that somehow confuses the name of the ministry is "Armed Forces", and not "Defence" (again, defense was not provided for, as in 1941?) Although the choice of name could also be influenced by the fact that Soviet troops after 1945 were in many some foreign countries. But so far there is no evidence for this. Yes, and it doesn't matter.

Something else is important. In February 1950, the MVS of the USSR again DIVIDED into two ministries: the War Ministry and the Naval Ministry. And already they were merged into a single Ministry of Defense in March 1953.

How to explain this step of the Soviet government headed by Stalin? With whom was the USSR going to fight? With England and the USA? Yes, indeed, these countries actively participated in the Cold War and intensified their military preparations. As noted earlier, the US Strategic Air Force saw itself at the height of its power in March 1954. And readiness according to the Dropshot plan was to be achieved by

01/01/1957. (For information: in English, two spellings of this word are possible: "Dropshort" or "Dropshot". But the translations of both are approximately the same: either "Sudden throw ((on-) fall)" or "Sudden shot").

But then why were the divided war ministries united again in March 1953, the year before?

How did the aggressiveness of the US Air Force reach its peak? And even more so four years before America was ready for the Dropshot plan? Probably, it was necessary to act on the contrary, to further increase readiness for a "surprise attack" from the United States. For example, dividing the land ministry into several more parts; creating, for example, the Ministry of Defense of the Far East?

Funny? I believe that there can be no laughter here. Moreover, something similar happened in the Soviet construction system at the end of the 70s, when the Ministry of Construction was created in the regions of the Far East and Transbaikalia.

And all the more so because something similar already existed in the War Department itself! To do this, just read the biography of Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky R. Ya. Here is part of it from the summer of 1945:

from July to September 1945 - commander of the Baikal Front in the war with Japan;

1945-1947 - Commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District;

1947-1953 - Commander-in-Chief of the Far East;

1953-1956 - Commander of the Far Eastern Military District;

1956-1957 - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and 1st Deputy Minister of Defense.

Let's digress for a while and see what they write in the SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA about the term "Commander in Chief":

*"The Commander-in-Chief (Commander-in-Chief) is the highest military position in any theater or strategic direction, as well as in certain types of armed forces. In the Soviet armed forces, the commanders-in-chief were in the North-Western, Western, South-Western (July 1941-May 1942), North Caucasian*



*(April - May 1942) directions and on the Far East (1945). By 1976 there are Commanders-in-Chiefs of the branches of the armed forces, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany."*

Apparently, in this list there is no mention of the position of Marshal Malinovsky in 1947-1953. Accidentally? The Far East is not a branch of the armed forces, it is a direction (or theater of operations). But the Commander-in-Chief is directing niya is a position more of a wartime than a peacetime one. In peacetime, it is sufficient to have a General Staff within the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the administration of military districts (as it has been since 1953).

During the war with Japan in 1945, the position The commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East was occupied by Marshal Vasilevsky. (In the presence of commanders of three fronts, and since 1949 he became the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR).

Nikita Sergeevich was mistaken in his memoirs when he called Malinovsky commander of the Far Eastern Military District. He held this position from 1953 to 1956. And until 1947 he commanded the military district (Zabaikalsko-Amur). But it turns out that between them he was, as it were, at war.

In what battles was Marshal Malinovsky to coordinate the actions of the troops in a combat position in PEACETIME? No matter how Khrushchev asked, Stalin did not let him into Korea. When the Chinese volunteers entered the war, they were commanded by the Chinese general Peng Dehui. Khrushchev wrote that he was called a "rising star" among the Chinese generals. Then what was Marshal Malinovsky supposed to do? Maybe at that time there were no military districts in the Far East? It turns out they were!

Here again we have to digress a little and consider the question of the military districts. "GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA" (volume 5, 1971) explains that in

The military district is (in the USSR) a territorial general military association of units, formations, military educational institutions and various local military institutions. It is headed by the commander of the troops

county under the Secretary of Defense. Division

the territory of the state into military districts ensures the convenience of command and control, the implementation of operational and other types of training of troops on

case of defense against attack. In addition, in the event of a war, the administrations of the border military districts are transformed into administrations of the fronts. strategists

Frankly, this is better than bringing generals from other areas and wasting time while they study their theater of operations and establish command and control.

Thus, based on the structure of the military districts, one can to some extent judge the plans of the military command. Moreover, after the war, this level of command and control in the USSR turned out to be more important than before the war, when the secret process of creating new divisions and armies was going on. Then it had to be maxi

little to classify, and the structure of the military districts changed little. Moreover, it turned out to be especially important

only a few western border districts, which were transformed into fronts with the outbreak of the war (more precisely, BEFORE the German attack, 06/19/1941).

But the experience of the war showed that the operational zone on the terrain allotted to the front should be less than it was supposed before the war (at least when the front consists of "normal" armies as formations of divisions, and not also corps of several divisions). Accordingly, if Stalin planned the imminent start of a new war, then this circumstance had to be taken into account when converting front and army administrations back into administrations.

military districts.

In this regard, it is interesting to recall the fact cited in the article by O. Rzheshesky, published in the Pravda newspaper on October 31, 1988, as part of a discussion about the causes of the Cold War. As confirmation of the "peacefulness" of the Soviet Union at that time, the author of the article cites a list of measures taken by the Soviet government, including the demobilization of soldiers of "older" ages, and the abolition of the State Defense Committee, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from foreign countries, and that in

In 1945-1946, the number of military districts was reduced from 33 to 21. And then he writes: *"What kind of "Soviet military threat" could we talk about?"*

Indeed, the reduction of military districts from 33 up to 21 facts seem to be peaceful. But how many were there before the war? Turns out it's 16! The same article from TSB says: *"Depending on the tasks of the defense of the Soviet Union and as the Armed Forces develop USSR, the number of military districts changed. For example, before the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 there were 16 of them (and one Far Eastern Front). After the war, there were 33 military districts, and by October 1946 their number was reduced to 21.*

To this we can add that in the period of "developed socialism" (for example, in 1976, at the time of the publication of the second volume of the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia") there were also 16 of them.

Moreover, the lists of pre-war districts in 1976 turned out to be almost the same:

### **Before the war 1941 In 1976**

- |                 |                 |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Baltic       | 1. Baltic       |
| 2. Western      | 2. Belarusian   |
| 3. Kyiv         | 3. Kyiv         |
| 4. Leningradsky | 4. Leningradsky |
| 5. Odessa       | 5. Odessa       |
| 6. Arkhangelsk  | 6. Carpathian   |

7. North Caucasian 8.  
Transcaucasian  
9. Moscow 10.  
Volga 11. Central  
Asian 12. Ural 13.  
Siberian 14.  
Trans-Baikal 15.  
Kharkov 16. Orlovsky  
- Far Eastern Front

7. North Caucasian 8.  
Transcaucasian  
9. Moscow 10.  
Volga 11. Central  
Asian 12. Ural 13.  
Siberian 14.  
Transbaikai  
15. Turkestan 16. Far  
Eastern

But a complete list of the 33 post-war districts could not be found. However, in the "Soviet military encyclopedias" contains descriptions of many of them, as well as biographies of famous military leaders, in which there are indications of positions, for example: "commander of (such and such) districts". This made it possible to find the names of 31 military districts as of December 1945:

1. Baku  
2. Baranovichi 3.  
Belomorsky 4.  
Voronezh 5. East  
Siberian 6. Gorky 7. Far  
East 8. Donskoy  
9. Transbaikai-Amur  
10. West  
Siberian 11. Kiev  
  
12. Kuban 13.  
Leningrad 14. Lvov  
15. Minsk  
  
16. Moscow  
17. Odessa

18. Special (Kenigsberg)  
19. Baltic 20. Volga  
21. Carpathian 22.  
Primorsky 23.  
Smolensk 24.  
Stavropol 25.  
Steppe 26. Tauride 27.  
Tbilisi 28.  
Turkestan 29. Ural  
30. Kharkov 31.  
South Ural 32 .?

33.?

The names of the two districts could not be found. But in "SVE" there is a vague mention of some kind of Caucasian Military District in the biography of Colonel-General N. I. Gusev, which says that after the war he commanded its troops (1945-1946). However, there is no separate article about the Caucasian MD in the encyclopedia.

What can be said about these lists? Throws himself in eye appearance in 1945 of many small military districts. For example: Baranovichi, Baku, Special, Voronezh, etc. However, in 1946 their number was reduced. And this is cited as proof of the "peacefulness" of the USSR. Judging by the descriptions of the histories of the districts, the administration of many of them was created from the administrations of different fronts or armies. Perhaps this was done, among other things, for the purpose of more convenient demobilization.

But "21" is larger than both the pre-war 16 and the subsequent 16. In addition, at the end of the 40s, some military districts were recreated again! (This was called the "second formation.") For example, Gorky, which existed from June 1949 to May 1953, Voronezh (from the same June 1949, but until 1960) or Donskoy (August 1949 - November 1953 .).

In other words, the number "21" is not the last, and it increased again, and only from 1953 began to decrease, until the number of military districts by the 70s was 16. Thus, not everything is so simple in their post-war history . And before recalling it to prove one or another direction of the policy of the USSR, it is necessary to get acquainted with it in more detail.

But investigating this issue is not an easy task. It should be carried out in two directions at once: by territories (by possible theater of operations) and by time.

We have already talked about the high command on Dal

German East. It makes sense to see how it has changed structure of military districts.

The war with Japan was carried out by the troops of three fronts. Three military districts were formed on the basis of their directorates on September 10, 1945: the Far East with headquarters in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (from the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Primorsky with headquarters in Ussuriysk (from the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front) and Zabaikalsko-Amur with headquarters in Khabarovsk (from the troops of the Transbaikai Front).

05/22/1946 Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District was renamed Zabaikalsky, part of its territory was transferred to the Far Eastern Military District, and its administration in Khabarovsk was transformed into the administration of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East. The administration of the Trans-Baikal District was located in Chita, and it began to include the Chita Region and the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Briefly about the East Siberian Military District. He was formed on October 1, 1945 from the eastern part of the Siberian Military District (which, in turn, was renamed the West Siberian). The territory of the East Siberian District included: the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Tuva and Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and the Irkutsk Region. The office was located in Irkutsk. This district existed until May 1953, when it was merged with the West Siberian, in 1956 it was again renamed the Siberian Military District (headquarters in Novosibirsk).

Note: in front of Alaska (US territory - a possible enemy) - the troops of the Far Eastern military district, the administration of which may well be quickly transformed into the administration of the front (to Alaska). But what about Japan? And in front of her are the troops of the Primorsky Military District. Moreover, there are two reserves: the departments of the East Siberian and Trans-Baikal districts.

In 1947 in the Far East there were also transfers of generals in positions. For example, M. A. Purkaev, who had previously been commander of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, and then commander of the Far East, from June 1947 became chief of staff and first deputy commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East. In the same year, General Odintsov G.F. arrived at the post of commander of the artillery of the troops of the Far East, leaving a similar position in the Leningrad Military District. On

the post of commander of the naval forces of the Far East in 1947, Admiral Tributs VF arrived, leaving command of the 8th Navy (Baltic).

Speaking of Purkaev. He met the war of 1941 chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, or, more precisely, chief of staff of the Southwestern Front. And he fought in this position during the first most difficult months of the war, until he was replaced by General Tupikov (who later died while trying to break out of the autumn encirclement near Kiev).

Purkaev was in DalVO until July

1952, when he was transferred to Moscow to the post of head of the Directorate of Higher Military Educational Institutions of the USSR Military Ministry.

Thus, in addition to the directorates of the military districts in the Far East, since 1947, a solid company of military generals has been added, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of all the troops of the Far East. For what? It is difficult to manage this territory from Moscow due to the large time difference (from 8 to 10 hours). But in peacetime, the directorates of the military districts are enough. Additional local add-on

is important only in one case - for the coordination of military ACTIONS!

But the Soviet Union did not enter any major war in the Far East at that time (not counting Korea and China). And by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of April 23, 1953, a reorganization was carried out

command and control structures in the Far East in the direction of lowering offensive readiness. At cha

density:

- 1) the Directorate of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Troops was liquidated;
- 2) the Primorsky Military District was liquidated;
- 3) the headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District in Yuzh but-Sakhalinsk was transformed into the headquarters of the army;
- 4) on the basis of the Directorate of the Commander-in-Chief in Khabarovsk, the Directorate of the new Far Eastern Military district, which included the territories of all Far Eastern regions and territories.

In addition, in April 1953 (possibly due to the same order) a unified Pacific Fleet was again formed, which in January 1947 was divided into two: the 5th (the main naval base (Naval Base) in Vladivostok) and the 7th (the main naval base in the Soviet Harbors).

The fact of the division of the Pacific Fleet, Soviet historians usually also tried not to remember (as, incidentally, the fact of the division of the Baltic Fleet into the 4th and 8th in February 1946). For example, in various biographies of N. G. Kuznetsov, the pre-war and military People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR, they usually wrote briefly about the period of the late 40s: either that he was sent to the Far East, or that he commanded the Pacific Fleet. But only from the "Soviet military

encyclopedia" you can find out his specific post-war positions:

February 1946 - March 1948 - Head of Administration  
leniya naval educational institutions;

June 1948 - February 1950 - Deputy Commander-in-Chief  
troops of the Far East for naval forces;

February 1950 - July 1951 - Commander of the 5th Navy;

July 1951-1953 - Minister of the Navy;



## 1953 - December 1955 - First Deputy Minister

Defense - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy;

since February 1956 - retired with a decrease in rank.

Moreover, before sending N. Kuznetsov to the Far East, Stalin "passed" him through the "court of honor." And not only him, but also three more admirals (L. M. Galler, V. A. Alafuzov and G. A. Stepanova). The trial was held from January to March 1948 under the chairmanship of Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov. The reason was the information that during the war the defendants allegedly handed over secret scientific and technical information to the Allies. As a result, N. Kuznetsov was demoted in rank "3rd from the top" (to "rear admiral"), the rest were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment (4 and 10 years). Alafuzov and Galler did not live to see their release. ("FLAGSHIPS: COLLECTION OF REMEMBERS AND ESSAYS", Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1991).

There is also some secret connected with Admiral Haller. At the end of 1937, he was appointed head of the newly created Main Naval Staff (GMSH), Rear Admiral Alafuzov - his deputy. At the same time, at the direction of Stalin, a strong-willed decision was made to build a large sea and ocean fleet (in particular, many battleships, heavy cruisers, ships of other classes of the surface fleet, as well as torpedo boats and submarines of various types) were built. However, sometime towards the end of 1940, a meeting was held at which Stalin remarked that Soviet warships would not go to America. Moreover, it was decided to stop the construction of large ships. All these events or some other ones led to the fact that Admiral Haller began to consider himself "doomed", was afraid to make responsible decisions, became too cautious. In October 1940, Admiral

I. S. Isakov, and Galler went to work as Deputy People's Commissar of the WFM for shipbuilding. In 1947 he was transferred to Leningrad, and in 1950 he died in prison (at the age of 67).

Until 1937, in Soviet Russia, the Naval General Staff existed only during the war of 1917-1921. years, being the highest operational-strategic command and control body of the naval forces. The fact that it was organized again (under a different name) in 1938 is understandable: Stalin began concrete preparations for a new world war. But in February 1950, the Naval General Staff was again created, which existed until March 1953, when the Main Staff of the Navy was created on its basis. Chief of the Main Naval Staff since February

In 1947, and from February 1950, Admiral A. G. Golovko was Chief of the Naval General Staff. In 1952, he transferred to command of the 4th (Baltic) Fleet. The 4th and 8th fleets existed as separate naval operational formations until December 1955 , and then were again merged into a single Baltic Fleet.

In retirement, Admiral Kuznetsov took up literary work and wrote, in particular, memoirs entitled "SHARP TURNS", which are printed were published at different times in different publications, for example: in VIZH in 1992 and 1993. But in them he does not provide a detailed analysis of military-strategic work in post-war period, perhaps, given the secrecy of such information. It also allows for inaccuracies. For example, he writes (PRAVDA newspaper, 07/29/1988) that Stalin offered him to divide the Baltic Fleet in the spring 1946. He refused. But it has already been noted above that this fleet was divided into two in **February** 1946.

Of course, you can see that the error is small - whether the end of winter (February) or spring (March to May).

But February and March, specifically, 1946, are a big difference. Since the beginning of March (since Churchill's Fulton speech), historians have been counting down the Cold War. In February, it formally did not exist yet!

Moreover, N. Kuznetsov notes that he did not really understand what was happening. In particular, in an excerpt published in VIZH, No. 3, 1993, there is the following phrase: "*In 1951, under circumstances that were mysterious to me, I again found myself in the position of Minister of the Navy*". Of course, if we consider the USSR of that time as a fighter for peace (in the sense of "for non-war", and not "for world space"), misunderstanding is possible. Indeed, why did it suddenly take Stalin IN PEACETIME to first punish the combat admiral,

and then gradually promote him again in his position? And besides, there is some information about how, on the orders of Stalin on July 20, 1951, N. G. Kuznetsov turned out to be the Minister of the Navy, as set out in the article "I. V. STALIN: "THE STATE CANNOT WAIT UNTIL... THE MINISTER STOP DRINKING" ("VIZH", No. 2, 3, 1996). In particular, it contains transcripts of the meetings of the Main Military Council of the Naval Ministry, held in mid-July 1951. Many issues were considered at them to improve this type of troops, including

rum to increase the number of issued naval officers in the near future.

However, the "lack of understanding" of what was happening did not prevent N. Kuznetsov from placing an order for the retired (since 1947) Vice Admiral A.V. (Until his resignation, Nemitz was a professor at the departments of strategy and tactics at various military academies - information from the collection "FLAGSHIPS ..."). As a result, "*analyzing the experience of past wars, A. V. Nemitz emphasized that for success*

*strong confrontation with a powerful sea enemy  
a balanced development of heterogeneous  
fleet forces, and among the strike forces should be  
and carrier-based aviation. He argued his arguments with  
statistical data and calculations.*

*By 1952, the study was completed and personally handed over  
to N. G. Kuznetsov.*

Of course, one can object that this is why there are combat admirals to increase the combat readiness of the navy. But why would a peaceful country, after a brutal war, have "strike naval forces with carrier-based aircraft"? Only for the landing of operational assault forces within the operations of the land fronts? And on what sections of the Soviet border could such a situation arise? In the Soviet Far East, where there is a long winter with 40-degree frosts, permafrost and continuous impassability? In the Baltic Sea surrounded by friendly or neutral countries? Or on the Black Sea in the war with Turkey? After all, we are talking about the sixth year after the devastating war! Was the naval "strike force with carrier-based aviation" really necessary at that time?

But we must pay tribute to Stalin: he was in no hurry to build aircraft carriers. Apparently, he understood well that they could not be attributed to defensive weapons. An aircraft carrier is a means of attacking distant territories separated by the sea. Stalin is the first  
turn paid attention to the secrecy of training. And it would be difficult to hide the presence of aircraft carriers.

But some kind of need for shock naval forces arose, since in 1950 not only the Naval War Ministry and the Naval General Staff were restored, but also the Main

military councils under each of the military departments

(merged in March 1953 into a single Main Military Council under the Ministry of Defense of the USSR).

Here you need to digress again and get acquainted with the occupation of such military structures. The "SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA" says that the Main Military Council is an advisory body under the Minister of Defense of the USSR in peacetime. But for the first time such councils were created by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 322 dated March 13, 1938, under both military people's commissariats. They dealt with the most important issues of building the army and navy. Much attention was paid to the discussion and generalization of the experience of military operations with Japan and Finland. The main military councils gave recommendations on the development of new types of weapons and military equipment and on the modernization of existing mo the reports of the commanders of the military districts on the issues of ensuring the combat readiness of the troops, measures for the preparation of theater of operations and others were heard. 06/23/1941 in connection with the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Main Military Councils of the Red Army and the Navy were abolished.

And until 1950, for some reason, the need for them was felt, although the rearmament of the army and navy was in full swing, and the structure of command and control of troops was also changing. What could have changed in 1950? As mentioned earlier (and especially in the chapter on the events in Korea), Stalin was not opposed to the Americans being drawn into a new big world war at the end of this year or at the beginning of the next. But the crisis in Korea arose with the serious participation of the USSR. And it turns out that active preparations for war were going on not only in North Korea, but also in the Soviet Union itself!

But let's end this small digression and return to naval affairs. It was said above that the Pacific and Baltic fleets were divided. And how was the situation in the other two fleets: Se

true and Black Sea? Were they divided? No, although there were just four "free" numbers left: 1, 2, 3, 6.

For comparison, it can be noted that two American fleets do not operate in the Pacific Ocean: the 3rd (eastern operational direction) and the 7th (western part of the ocean). And in the Atlantic Ocean there are also two American fleets: the 2nd (Atlantic proper) and the 6th (Mediterranean Sea).

Why might the division of the Soviet fleets be required? At least not from the point of view of the defense of its coastal strip. For this, the existing management structure could well be enough. But in the event of a war with the United States and its Western European allies, the need naturally arises not only for "strike naval assets with carrier-based aircraft", but also for the need to conduct operations in various operational areas. For example, the Pacific Fleet would have to send its ships to opposite areas of the Pacific Ocean: to the southeast (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines) and to the northeast (Alaska, the northwest coast of North America).

A similar situation could arise with the Baltic Fleet, when a large group of ships would have to go far to the west to support military operations in West Germany, France, England and beyond. As for the Black Sea Fleet, there could also be a need to divide it into two for two operational directions: the Turkish-Greek and the Western Mediterranean. But it is possible that the division of the Black Sea Fleet was made dependent on the solution of the problem with the Black Sea straits, which was delayed due to the stubbornness of the former Western

allies.

And the need to share could become urgent Northern Fleet, when it would be necessary to send

groups of ships into diverging directions: southeast (Norway, northern Great Britain) and southwest (Svalbard, Iceland, Greenland and the east coast of North America).

But one can ask a perfectly reasonable question:

Are we too carried away by fantastic assumptions? I advise you to flip through the pages

back and read about the drawings of the submarine project for the landing of tank troops in the Arctic. I didn't draw it. And here we will discuss another problem: where to get so many ships? Indeed, for such tasks they may require a lot! But firstly, the Soviet shipbuilding industry to a greater extent built warships (the Soviet Union ordered peaceful ships in other countries). Secondly, many ships were received from the United States under lend-lease, and Stalin was in no hurry to return them. Trucks were given away, and as for the ships, their return was delayed in every possible way. Thirdly, some warships were received from Germany and Italy as trophies. Fourthly, a certain number of ships could be captured in the ports of Western Europe in case of an unexpected attack on them (with the help of landing troops).

Thus, the technical base for maritime operations was available. Perhaps not in full. But in 1941, Hitler showed Stalin that it was not necessary to carry out full training. You can start with minimal sufficiency.

But in any war, military operations at sea are not the main ones. The main work is carried out by the ground forces, which must also be carefully prepared. So let's get back to events on land. The training of troops in the Far East has already been considered above. Therefore, we are moving on to other territories, in particular, to the European north of the USSR. And right away we can

but to say that here too there was a "shuffling

ka" military districts. Moreover, to a greater extent than in the Far East.

But first, let's get acquainted with part of the biography of one of the prominent Soviet military leaders - Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov KA. In the final period of the war with the Germans, he commanded the Karelian Front, then was the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front. And then, as stated in the TSB, he commanded the troops of the Primorsky, Moscow, White Sea and Northern military districts, or according to

years:

1945-1947 - Primorsky Military District;

1947-1949 - Moscow Military District;

1949-1951 - White Sea Military District;

1951 - 1954 - Northern Military District.

It turns out that he commanded four military districts. But in fact - three! Since the name "Northern" would be more correct to write in brackets, and not through the union "and". Minor note? For an answer

Let's move on to the details of this question.

In March 1940, the Arkhangelsk Military District was formed with control based on the command of the 15th Army. After the end of the war in Karelia, 15.12. 1944 The district administration moved from Arkhangelsk to Kem, and the district itself was renamed Belomorsky. Its territory included: Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Murmansk regions, Komi ASSR and Karelo-Finnish SSR.

In February 1946, the Arkhangelsk Military District was again detached from the Belomorsky unit, with command and control based on the field headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army. And in March 1946, the administration of the White Sea Military District moved to Petrozavodsk.

In July 1951, the Belomorsky Military District was renamed into Severny, and the Arkhangelsk - into Belomorsky. New Belomorsky District



shaft until April 1956, then it was disbanded, and its territories were again attached to the Northern District. But the latter four years later, in March 1960, was also disbanded. At the same time, the Komi ASSR was assigned to the Ural Military District, the rest of the territory was included in the Leningrad Military District.

Suppose that Stalin was preparing a war with the United States and England (which from 1949 meant war with the rest of the NATO countries). How were the hostilities in the north of Europe supposed to unfold? Firstly, it would be necessary to send Soviet troops to the north of Norway and to the island of Svalbard, which belonged to Norwegian territory. This would require a separate front. Logically, the name "Northern" and not "Belomorsky" begs for it, since the troops had to move further west from the White Sea. At the same time, the territory of the "preparatory" military district could be transferred to the neighboring military district that remained.

But the troops of the Belomorsk (in Arkhangelsk) military district, in turn, could be used as a second echelon for the troops of the Northern military district, which would have entered the battle first. This can be assumed from the fate of Colonel-General V. A. Frolov. From September 1941 to February 1944, he was the commander of the Karelian Front. In February 1944, he "surrenders" the front to Marshal Meretskov K. A., and he himself becomes his deputy (of course, this was done not according to their wishes, but on the orders of the Headquarters). From 1945 to 1948, General Frolov commanded the White Sea Military District, and from 1949 to 1956, Arkhangelsk (which was renamed Belomorsky in 1951). Since 1956 - in reserve.

In other words, both the Northern and the neighboring White Sea military districts since 1949 were commanded not only by former front commanders, but also by

di, who knew each other well. And besides, they had the experience of fighting in these natural and climatic conditions. And Marshal Meretskov had one more "dignity" from Stalin's point of view - in April 1941 he was arrested (from the post of Chief of the General Staff) and spent several months in the dungeons of the NKVD, where he was beaten in connection with

"leadership" of a non-existent conspiracy of the country's top air force commanders (according to which many of those arrested were shot at the end of 1941).

But the war in the Arctic has a number of features for which one must carefully prepare. Was there any preparation? Was held! This has already been briefly noted in the previous chapters (for example: the presence of aerosleigh units, practicing aircraft landings on floating ice and the construction of railways in the tundra). And in the journal "KNOWLEDGE - POWER" (No. 9, 1993), an entire article by Z. Kanevsky was placed under the heading "TOP SECRET ARCTIC" (that is, "top secret"). In 1951-1955, the author of the article studied at the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University with a specialization in geography of the polar countries, where from the second year and closer to the end of his studies, the word "special course" appeared more and more often in the schedule of classes (such a name *in* Soviet educational institutions usually meant military training).

Himself 3. Kanevsky did not have time to take active teaching in events in the Soviet northern latitudes up to

1953, but he was familiar with information about them. And he writes that *"the Soviet Far North was "closed" shortly before the Patriotic War or with its beginning. All special Arctic publications and many detailed maps ended up in the special depository. And after 1945*

*years one after another in high latitudes passed powerful integrated air expeditions. With the help of aircraft in various points of the Northern Ledo*

*In the twisted ocean, groups of various explorers landed (including purely military ones). On eternal permafrost, secret airfields were built, strategic roads were laid.*

From 2.04.1950 to 11.04.1951 in the eastern Arctic, in the Region of relative inaccessibility, for 374 days the station "North Pole - 2" headed by Mikhail Mikhailovich carried out a secret drift

Somov. The drift went to a distance of 2600 km (or 640 km in a straight line) ("SHORT GEOGRAPHICAL ENTSIK LOPEDIA". M.: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1962, vol. 3).

In its 5th volume, in the article "GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH VANIA IN THE ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC IN THE XX CENTURY" confirms that after the war in high latitudes Air expeditions are regularly carried out with landings on ice at many points (but it is indicated that this process began in 1948). In addition, oceanographic work was carried out in the northern seas on board the Litke (1948) and Equator (1951) vessels.

Kanevsky recalls that the station "SP-2" was prepared and landed in an atmosphere of not just strict, but "insane" secrecy. Radio communication with the station It was encoded, there were no radio communications with relatives. Relatives of the participants of the drift sent parcels to the address "p / box ...". And the members of the expedition themselves worked, as it were, without the right to be themselves, as if in the deep enemy rear. The head of the station, Mikhail Somov, had an order to blow up the station and burn all documentation if there is a threat of American aircraft or submarines. After the successful completion of the drift, by a secret decree, all participants were awarded the Orders of Lenin, and Somov also received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

And not only "SP-2" secretly worked in the ice of the Arctic Ocean. There is a story on the Internet

a former soldier born in 1927 who served as a driver and ended up in the North (<http://www.russdom.ru/2005/200501i/200501026.html>). In 1950, he participated in the secret Arctic operation "Task 70". But first he was instructed to get a special car:

*"... The implementation of this task was entrusted to the OS new to the Air Force, including our unit, where I am, Fedor Aleksandrovich Belyakov, born in 1927. birth, passed the 5th year of military service (total served 10 years). In January 1950, I and another driver brought two GAZ-67 [GAZ-67 is a variant of a jeep], all-terrain vehicles, from the Gorky Automobile Plant . In the workshops, we reinforced them, and here they were made buckets-dumps for cleaning snow and studded tires".*

*"On February 11, 1950, we, the drivers, were picked up at night, brought to the neighboring part, where there was an echelon with cars fixed on the platform. We were dressed in clothes for the North and put in a heating wagon, equipped with bunks and potbelly stove. The train set off, taking us to no one knows where and why..."*

They were taken to the Bolshoi Never station, from there they drove to Yakutsk in a frost of 60 degrees along the Yakutsk highway 1200 km long. There they loaded into a C-47 and flew to Tiksi, where they left one car, and Fyodor Belyakov was taken with the car to Kotelny Island (Novosibirsk Islands), where the officers of his unit were already located. There he changed to ma

tire on studded tires, put a bucket on it and cleaned the runway (runway) for receiving Air Force aircraft. Then, an aircraft of the Polar Aviation LI-2 flew to Kotelny with a crew of experienced polar pilots: commander - Hero of the Soviet Union I. I. Cherevichny, navigator - Valentin Ivanovich Akkuratov (later flag-navigator). This eki

the page flew over the drifting ice of the ocean, from he threw down from the air a suitable ice field for the construction of a runway and aircraft parking and reported the coordinates. And a plane with officers and Fyodor Belyakov's car flew to that place.

Arriving at the place, Belyakov on his "all-terrain vehicle" cleared a runway up to 2 km long and 40-60 meters wide with the expectation of receiving a group of combat aircraft on wheels (*"from heavy (with paratroopers) to fighters"*). It usually took 2-3 days to clear one such runway. Then the crew of Cherevichny flew off to look for a new ice floe. And behind them is a group with the car of the driver Belyakov. So, flying from place to place, on April 12, 1950, they cleared the runway at the Geographic North Pole. The last runway at the beginning of May 1950 was cleared by Fedor Belyakov on about. Wrangel and left the car there. Then he returned to Moscow through Tiksi to his unit, where he served another 2.5 years of urgent service - until the end of 1952. He was supposed to be called up in the fall of 1944. In total, in fact, it turns out 8 years, not 10 - apparently, there is a mistake on the site.

But we will talk more about the fate of the guys born in 1927 later. And here we note that in 1950, even before the start of the Korean War (exactly!) In the Soviet sector of the Arctic up to the North Pole, runways were prepared for landing combat wheeled aircraft for various purposes - fighters and bombers. And where were they going to fly? Who to bomb? Polar bears? Well, let's say that a group of bombers with escort fighters flew to the North Pole. And then what? In turpo years, or what? Admire the northern sun and come back? With full ammo? Or was it planned to bring barrels of fuel to these icy runways for refueling and...

ronu "(by the way) only the territory of Canada was visible. And a little USA (Alaska).

By the way, about the "Alaska Front".

On the same Internet, on the website of the Kommersant newspaper No. 10 (1413) dated January 24, 1998 (<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=191077>), an article by Gulfira ĭ-Chernogaeva "50 YEARS AGO THE SOVIET ARMY READY TO ATTACK ALASKA."

This article cites the story of the former officer of the intelligence department of the 14th army, retired lieutenant colonel Alexander Titensky, who in 1998 lived in Tashkente and, after the statute of limitations, decided to disclose the secret of the war with America that never took place.

According to him, the 14th Army was to land in Alaska in the first echelon of the Soviet landing. Aircraft of the 132nd Long-Range Aviation Regiment were supposed to cover them from the air.

Titensky suggests that the idea to prepare a landing party for Alaska should have arisen in the winter of 1947/48. Since they received an order to relocate to Chukotka in the spring of 1948 in Transbaikalia. At that time he served as a lieutenant in the intelligence department of the 36th Army. But *"in the spring of 1948, they were read a directive from the General Staff on disbanding the headquarters of the 36th Army and*

*on the formation on its basis of the headquarters of the 14th army with stationed in Chukotka, in Providence Bay. Everyone the officers were instructed to immediately hand over their cases and go on vacation, and then return to the Tsugulovsky Datsan in order to proceed to the north in echelons.*

*Transfers to other parts and districts were strictly forbidden, no circumstances - neither medical nor family - were taken into account. All*

*were automatically enrolled in the new army.*

Further, Titensky said that, as an intelligence officer, he learned about the great activity of the Americans in Alaska to create military facilities, primarily about

derogatory character, which became known to Soviet intelligence.

*"..Metam 1948, before sending echelons*

*14th Army from Transbaikalia, to the north, officers of the topographic service of the army headquarters were urgently summoned to Moscow and Khabarovsk. They returned already to Vladivostok, where, under great secrets, they told that in the General Staff, and in the headquarters of the commander of the Far Eastern Districts, they collect operational topographic maps of Alaska, Canada, and even the Pacific US coasts. Some of the maps came directly from the military cartographic factories. Their quality was remarkable: even small farms, bridges and fords on tiny rivers were marked.*

Then from Vladivostok, units of the 14th Army should be sent by ship to Chukotka in Provideniya Bay. But the dispatch slowed down, as the army command flew to the North and made sure that there was no place to settle the paratroopers yet - a "wild

*edge, which can not be large in the rear*

*landing operation. Tundra, however! There are no "bushes". It is impossible to dig holes - permafrost. Plus, there is no serious heating infrastructure. By*

Therefore, the first steamships were sent there, loaded "not with soldiers and equipment, but with cement, wood and stoves." But there were not enough ships, so the first units with headquarters went to Chukotka only at the end of September 1948. In addition to this army, the Dal VO included five army corps: two each in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, one in Kamchatka. There was also military aviation. "In the autumn of 1948 from the airfields of Sakhalin,

*South Kuriles and Primorye began relocation*

*to the north of aviation, in particular, the air regiments of the 334th Koenigsberg Aviation Division. 132nd Berlin long-range bomber regiment armed with Tu-2 bombers was deployed for urgent*

*but the reconstructed Kamchatka airfield Eli*

*calling."*

Another Tashkent veteran, aviator Eldar Karimov, served in Yelizovo. He said that they were not officially informed of the essence of combat work for the bombers. *"But both pilots and technicians openly discussed the upcoming "combat work" to ensure landing operation in Alaska.*

In the winter from 1948 to 1949, the bulk of the officers and soldiers were in Provideniya Bay. *"They are camped in insulated tents built by the military ny sappers. There were few barracks. But there were many frostbitten and sick."*

When they were taken out of there, the article does not indicate. Only a hint is given that, apparently, in Moscow they realized that such an undertaking was a complete adventure. But it must be assumed that in 1949-early 1950 (at least until summer navigation) the 14th Army was still in Providence Bay. That is coincides in time with various military "measures" both in the subpolar ice and in Korea. Accident? Or a completely serious readiness to "land" in Alaska in the event of an "expansion" of the Korean War?

After 1945, Americans and Canadians also showed interest in the Arctic. They also directed high-latitude expeditions and took aerial photographs. From the spring of 1952 to 1962, the American station T-3 (Fletcher's Ice Island) drifted in the Arctic. But the Americans began to show military interest in Greenland as early as 1941. On April 9 of that year, the Danish envoy to Washington signed a defense agreement with the American government (ratified by the Danish Riksdag on May 16, 1945). The United States built several military bases on Greenland (the largest of them is located in the village of Tula). Then it was focused on defense against Hitler's Germa



research institutes. But after the war, as Soviet-American relations deteriorated, the military bases in Greenland acquired a new purpose—defense against the USSR. And after Denmark joined NATO between the Danish and American governments on April 27, 1951, it was under

a new agreement was written to continue cooperation between Denmark and the United States in the joint defense of the island. By 1971, the Americans had two military bases and other military installations in Greenland with a total staff of 2,000 to 4,000 people (TSB information).

Returning to the Soviet military presence in the Far North, one can note another oddity associated with the fate of the head of the first Soviet Arctic station "SP-1" Rear Admiral (1943) I. D. Papanin. For some reason, in all his biographies that could be found, there are no instructions on what he did from 1946 to 1948. Listed only

his following positions:

1941 - 1945 - authorized GKO for transportation in the North and at the same time head of Glavsev sea route";

1948-1951 - Deputy Director of the Institute of Oceanology of the USSR Academy of Sciences for expeditions;

since 1951 - Head of the Department of Marine Expeditionary Works of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR;

since 1952 - (at the same time) director of the Institute of biology of internal waters of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

As for snowmobiles, as noted earlier, during the war of 1941-1945, a lot of combat experience was accumulated in their use, including as part of special snowmobile battalions. However, the history of the snowmobile, as it were, ends with the end of the war. There is evidence of their use on post-war postal aerosleigh lines in the Far East and the Far North. However, for this, did the uneconomical former combat snowmobiles build

ki 1941 and 1942. And there is a mention of the post-war service of combat snowmobiles "mainly in the border troops." Strange. But, unfortunately, there are no other data on this technique yet.

Thus, it can be quite convincingly noted that the USSR was actively preparing for a war in the Arctic.

But there are considerations that prisoners ("black jackets") could turn out to be an additional manpower reserve for the front line. There were many of them in the North at that time. We can recall the camps in the Komi ASSR, in Vorkuta, around Arkhangelsk, as well as in Kolyma, Chukotka (for example, see the article by S. Golubchikov "STALIN'S "AUSCHENTIM" IN CHUKOTKA" in **the** journal "Energy: Economics, Technology, Ecology", 1991, no. 2). Moreover, the remains of the Chukotka camps could be found as early as the 70s, for example, along the roads from the northern port city of Pevek to the depths of Chukotka. Large "houses" built from local stones in the form of a large tent have been preserved from them - this is for prisoners. And for protection, small houses of the usual type were built nearby, with walls painted in two colors - blue below, yellow above. Local geologists assured that the first Soviet atomic bombs were created on

Chukchi uranium.

But after the war, another feature appeared in the case with the camps. It was noticed by the former Intlag prisoner A. Zorokhovich, who was already mentioned in the chapter on "blank spots" in the postwar history of Soviet technology. In his memoirs, he emphasizes that the northern outskirts of the USSR, separated from the main territory by the "Iron Curtain", at the end of the 40s were a real slave state within a state. But amazing for

it turned out to be the behavior of two camp leaders: Lieutenant Bogdansky, the head of one mine camp, and Lieutenant Nazarkin, the chief

as a planning and production part. Unlike others, they treated the prisoners "like people". Then it turned out that before the camp they were combat pilots. Zorohovich, who worked at the Research Institute of Minaviaprom before his arrest, once asked Nazarkin why he abandoned his profession? In response, former the pilot told the whole story.

*"It was in the summer of 1945. The regiment in which he served, stood near Bucharest. In Romania at the time in power was the young King Mihai, a military pilot by profession. On the king's birthday band*

*pilots, including Nazarkin, decided to go to royal palace and congratulate your colleague profession, recently, by the way, awarded Soviet order "Victory". None of them are anything I didn't see anything wrong with that. But of course everything they hoped that the king would bring them a cup or two. When the king was informed that a group of Soviet pilots came to wish him a happy birthday, he invited everyone to the table. "We tasted such wines," said Nazarkin, "that we would never have had to."*

*After the royal treat, the pilots, leaving the palace, saw the commandant's car waiting for them.*

*They did not judge them, but they lowered them in ranks and sent to work in distant camps, which at that time were growing rapidly, and there were not enough regular camp officers.*

Interesting story! So, in the summer of 1945, the command of Nazarkin and others received some "order" for secondment of a certain number of officers for use in the Gulag system. And now let's remember what special things could happen at that time (in the summer of 1945)? First

turn - the reduction of the army, i.e. many, including officers, were to be transferred to the reserve. But it turns out that the government of the USSR (i.e., Stalin personally) already in the summer of 1945 takes some decision to transfer

de a certain number of BATTLE OFFICERS for a new, "peaceful" type of service - as commanders in camps (which, in turn, could be considered as "peaceful" "penal battalions"). For the world community, the Soviet Union is reducing the army, but in fact a considerable reserve for future fronts is preserved. Especially for a future war in the Arctic, where it would be too noticeable to keep a lot of "normal" troops. Here, by the way, it would be quite appropriate to recall the fact of the transfer of former Soviet prisoners of war from Nazi concentration camps to Soviet ones. These are natural troops! So what if the "normal" army was reduced? First, only until 1948. And secondly, it is quite possible to add on the camps where former prisoners of war were kept. By the way, some prisoners who went through the front and the Nazi captivity, after the death of Stalin, tried to organize uprisings (for example, near Vorkuta, when they held out for 3 months, and only the planes managed to stop the "black jackets" that got out of control).

But it was necessary to train "normal" troops, including somewhere near the Northern and White Sea military districts. What counties were their neighbors? From the south - Leningrad and Moscow. From the southeast and east - the Ural and West Siberian. Leningrad and Moscow, of course, could be a reserve for the northern districts. But their territory was too industrialized, and it was impossible to "bare" it in case of emergency. That is, their management primarily solved non-combat tasks of an internal nature: maintaining order and preparing various resources. This also confirms Stalin's attitude to their command. Some generals left Leningradsky for other positions. For example, the former commander of the front, Marshal L.A. Govorov, who in April 1946 transferred from the post of commander

this district to the post of chief inspector of the Ground Forces, and from July 1948, commander of the country's air defense forces. Or the previously mentioned General G. F. Odintsov, who in 1947 transferred to the post of artillery commander of the troops of the Far East from a similar position in the Leningrad Military District. Or the same Marshal Meretskov, who in 1947 took over the Moscow District from Colonel-General Artemyev P.A., and in 1949 surrendered it to him. By the way, General Artemiev commanded the Moscow Military District until 1953, when Marshal arrived in this position

Soviet Union Moskalenko K. S.

Other neighbors may be of more interest northern military districts - Ural and West Siberian. First, they were located away from the eyes of foreigners. Secondly, their natural and climatic conditions were very similar to the nature and climate of North America. Third, they were both commanded by former commanders of the fronts: the Ural fronts, the pre-war chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov (1948-1953); West Siberian - General of the Army Eremenko A. I. (1946-1953).

Marshal Zhukov did not escape Stalin's disrespectful treatment after the war. For a long time they did not like to remember this until the 90s came. The most detailed description of this story appeared in the Ogonyok magazine, 1993, No. 11, in which, on p. 12-13 was placed the article by G. Tsitrinyak "CRIMINAL CASE OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV". In it at

there is evidence that after his appointment in January 1941 as chief of the General Staff in the NKVD, they began to prepare "incriminating materials" against him. Various generals and officers were arrested and interrogated. The "case" was conducted until the end of the summer of 1942, then stopped. This includes the arrest

a few months (in 1941) of the future Marshal Me  
Retskov.

But since the end of 1945, this process has been restored.  
after Stalin at one of the meetings in the Kremlin publicly accused Zhukov  
of attributing all the victories to himself (despite the fact that Soviet military  
historians at that time were intensively developing the idea of "ten hundred  
lin strikes", which meant all  
the main strategic offensive operations of the Soviet troops since 1944).

Two criminal cases were opened. First, the Minister of Aviation Industry  
of the USSR A.I. Shakhurin was arrested, but he did not testify against  
Zhukov. Then (until May 1946) they arrested the air marshal

A. A. Novikov and former adjutant Zhukov, Lieutenant Colonel A. S.  
Semochkin. *"After severe torture, both  
signed testimony against Zhukov.*

In May 1946, Stalin assembled the Chief Military  
The council at which he brought charges against the famous marshal. But,  
as Zhukov himself recalled, *"most of the marshals who spoke supported  
me.  
Particularly sharp in my defense was Marshal of the Armored Troops P.  
S. Rybalko, " who, in part  
news, he said that one cannot trust the testimony, drawing  
brutal violence in prisons. However, after this meeting, Stalin removed  
Zhukov from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and  
sent him to command the Odessa Military District, and since 1948, the Urals.*

Briefly about the fate of Novikov and Rybalko. Summing up  
data of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" and "Soviet Military Encyclopedia",  
it turns out as follows  
current:

Novikov A. A. - Chief Marshal of Aviation (1944),  
twice Hero of the Soviet Union (both times - 1945).  
1942-1946 - Commander of the USSR Air Force;

1946-1953 - *"Held a number of responsible positions in the Air Force";*

1953-1956 - Commander of Long-Range Aviation;  
since 1956 - In reserve due to illness.

Rybalko P. S. - Marshal of the Armored Forces  
(1945), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1943, 1945).

From April 1946 - First Deputy Commander, and from April 1947 - Commander of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Soviet Army

missions.

Years of life: 1894-28.08.1948 (Moscow).

We return to the fate of Zhukov. Since the beginning of 1948 resumed the arrests of generals related to him. But the matter did not come to his arrest. Moreover, Stalin gradually began to promote him in the system of the Soviet hierarchy. In particular, at the end of 1952, Zhukov was a delegate to the XIX Congress of the CPSU, where he became a candidate member of the presidium of the Central Committee of the party. But Zhukov managed to "recoup" more fully for the humiliation only after Stalin's death.

Now let's move on to the situation with other military districts. A certain dynamics in their reorganization was observed in the eastern and southern parts of the European zone of the USSR. Here we can recall the existence of the Taurida military district in the south of Ukraine (1945-4.04.1956). We can recall the divisions and mergers of military districts in the North Caucasus and Central Russia. It can be recalled that before the war in 1941, for the "defense", one Kiev military district was quite enough for the entire western half of Ukraine, and after the war, when possible opponents moved to the West, for some reason the Carpathian Military District with headquarters in Lvov was needed (closer to the West?). By the way, about him. I mean about the situation

with Soviet troops beyond the western border of the USSR. In Poland, there was the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, headed by the former commander of the front, Marshal K. Rokossovsky. Among historians, there were opinions that Stalin did not do well to him by sending him to serve in Poland as the Minister of Defense (and this is also considered as a reference by analogy with Zhukov). But, firstly, before becoming the Minister of Defense of Poland, Marshal Rokossovsky was already in it, commanding the Soviet troops. Only the headquarters was not in Warsaw, but in ... Legnica (at least in 1945—

1946). Pavlov I.P. testifies to this in the already mentioned collection "HAVE THE POWER TO REMEMBER ...". In order to avoid arrest before the war, he changed jobs, moved from city to city, became an officer during the war, fought, was shell-shocked. After the war, on business, he went to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces in the city of Legnica to see Rokossovsky. This is the extreme southwest of Poland. Why not in Warsaw?

Perhaps in order to close the "gap" in Czechoslovakia between the Soviet troops in East Germany and East Austria in the event of a war.

In addition, Soviet troops were in Hungary and Romania. In his memoirs, Khrushchev writes that they tried to send troops into Czechoslovakia, but Klement Gottwald at that time convinced him not to do this. Then Stalin agreed. Possibly, he considered a quick introduction of troops to be real, in which case from the same Poland, whose Minister of Defense (1949-1956) and his deputy (1945-1956) (General Poplavsky S.G.) were immigrants from the USSR (and even in There were many immigrants from the Soviet Union in the Polish army). And once again, we note that Marshal Rokossovsky ended the war as a front commander.

Military districts near the western border of the Soviet



Union after the war was also headed by former teams

blowing fronts (Baltic - Army General Bagramyan I. Kh. (1946-1954), Belarusian - Marshal Timoshenko S. K (1949-1960), Carpathian - Army General Eremenko A. I. (1945-1946) and Marshal Konev I. S. (1951-1955)).

In addition to the organizational training of troops on his territory, Stalin also controlled the interaction of the armies of the new allies. But historians usually like to start the topic of military cooperation between the socialist countries with the Warsaw Pact. And I want to draw attention to it. But I hear the question: "What does this have to do with it? After all, it was created in 1955 after the death of Stalin and in response to the creation of NATO!" That's right, I want to discuss this thesis: "IN ANSWER". As far as we know, NATO was created on April 4, 1949. "Warsaw Pact" in 1955. And if I say this phrase: Hitler's troops attacked Poland in 1939, and in response to this, Soviet troops entered Berlin in May 1945. Again I hear the question: "How is it? Many years have passed from 1939 to 1945. Many events have happened. Only 06/22/1941 "exactly 4.00" is worth something (and some people write "3.45"). If you count by minutes, then six

years will result in astronomical numbers.

Then why is the 1955 event URGENTLY suggest that it be considered as a RESPONDING to an event six years ago? Everything is clear without explanation ny?

By the way, Stalin was categorically against the creation of any military blocs between the countries of Eastern Europe. Is that understandable too? Strange! Until 1955, a military bloc in the east of Europe is not needed. And it's elementary! And since 1955, for some reason, it was very much needed! And this is also quite understandable! Who understands? I'm not quite, if you take into account

only official explanations, or rather, the lack of those.

Recall that the conflict with Yugoslavia occurred precisely because of the problems between the Yugoslav leadership government and Soviet advisers, including the military nym. That is, it is openly admitted that Soviet military advisers were in the countries of "people's" democracy without any kind of joint bloc agreement. And what should the leading bodies of the military blocs do? Apparently, to create joint defense systems. So, if before 1955 there was no military bloc in Eastern Europe, then there were no joint defense systems either? And if there were no joint defense systems, how could Stalin plan a world war?

But let's read a quote from the article "AIR VYAZ" ("VIZH", 1992, No. 6-7. Author - Air Marshal I. I. Pstygo). The article is devoted to the fate of General Zimi on G.V.: *"In December 1951, G. V. Zimin was appointed to the very responsible position of the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense (more precisely, the Ministry of War) for the unified air defense system of the people's democracies. This work area was kept under personal control of Stalin, and Zimin repeatedly I had to meet with him and report on the state of affairs. Create an air defense system of the people's countries Democracy is a big, complex, multifaceted matter. The work went on with great difficulty, but gradually got better. Finally, the system started working - in these countries they began to be on duty and perform security tasks air barriers own air defense forces, which is no small merit of Zimin.*

So, Stalin was not stopped by the absence of officially signed treaties. Joint military systems were created as needed and without the presence of a military bloc. Creation of the Warsaw

agreement" was required for other reasons. But this is a topic for another conversation. And here we can note another fact of the preparation of a surprise attack - the creation of a joint military system of several countries without an official military bloc between them (i.e. when trying to carry out these measures in very deep secrecy).

On the contrary, the absence of a military bloc (i.e., the absence of joint governing bodies) allowed Stalin much more effectively to carry out activities according to his own plan under the formal guise of bilateral economic agreements. Otherwise, extra time would have to be spent on interconnecting plans, which would have to be created in two forms: formal for cover and actual in deep secrecy. And this would complicate the task and could introduce confusion. In general, a military bloc is more viable in the case of defense against an aggressor (or to preserve power from other threats). But creating it to prepare an attack is difficult. Firstly,

excessive interconnection of two-level plans; secondly, an extra source of information leakage; thirdly, it is much more calm to put the governments of other "allied" countries before the fact of war than to explain to them in advance the "charms" of the near future. And no matter how much you send "your" people to the "allied" countries we, they have the opportunity to resist or do something wrong. Yugoslavia showed this to Stalin by a clear example. Moreover, the situation in the Eastern European countries still needed to be brought to the desired state.

This, in particular, was shown by the exchange of opinions at the information conference of representatives of some communist parties in Poland at the end of September 1947 (a collection of speeches by the participants of which was published in Moscow in 1948 by the publishing house of political

literature). The CPSU(b) was represented by Zhdanov and Malenkov.

If you carefully read the notes of the reports, then with gives the following impression: representatives of other countries (except the USSR) talked about their internal problems (crop failures, elections, lack of goods) and agreed that the Soviet Union provides assistance on a larger scale than the United States. And the representatives of the USSR considered it most important to explain the international situation to their colleagues. Zhdanov's report was called: "On the international situation." In it

it was believed that of the six great imperialist

After the war, only one power remained strong - the United States of America, which wants to seize the whole world. And then it was noted:

*"But the USSR with its growing international influence stands in the way of the USA to world domination...*

*Therefore, the new expansionist and reactionary*

*US policy is designed to fight against*

*USSR ... Thus, the expansionist program*

*The United States is extremely reminiscent of the ingloriously failed adventurist program of the fascist*

*aggressors, recent pretenders to world domination..."*

Amazing! Less than two years had passed since the end of the joint struggle against the fascists, as one of the allies wrote down the other in the next "fascists". By the way, there was no NATO yet (the creation of which was a year and a half away!). But everything is clear to Stalin:

*"After the war, two camps were formed - the imperialist and the anti-democratic, which had as its main goal the establishment of world domination.*

*of American imperialism and the destruction of democracy, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, which has as its main goal the undermining of imperial*

*realism, the strengthening of democracy and the liquidation of the remnants of fascism.*

Who is in the forefront of these "remains", see the quote above. But what does "liquidation of residues" mean? In what way it was necessary to liquidate them - by the military? I hear an indignant voice: "The Communists never called for war!"

And here I would like to object and turn to the famous primary source - the work of I. Stalin "SHORT COURSE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CPSU(B)", published in millions of copies in different languages of the world. At the end of 1950, 12 years were celebrated from the date of its first publication. In the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda of October 1, 1950, on the second page, a large article was devoted to this event under the heading: "The GREATEST CREATION OF STALIN'S GENIUS."

On the attitude of the Communists to the war, it says:

*"Tov. Stalin in his "Short Course..." expounds the Marxist-Leninist view of the nature of wars in the era imperialism, teaches us to distinguish between just wars and unfair, breaks the wrong look at Bolsheviks as a kind of pacifists.*

*... War, - indicates comrade. Stalin - sometimes two kinds:*

*a) just war, non-conquest, freedom diligent, with the aim of either protecting the people from external attack and attempts to enslave it, or the liberation of the people from the slavery of capitalism, or, finally, the liberation of the colonies and dependent countries from the oppression of the imperialists, ... "*

For those who are not understanding, the formula can be simplified even more: "A just war can be aimed at either protection from an external attack, or ... " Next are the options for a just attack on others."

I can also cite a quotation from Lenin's work, which struck me while still studying at the institute:

*"They gave you ... (a rifle, a machine gun,) ... a rapid-fire*

*cannon, take these instruments of death and destruction, do not listen to sentimental whiners who fear war; there is still too much left in the world that must be destroyed with fire and iron for the liberation of the working class..."* (V. I. Lenin, vol. 26, PSS, p. 259).

No one tried to compare the "Short Course ..." Steel on with Hitler's "Mein Kampf"? And in vain, I feel, one could find interesting parallels if one replaces national superiority with class struggle. But we digress. Let's better consider the question \*, but how to know whether a just attack or not?

Here is his explanation and should occupy an important the place in politics of the main determinant of justice, who then, by the will of various circumstances, turned out to be I. V. Stalin. In particular, it was necessary to explain and leading asset of the new allied countries in joint my camp.

Zhdanov in his report at a meeting in Poland in end of 1947 clearly explained the intentions of Soedi uninhabited states:

*"The military strategic plan of the United States provides for the creation in peacetime of numerous bases and bridgeheads ... intended for use in aggressive purposes against the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. American air and naval bases exist or are newly established in Alaska, Japan, Italy, South Korea, China, in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Austria and West Germany. Feverish preparations are under way to use the Arctic for purposes of military aggression. The concrete expression of the expansionist aspirations in the USA under present conditions are Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.*

Several remarks can be made on the above list of countries.

1) Why can't the USA create military bases on its territory (Alaska)?

2) In the previous chapters it has already been considered, with whose active participation American troops ended up (or were delayed) in Germany, South Korea, China, Iran, Turkey, Greece and Japan.

3) For balance, it would be useful to indicate a list of countries where Soviet troops were located. But then this the phenomenon, apparently, was meant as "fair". (By the way, in the Law of the USSR of January 15, 1960 on the second reduction of troops by 1,200,000, as proof of the "peacefulness" of the Soviet Union, a list of countries was given from which the USSR withdrew its troops, but for some reason it was not indicated for what they were there.)

In addition to the aggressive forces in the US-led camp, at a meeting in Poland at the end of 1947 there were additional opponents of the communists in European countries were identified - right-wing social democrats. They should have been called *"traitors in the business of frustrating the plans of imperialist aggression."*

I personally reread this phrase several times, trying to understand its meaning. I'll give you a line of thought: Let us suppose that the imperialists are preparing aggression, transferring industry to a military regime, increasing the army, and so on. How should political forces act in these conditions? To disrupt them, call for their collective sabotage. Or actively support the activities of the authorities, then they can be called traitors in the matter of disruption. And what could the political forces in war-ravaged European countries call for in 1947? To a new war? Something doubtful. Bordering on mental illness. So, they were not called to a new war, but why were they classified as traitors? Maybe they didn't call for sabotage? What kind of political forces are they if they did not call for anything? But why are they traitors?

In short, I suppose that with this formula, Stalin taught the communist activists of the European countries the following: the imperialists MUST prepare aggression. But the RED ARMY must break it. A right

high Social-Democrats, calling for peace, get confused in feet of the imperialists and frustrate their preparations for aggression. But that's how the role of the Red Army in thwarting aggression is being thwarted! In this case, the Right Social Democrats are indeed traitors.

And the fact that the activists of foreign communist parties needed training is also shown by the materials of the conference itself in Poland at the end of 1947.

For example, a representative of the Hungarian communists I. Revai, apparently wanting to give an example of a traitor behavior of right-wing social democrats, issued by which passage

*"As for the Social Democrats, their policy during the election campaign (in Hungary in August 1947) was dictated by the right wing. For achievement they adopted their goal from the anti-communist reaction and partly anti-Soviet slogans and arguments. For example, throughout the country spread provocative rumors that if the communists win the elections, they will immediately organize van collective farms.*

Strange, what is anti-Soviet here? Malenkov himself at the same meeting, he listed the achievements of the planned Soviet system in the USSR, among which a certain place was given to the advantages of the collective farm system. Maybe "anti-Soviet" was contained in the word "immediately"? Does this mean that it is not humane to "break the backs" of the peasants all at once, is this an achievement of socialism?

And how was Stalin going to eliminate the remnants of fascism - systematically or how it would turn out? But a plan is a very serious thing. In this case, completely gender



It was dangerous for Stalin to attack the leaders of the new allied countries of the USSR. It is much safer to rely on your advisers and your own armed forces. And when the "just" attack begins, find out

It won't take long to figure out who is an ally and who is a traitor. With traitors, according to the laws of wartime, the conversation is always short. So it turns out that the military bloc in the east of Europe was harmful to Stalin. Therefore, let us return to the USSR of those years and continue to consider under training of the Soviet armed forces.

Troops with a certain number of people must attack someone. What was the situation with this case after the war? Historians very loudly explain that after the war the Soviet armed forces were drastically reduced (from 11.5 million people in 1945 to 2,874,000 people in 1948). These figures are given in many publications (for example, Donchenko V. N.

"DEMOBILIZATION OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL IN THE FIRST POST-WAR YEARS", magazine "ISTORIYA SSSR", 1970, No. 3). And they usually added: *"Oh what Could the "Soviet threat" be discussed?"*

That's right, an army of 3 million is not enough to conquer world space. But why do historians "stumble" about 1948? And what happened in the following years? I answer: the number of Soviet troops began to GROW! Those who do not believe can count. From 1955 to 1962, reductions of Soviet troops were carried out for a total amount of over 3 million people. And if after them about 4 million people were to remain in the troops, then it turns out that by the time of Stalin's death, the army should have increased to 7 million people (in peacetime and in the presence of incompletely equipped units!).

However, an explanation can be put forward: the Soviet Union did not plan a new war, in 1946-1948 it carried out the demobilization of troops, but in 1949 the

"Cold War", the external threat has risen, so  
mu and had to increase the army.

Composite fairy tale. But before agreeing with her,  
it would be useful to get acquainted with the system of calling for  
dismissal in those years. As I already noted in DIGES TE, in  
addition to the "older" ages, en masse with  
called:

- in 1942 - guys born in 1925;
- in 1943 - guys born in 1926;
- in 1944 - guys born in 1927.

In the summer of 1945, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR  
adopted the Law "On the demobilization of older ages of the  
personnel of the active army." (M., OGIZ Publishing House, 1945).  
It was sequencing and  
the order of dismissal of older ages, in particular, by the end of  
1946, 30 ages were dismissed from the army, but some of the  
"senior" remained until the end of March 1948, the dismissal of  
which was carried out according to the February (1948) decision  
of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces. This is confirmed  
by Stalin himself in an interview with a faceless correspondent  
for the newspaper Pravda on February 17, 1951:

*"QUESTION: How do you regard the latest statement of the  
British Premier Attlee in the House of Commons about  
that after the end of the war the Soviet Union did not  
disarmed, i.e., did not demobilize his troops, which  
Since then, the Soviet Union has been increasing its  
armed forces?*

*ANSWER: I regard this statement of the prime minister  
Attlee as a slander against the Soviet Union. To the whole world  
it is known that the Soviet Union demobilized after  
war their troops. As you know, demobilization was  
was carried out in three stages : the first and second stages were  
carried out during 1945, and the third stage - from May to  
September 1946. In addition, in 1946 and 1947. was  
demobilization of senior ages of personal  
composition of the Soviet Army, and at the beginning of 1948 were*

*all remaining older ages were demobilized.*

*These are the well-known facts...*

Strange. Again, the phrase "older ages" catches the eye. And not a word about the fate of the "younger ones". But excuse me, Stalin gave an interview in February 1951. It turns out that by this time in the Soviet troops were there any "younger" ages from the time of the war? Is it possible? I answer: exactly like that, they stayed. The "younger" ages included guys born in 1925, 1926 and 1927. But maybe my father, purely by chance, ended up in some elite units? Firstly, it was my father who was unable to access the "elite" units: he spent 1941-1943 in the Bryansk region, which was then occupied by the Germans.

Moreover, there is even confirmation of this information in the book by V. M. Khaitsman "USSR AND THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. 1945-1959". In it on p. 105 states that since April 1948 *"there were mainly conscripts of two ages in the Soviet Army - 1926 and 1927 years of birth."* But nothing is said about when they were drafted and when they were finally fired. And what does the remark "mostly" mean? What age was omitted - 1925?

To clarify the situation, it would be useful to chat talking to veterans, can they confirm all this? Unexpectedly, fate took me a few of these meetings.

The first took place on a quiet sunny September on the evening of September 3, 1994, when I was returning from a suburban dacha. The role of one of the bags for the harvest I played an army duffel bag. I went to the dacha by regular bus, the final stop of which was a few kilometers from ours.

Shortly after the bus passed stop, and I stayed to wait, an unfamiliar elderly man came to the stop. He said hello

Xia and asked if the bus had passed to the terminal. I replied that I had passed. After that, he lowered his bags with the harvest on the ground, began to arrange them and said: "Here, I'm used to them, I don't even want to let go of them." I pointed to my duffel bag and said that I really liked it for its convenience. The man was silent for a few seconds and suddenly says: "But I had to wear one in urgent seven years." I was almost dumbfounded by these words and decided to ask him in more detail. To begin with, he asked: "*And what year are you?*" He answered briefly: "*Twenty-seven.*" After such an answer, I began to feverishly think about how to talk to him until the bus arrived. But he went on himself and began to explain that the 1944 conscription was so "lucky". But couples born in 1928 already served "normally" -

three years.

*When were they called?* I asked.

*"In 1948,"* he replied.

*Maybe in 1949?* I tried to clarify. He replied that he did not remember. And then we had this conversation:

*- And when you quit in 1951 - at the beginning of the year or at the end?*

*- I didn't quit. I went to a one-year officer course in 1950.*

*Looked at such a life and*

*decided to go to the officers, otherwise it was not clear how much longer he would have to serve as a soldier. Courses were at the school. We were also given general training. From U.S turned out to be better officers than those who studied normal three years.*

*- But you somehow explained why you need so much serve? After all, every soldier knows when he has demobilization!*

*- No explanation! Serve and all!*

*- And how did you recruit for the courses? There were some messages scheniya in newspapers?*

- *Nothing was written in the newspapers. It was a special set. Agitators traveled to military units.*

*So I ended up in Kaliningrad, which is Koenigsberg. Learn well, mines, obstacles (and listed other elements of sapper business).*

- *And after school where were you sent?*

- *Optional. We had the opportunity to choose*

*army. So I ended up in Kyiv. (And again began to remember, how well they taught, gave knowledge of the Russian language, mathematics, German ...)*

*I asked: "And English?"*

- *Did not have.*

- *Well, of course, because they were going to fight with America, England.*

*"We weren't going to fight..."*

But he had already said the last words, rising to bus, and our conversation was interrupted.

As a result, I received not only confirmation of the fate of the guys in 1927, but also new information: at the beginning of 1950, Stalin decided to increase the number of junior officers in 1951 through, among other things, accelerated retraining of soldiers and sergeants.

My father, in the summer of 1950, also entered courses at school. But at home he did not say that agitators went around the military units. He believed that the path to the officers was ordered to him because of the line in his biography: "I was in the occupied territory." But he wanted to become an officer, and he explained that he got into the courses by a successful car repair to some general, who helped. But if there hadn't been a wide agitation in schools, then another question is how my service would have turned out.

th father further.

Moreover, my random fellow traveler said that he studied at the courses for a year. And my father is six months old. Why such a hurry? Once I asked my father, where did the graduates from his courses go? He replied that the group

accelerated graduation (in which he also found himself) went to the Far East, the rest studied for another 6 months and then ended up in Germany.

Then there were more meetings with veterans of 1927 birth. One happened right at work.

At the end of the 1980s, I knew that Vasily Prokofievich Salo was the Minister of Construction of Ukraine. But in the early 90s, after retiring, he began working for us in a construction trust. Somehow I met him, and sometimes we had to communicate on production issues. Then I found out that his birthday is November 21st. And when I was already working on the book, I also found out the year of his birth - 1927.

And then one day I made up my mind and asked him to share his memories of serving in the army in the postwar period. He agreed and listed in some detail the places and positions of his service.

He was drafted on November 21, 1944, and ended up in the Gorokhovetsky camps (near Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod), where I also had to spend many months in 1982-1984). There, in the 51st training rifle regiment of the 30th Ivanovo rifle division, he was preparing to become a gunner of 4 5-mm guns. In the same camps they had to meet the Victory.

In the summer of 1945, after some decree by Stalin on replenishment of the navy (whose sailors were often used in the war on the front line instead of infantry), Vasily Prokofievich was transferred to the Moscow naval crew (in Khimki).

In October 1945, he was sent to Kyiv to the training detachment of the Navy for a 6-month course of helmsmen and signalmen, after which he ended up on the Danube military flotilla. At first he served in the city of Baja (Hungary) on the Zheleznyakov monitor (which now stands as a monument on Rybalsky Island in Kyiv).

Then he was transferred to the 1st brigade of river ships

lei of the Danube military flotilla (armored boat 231), based in Vienna, Kuhelau backwater. Vasily Prokofievich explained that they had to go on combat duty in the area of Linz (west of Vienna). They were on duty opposite the American armored boats.

After the reduction of the Central Group of Forces, at the end of 1947, the division was transferred to the city of Reni (Odessa region), and then to the city of Vilkovo, where Vasily Prokofievich served until his transfer to the reserve at the end of October 1951 with the rank of foreman of the 1st article .

And here is another unexpected meeting from 1927: the biography of the writer Vladimir Dmitrievich Uspensky, printed on the inside cover of ROMAN GAZETA, 1992, no. Although I do not agree with some of his conclusions and

storylines, but I believe that this novel for the first time paid attention to a number of tragic events of 1941, which official historians rarely addressed. In this regard, his novel has a certain value. But it turned out that there is also an interesting stage in his biography. In particular, it says

rushes:

*"IN. Uspensky was born in 1927 in the city of Odoev Tula region. Member of the Great Patriotic war. Until 1951 he served in the Navy. Then, before the publication of the first book, - a journalist in Moscow. He graduated in absentia from the Faculty of History of the Arkhangelsk Teachers' Institute and the Literary Institute named after A.M. Gorky... More For thirty years the author has been working on a confessional novel, THE PRIVATE COUNSELOR TO THE LEADER.*

Thousands of people could read this biography, but few paid attention to the phrase "I served until 1951...". And only the veterans of 1927 could clarify it: **"conscription** service, starting from 1944."

Stalin was right when he spoke in February 1951 about the dismissal of only "older" draft ages. But why did this clarification then disappear from the lexicon of official historians? Didn't consider it important to understand the details? Or decided *"uninitiated not*

*embarrass"*? So, after all, *"not by that, this is how the family is known ... not by itself, but through those who themselves ..."*.

But that is not all. It is necessary to find out when the "normal" conscription of youth was resumed in the USSR. The fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1939 adopted the Law on Universal Military Duty. According to it, citizens were called up for active military service who were 19 years old in the year of conscription from January 1 to December 31, and who graduated from high school and corresponding educational institutions - 18. The terms of service were set as follows:

- for ordinary land units - 2 years;
- for sergeants - 3;
- for privates and sergeants of the Air Force - 4;
- for privates and sergeants of coastal defense - 4;
  
- for privates and foremen of the Navy - 5 years.

Perhaps this order after the war somehow changed, since until the end of 1967 they served in the Ground Forces for 3 years, and in the Navy - 4. And in 1967, the term of service was reduced by one year and began to be recruited starting from 18 years under the new Law on universal conscription. Once I was talking to a man who had served 3 years in 1967 and was leaving with those who had served two. He was offended.

So, a specific question: when were the guys born in 1928 called? Theoretically, they should have been in 1947. But as it has already been clarified above, at that time all the "older" ages had not yet been fired. It turns out that 1928 should have been called later. When? Do!



For a long time I could not find a clear answer to this question. Well, do not go to the military registration and enlistment office with a request ?!

And now I'm reading the article "MYSTERY OF CAPE LAZAREV" (magazine "TEKHNIKA - YOUTH", 1996, No. 7, p. 21). It cites the memoirs of a former participant in a secret construction project (he gave a non-disclosure agreement) of a railway tunnel under the strait to Sakhalin Island. The fact in itself is interesting for our study. But I was interested in the dates in the fate of the main character of the article: Gryazev Vitaly Afanasyevich, Doctor of Agricultural Sciences (1982). The year of birth turns out to be 1928 (the article says that now he is 68, i.e.  $1996 - 68 = 1928$ ). Drafted into the army in March

1949, in a construction battalion located in the city of Blagoveshchensk (military unit 65526). In June 1950, the battalion was reorganized into a sapper battalion and sent to build a tunnel. Gryazev V. A retired in October 1952, having served for more than three years. (And Vasily Prokofievich Salo said that guys born in 1928 began to appear at their place in 1949.)

But that's not all. A few years ago, I learned that guys born in 1931 were drafted "normally" in 1950. Another question arises: when were the guys born in 1929 and 1930 called up? Like Gryazev, in 1949?

In the literature, the answer to this question is could not find. But in some form, I found information - again through a chance meeting. She also confirmed the fate of the guys born in 1928.

That day, for various reasons, I lingered on work, and then rode the subway with the thought of quickly dobbing home and reading a Romanian author's detective story about the analysis of a crime in 20 years. I am sitting in the car, reading a book, people get off/get on at the bus stops. And when more than half the way has passed, suddenly over my head I hear the question of an elderly man:

- *Excuse me, friend, will I go straight to Obolon or with a transfer?*

I was surprised that a grown man could not sort out the metro stations, and answered:

- *With transplant.*

- *Is it on Tolstoy? he clarified.*

"Yes... *at the Sports Palace,*" I corrected.

- *Ah,* - he said and continued, sitting down next to him: - *Well, I'm sorry, I won't bother you anymore, you reading something here...*

"*This is not Moscow,*" I interrupted him, feeling that he belongs to the category of people who like to talk (even with strangers). And he continued: " *There are dozens of interchange stations there. Here*

*just three.*

"Yes, *we are a little confused here,*" began explain it. — *Celebrated 70 years with a friend. I tell him steal...*

"70 years old?" I got worried and asked:

*Are you from 1927?*

- *No, this is a friend from 1927, and I from 1928.*

"Since 1928?" - I was surprised and quickly start "to ask":

- *Did you serve in the army?*

- *Certainly!*

- *And what year were you called?*

— *In 1949.*

— *In the spring?*

*No, in autumn.*

- *And 1929 was called with you?*

- *In 1950, there was a delay, but what?* he asked, apparently beginning to be surprised at this turn of the conversation.

" *My father since 1927,*" I explained. — *He served in the military for six years.*

"Ah, yes, *that's right,*" he agreed. — *They do they served...*

But at that moment the train jerked to a stop,  
and I said:

- *It's time for you to leave. For a transplant.*

He quickly got up and began to make his way to the exit,  
ending our conversation with the phrase:

*Yes, they served, and served, and served...*

Then I regretted for a while that I didn't come out  
together with him and did not continue the conversation, did not write down, but  
not, what is his name and how specifically he was served at that  
time. But he said almost nothing fundamentally new, but only  
confirmed the previous data. When I asked him about the year of  
conscription, I was sure that he would name 1949. And so it  
happened. Principi

Important for our study is that in

In 1949-1951, more draft ages were drafted into the army than  
were supposed to be. And this is reminiscent of the situation that  
was before, in particular, in 1939, when a new law on universal  
military service was adopted, the conscription age was reduced  
from 21 to 19 years, and several conscription ages were  
conscripted at once. And this is already called "beyond the pond",  
and taking into account other facts, it proves the determination of  
the country's leadership to fight in the coming years.

It turns out that in the late 40s they tried the situation  
repeat? We analyze.

In 1948, the demobilization of the "older" ages was completed,  
but the guys from 1925, 1926 and 1927 who saw the front or  
communicated with the front-line soldiers remain. In 1949-1950.  
guys born in 1928, 1929 and 1930 are added to them.

By the end of 1950, they will take over valuable combat  
experience from the "junior", and even recruits born in 1931 will be  
added to this company.

Or maybe just such a massive increase in soldiers  
and led to a shortage of junior officers? Which forced Stalin to  
use accelerated courses in their

training in addition to regular schools? But it turns out that this is too simple an answer for Stalinist combinations. Not so simple.

The fact is that then (at least in the Far East, where my father served) there were many cropped units. That is, the soldiers were NOT ENOUGH for all the officers! What is it? This is when there are officers and equipment, but there are almost no soldiers. Soldiers must come from civilian branches after the announcement of mobilization. Father said so that his proposals to reduce the number of officers were answered: "*You don't understand!*"

*If there is war tomorrow, we will quickly call on the storekeepers and part will be ready!*

So, since 1949, the Soviet armed forces began to grow. Up to what size? There is a book - Giuseppe Boffa, "HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION", in 2 volumes, volume 2, 1941 - 1964 (translated from Italian) - M.: International relations, 1990. On p. 256 regarding the size of the armed forces of the USSR in 1948 at 2874 thousand people, he notes: "*According to the ideas of the second half of the 30s, it was enough to have an army twice*

*less...*" And then he claims that the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union "*began to grow again from the moment war in Korea and by 1955 increased from 2.8 to 5.7 million pers.*"

But, firstly, not since the Korean War (June 1950), and since 1949. And secondly, where does the figure of 5.7 million come from? If, after Stalin's death, more than 3 million people were fired during the layoffs, then taking into account the remaining (about 4 million), the total figure is 7 million. My father also called this figure, stating that he heard it at meetings in the Officers' Houses ("*Crush anyone!*").

Is this a joke? Deploy an army of 6-7 million in peacetime! Yes, even with a lot of cropped parts! Moreover, with a general military obligation

and a well-established system of mobilization (which at that time could be carried out quite calmly)! Moreover, in the presence of almost ready-made "black jackets" in the camps! Plus a reserve that had combat experience! Plus a submissive population with full police control! From this information, there can be only one main conclusion - the readiness of the country's leadership to fight!

Now I turn to the meaning of the topic "M-2". Firstly, "Day-M" is the day of the announcement of mobilization. But according to the Soviet theories worked out in the 1920s, the maximum number of mobilization measures should be carried out before this day. And "Day-M" is the day when covert mobilization develops into

covered, at the moment when it is no longer possible to hide it, and the troops prepared in advance were ready to throw. After the announcement of mobilization, the cadre units and units from the peaceful state quickly recruit soldiers and officers to the full state and move into battle.

For illustration, I can present an excerpt from my personal "Mobilization Order". I managed to get it at the end of the USSR. I carried it in my pocket for a month to make a photocopy, but did not dare to insert it into the book in its entirety. What if this is a court case? So what if the tanks are sawn up, and the atomic missiles are given to the neighbors. But maybe about "mob. instructions" simply forgotten? Indeed, I do not think that Ukraine in the current situation would start a covert, and then an open mobilization with a declaration of war on anyone. But just in case, I will not demonstrate a complete copy of my "sheet". I'll just quote:

*"On the basis of the Constitution of the USSR and the Law of the USSR  
"On universal military duty" with the announcement of mobilization You are  
obliged, without waiting for the summons of the military  
commissariat, to appear within \_\_\_\_\_ hours by  
address..."* (in words)

Strictly speaking, since 2009, theoretically, I am fit only for the "people's militia", and then at will. But "mob. the prescription "I still have" in memory of the USSR. Here is yet another confirmation that only a few hours and days are allotted for normal mobilization. And the "mini-leaflet" lay at home with many 1st-class military servicemen. But meticulous chi

thieves may object that everything is correct, that with the presence of nuclear missile weapons, when missiles fly for tens of minutes ... I answer: I agree. But I can give an example from service in the army.

Once, before the start of regimental exercises (by the way, at the Gorokhovets training ground), I got to the hearing regiment commander at the division commander in front of a box with a sand model of the training ground. It was a nice sunny day. We (from the company commander and above) are standing around this of the sand box itself, our regimental commander leads dialogue with the division commander. Suddenly, the general points his pointer at some place in the sandbox and gives an introductory note: *"Here the enemy used tactical nuclear weapons. weapons, your actions?"*

Our regiment commander begins to cheerfully report: *"The remaining artillery systems set up fire barriers. Artillery Commander! Report the decision! .."* At that moment, one of the officers standing next to me suddenly expressed this thought aloud: *"What nonsense! Even in the academies do not consider the consequences of nuclear explosions!"* I remember this.

Indeed, strategic missiles fly for tens of minutes. But in any case, this is less than the hours in which I have to run to some house. And if other people's missiles fly first, then in any case I don't have time. How then to mobilize? And no how! It is not necessary to prepare for war, but to fight for peace.

However, this situation began to take shape only

early 60s. In Stalin's time, it was still possible to carry out mobilization in days and without much haste.

But the question arises: how to ensure that all those liable for military service know in time about its beginning? First, they must feel that it is about to be announced. Secondly, conscripts must perceive the fact of the announcement of mobilization correctly, cheerfully and with a sense of duty performed, set out on the road. It is not so easy to create such conditions; certain measures are required. And that is what the next chapter is about.

And in conclusion, I will continue to explain the meaning of the topic "M-2". First, I wanted to emphasize that Stalin, after 1945, decided to repeat the M-Day, which he was preparing for 1941. But in the light of the facts that are being revealed, it turns out that there were two such attempts: one - in 1951, the second - in 1954. The first failed due to the crisis of strategic aviation, the second - due to the death of the "chief architect". But couldn't Stalin's heirs continue the preparations at the same pace? There is an assumption that they could not. And not everything here is so simple. And not only because of the struggle for power. And this will also be discussed in the next chapter.

### WHO IS THE NEW ENEMY?

The Second World War, officially started on September 1, 1939, officially ended on September 2, 1945. Six years later, almost to the day. And for most of this time, fascist Germany was considered the main enemy for the USSR. At the end of the term, imperialist Japan arose in the form of an enemy, but not for long. Day after day, the Soviet mass media reminded of them in many directions: from the reports of the Information Bureau, from the reports of correspondents, prose, poetry, music of cultural masters, and so on. Not to mention the living participants and their own experience.

But now the war is over. And there were no more enemies? For a short time - yes (for several years). More precisely, there were enemies, but on a "small scale": former accomplices of the same fascists, "anti-Soviet element" in the western regions of the USSR, etc. In addition, as a result of the war, there were gaps in educational work. To correct this, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks 27.09. 1944, adopts a resolution "On the organization of scientific and educational propaganda." Among the reasons that caused its appearance, it was indicated: *"During the war years many party organizations, directing all their forces to ensuring victory over fascism, reduced attention to the cause of scientific and educational propaganda among the population. activities intensified in the country churches, religious survivals expanded among*



part of the population, especially in areas that were occupied" ("CPSU IN  
RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS  
CONGRESSES, CONFERENCES AND PLENUMS OF THE CC. T. 6, 1941  
- 1954. Kyiv, 1980). And further:

"In order to radically improve the organization of scientific and educational propaganda,  
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the                      among                      population  
Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) decides:

1. ...Among the population, especially in the countryside, it is necessary to  
widely practice organizing lectures, holding conversations and reading aloud  
popular brochures and articles about the structure of the universe, about the origin  
of the Sun and the Earth, about the main astronomical phenomena, ... about the  
origin and plant and animal life, ... about energy and its use, etc.

.....

9. To oblige the journal Nauka i Zhizn to systematically publish materials on

Naturally - scientific questions.

In this resolution, the Nazis are remembered  
only in the preamble when indicating the reasons for its appearance. But it does  
not itself contain a list of "enemies" that the people need to be reminded of along  
with an explanation of astronomical and other phenomena. This is understandable.  
The war with the German fascists was in full swing, Japan is waiting in the wings,  
so there are still enough enemies.

But time passed, the wars with Germany and Japan ended. Their results for  
Stalin turned out to be much less than planned. The world revolution has stopped  
again. To continue it, a new war is needed. Of course, it is impossible to start it  
immediately after the victory of 1945. Peace treaties have not yet been signed in  
Europe and Asia, and international trials have not been held against the  
leadership of Germany and Japan. And most importantly, on

to restore the destroyed economy and restore  
population loss thread.

Several years have passed. Nuremberg and Tokyo

The trials were held, some peace treaties in Europe were signed (in 1947). The economy is recovering. You can think about the continuation of the war. More precisely, you can come to grips with its preparation. And that requires a new enemy.

But is it necessary to look for it? After all, the Cold War has been expanding for several years! The USSR has been declared an enemy in the USA and England! An aggressive NATO bloc has been created! Etc.

Of course, from time to time the peoples of the Soviet Union were informed about the "bad" behavior of the former allies. But in the summer of 1949, Stalin decided that the scale of such explanations was completely unacceptable. It urgently needed to be sharply increased.

For this, on June 20, 1949, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks takes another resolution "On the status and ways of improving the work of the All-Union Society for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge".

It was created in 1947 on the INITIATIVE of scientists, public figures, artists as a VOLUNTARY INDIVIDUAL organization. With the payment of entrance and annual membership fees. And also with payment to lecturers for the lectures delivered.

However, firstly, it is well known that no "initiative" in those years could not exist for a long time without the support of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And more often than not, it went straight to them. Secondly, the concept of "voluntariness" in the same years was usually understood as "voluntarily-coercion".

It can be seen that at that time television was only in its infancy. There were very few radio receivers and broadcasting stations. Intercity transport was underdeveloped. Therefore, it seems necessary that the leadership of the country care about the state of national

illumination.

But no state, much less public

The military organization, to which the CPSU (b) considered itself, logically and legally cannot indicate anything to any other VOLUNTARY PUBLIC ORGANIZATION. You can order to those who are

lives in submission.

But in the resolution of 06/20/1949, from the very first lines we read: *"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes that the All-Union The society... has carried out a certain positive work since the moment of its organization. However, the Society still does not fully fulfill the tasks assigned to it in the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge among the general population"*. The following is a list of serious shortcomings in the work of the Society.

According to these lines, it may immediately arise in pros: and who on the side "set tasks" for the "voluntary society"? The initiators of its creation are "famous scientists, artists", etc. Well, something doesn't work for them. So the members of the society itself who see this could solve such problems at its own meetings. And criticism in the main areas of work can only come from the most important initiators. It turns out that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was the most important initiator of the creation of the VOLUNTARY "all-union society for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge". Moreover, in those years, these arguments would not have occurred to anyone. Everyone knew his role.

What mistakes did the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks find in the activities of the Society?

*"1. It did not become a mass organization of the Soviet intelligentsia (on May 1-1949 there were only 34,000 full members and 16,200 candidates).*

(A strange structure, reminiscent of an academy of sciences. On the other hand, if there are professional associations of scientists and artists (the same academies

missions, unions (of writers), etc., then why else do you need some kind of society? Maybe it would be enough to "puzzle" each of them with an additional task, and that's it? Or would effective control over execution be impossible in this case? Could a report on such an additional task be lost among other reports?)

*2. The basic principle of the work of the Society is violated - the activity and initiative of the members of the society in the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge. Most members of the Society do not take part in its work. ("Driven voluntarily, force positively" and some high activity is still expected without "carrot and stick"?)*

*3. The Society's lecture work does not adequately reflect topical issues of internal and foreign policy of the USSR. [How to reflect, the ruling says further.]*

The 4th and other points point out various smaller (or very important?) shortcomings such as those that lectures are given without preliminary reading of the text, ideological mistakes are made in some lectures, and so on.

As a comment to this, it can be noted that in order to carry out such a detailed analysis, a lot of work had to be done to check the activities of the Society. Secondly, what are these "ideological errors"? The US is called an ally? Don't explain

the importance of trials in the countries of "people's democracy" over their leaders with death sentences? Thirdly, what is this need for a sharp "improvement" of the Society's activities? In connection with what? Massive complaints from listeners? There are many who want to listen to lectures, but they are not all held? Something among the errors was not indicated. This means that errors are such not on the part of the listeners, but on the part of the main

the initiator of the creation of the Society. For two years the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not pay much attention to his activities. But by the summer of 1949, the situation had somehow changed in such a way that it was necessary to "direct" the work of the Society in the right direction. What was offered to him by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks?

*"1. ... (to the Board) to transform the Society into a mass voluntary organization of the Soviet intellectual genie.*

*2. To propose to the All-Union Society ....:*

*a) lecture on the all-conquering Marxist*

*sko-Leninist doctrine, about the advantages of the Soviet building, etc.*

*b) to ensure regular lectures on questions of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, to respond in a timely manner to the most important events between*

*international life; STRENGTHEN lecture propaganda that reveals the AGGRESSIVE PLANS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, the anti-popular nature of the US social and state system, the deceitfulness of bourgeois democracy, the insanity of bourgeois*

*culture, lecture systematically on the economic condition of the working people in the capitalist*

*countries, about the development and strengthening of the communist parties, about strengthening the forces of the anti-imperialist, democratic camp.*

*.....*

*4. Propose to the Management Board of the Society to organize the work of the Society... For this purpose:*

*a) Regularly hold meetings of the members of the Society wa...*

*.....*

*c) Review the existing order and size*

*ry paying lecturers ...*

*5. Propose to the Management Board of the Company to provide the necessary control over the quality and ideological*

*content of lectures (preliminary control of notes, etc.).*

.....

7. ..The best lectures to publish in the journal *Society in "Science and Life"* and in national newspapers.

.....

10. Reduce entry and membership fees  
(2 times).

11. Propose to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, the krai and oblast committees of the AUCP(b) to strengthen the leadership of the Republican Societies, krai and regional branches of the All-Union Society ...  
systematically provide them with assistance in their work, create the necessary conditions for expanding lecture propaganda and ensure control over the quality and ideological content of lectures.

That's it. And someone thought that all this was optional and "voluntary". "Whips and gingerbread" issued. Big contributions? Let's reduce! Low pay for lectures? Can add. There are not many who want to listen? Nothing, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, the regional committees and regional committees will provide! And there will be other help from them (together with control!). In the outback, few of the local intelligentsia know the anti-popular nature of the social and political system in the United States? Read the journal "Science and Life" and the central newspapers. Everything is written there.

And so that no one doubts the seriousness of this case, the decision ends with the following: *"Until*

*On December 1, 1949, submit to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a report on the actions taken to implement this resolution.*

For those who don't get it, then the joke will be "tova  
Rish Mauser.

To illustrate the results obtained, I can cite a small review of the journal SCIENCE and LIFE, No. 1, 1953. Its title says that it

*"Monthly popular science magazine of the All-Union Society for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge".*

On the first page of the cover is a photograph of the head of the farm of the Leninskaya Iskra collective farm in the Kirov region, who, standing at the table, reads a volume of the works of V.I. Lenin against the background of a large portrait of I.V. Stalin in uniform, framed by large ears of some kind of grain. On the table lies the newspaper "PRAVDA", a blank sheet of paper and a pencil.

By the way, for a long time it seemed to me that something unnatural in this photo. And only when I was about to write the words *"standing at the table, reading,"* something began to dawn on me. Indeed, if a person reads at the table, then why standing? And if so, why is he reading? A normal person cannot stand at a table and read a book for a long time! This position can be taken only for a minute, for example, in order to take a picture. But this is a window dressing of the purest water! Yes, even on the cover of the All-Union magazine!

The second page of the cover is a handwritten instruction Stalin's decision to be guided in everything by the precepts V. I. Lenin.

The next page has a large portrait of Lenin pasted in. Both Stalin's instruction and Lenin's portrait did not colored, but designed so that they can be used vat when making some "red corners".

The first published a large article *"Under the banner ideas of Marxism-Leninism*. Here are some qi from it taty:

*"... Significant achievements have been made by the Soviet astronomy. She owns the scientific theory of the origin of the Earth and planets, new theories, deeply penetrating into the regularity of the origin of stars. These theories disproved the idealistic delusions of re promotional Anglo-American astronomers, torturing*

surviving..." (Only 8 years had passed after the "alliance" when England and the USA turned into a "reaction". And why only they, without the "reactionary" French, West Germans, Japanese?)

We read further:

*The "recent" transatlantic "theoreticians" and their European counterparts deny the objectivity of the world and the possibility of knowing its laws, preach fideism, mysticism, the fatalistic "predestination" of everything that happens and the uselessness any attempt to change the world. All this "philosophical" rubbish in the most direct way connects with praises of the "American image life" and Anglo-Saxon "democracy", with a spiteful slander against the camp of socialism and democracy, furious attempts once again to "refute" and "destroy" Marxism.*

*In our time it is especially obvious that in the ideological struggle one cannot be neutral, one cannot take a "middle" position..." (p. 3).*

*The fascist "prophet" of American capitalism, Henry Ford, argued that "the worker must take away all the need for brain work. Capitalists do everything to suppress the worker creative inclinations, physically exhaust and spiritually empty it. Thus, capitalism, especially on its current imperialist stage, extremely narrows the possibilities for the development of science and technology ... " (p. 4) (That's the label "fascism" combined with the word "America!")*

Much later, if the entire magazine is devoted to one topic, then usually at the beginning it was somehow noted. For example, *"in connection with ... this issue, the editors decided dedicate ... (to something) "*. In the first article in Nauka i Zhizn, No. 1 for 1953, there are no indications, but practically the entire journal is devoted to the name of Lenin on



map of the country, the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the most advanced Soviet science. With periodic denunciations of the aggressive plans of American imperialism, the anti-people nature of the US social and political system, and the slanderousness of bourgeois democracy.

Here are excerpts from other articles:

*"There, in the world of capital, where he manages all affairs dollar, everything; the development of science and technology is subordinated to the goals of obtaining the maximum capitalist profits, the tasks of preparing a new world war, which they are plotting against the USSR and the countries of the national US monopolists of democracy.." (p. 8) (But doesn't the pound sterling do business under capitalism? Or the franc? What about the Italian lira?)*

*"... - Marx wrote in the first volume of Capital. All the further development of capitalist agriculture confirmed the correctness of this brilliant analysis. One has only to remember that in the USA by 1939*

*112,800,000 hectares of formerly cultivated land were destroyed by soil erosion. The formation of deserts is accompanied by famine, ruin and impoverishment of millions of working people" (p. 10). [Here we will not consider the question: who then bought bread from whom: the USA from the USSR or vice versa?]*

*"It is no coincidence that the two main features that characterize Pavlov's teachings are consistently mathematical realistic basis and connection with life - cause now in the capitalist countries a sharper struggle against this doctrine than the one that was waged against him in Tsarist Russia. This fight against ideas of I. P. Pavlov is directly related to the struggle reactionary camp of imperialism and the war against progressive camp of democracy and peace.*

*In the days when the American and British empires sheets shed the blood of heroic Korean on*

*kind and transform biology and medicine - the science of life, about human health - into an ominous weapon of death, the indignant voice of Pavlov, a fighter for peace, sounds with renewed vigor ... " (p. 13).*

The magazine ends with a review of the translated rom on the Canadian writer Dyson Carter "The Future Is Us" (under the heading "Under the yoke of the dollar"). Here are some quotes from the review:

*The edge of this work is directed against warmongers, against those who threaten with an atomic bomb and sows panic among the population, scaring them with fictitious spies, conspiracies of the "Reds" and similar nonsense. The novel convincingly shows the difficult conditions in which one has to live. and work as honest representatives of scientific and technical intelligentsia in the capitalist country.*

*Canada, by the grace of its rulers, becomes more and more like a Wall Street branch. The notorious American "way of life" penetrates deeper and deeper into the bourgeois circles of the country. With each passing day, the onset of dark forces intensifies. reactions. Against this background, the events described in the new work of Dyson Carter take place.*

*Sometimes it seems ... that The Future is for Us is not fiction, but a diary, a chronicle.*

*Student Cal Finley, the son of a pastor, introduces Rem to Professor Summerville, who somewhere on the chatter about being connected with some kind of scientific circles in the Soviet Union. In fact, this Summerville belonged to that type of "professors" whose soul was completely corrupted by the dollar and who by rhetoric try to hide their complete retreat to fascism... (p. 46).*

*Those arrested are carefully processed so that they gave evidence pleasing to the police. Investigator*

*persuades Patricia to testify that  
Kerby and student Cal Finlay were spying...  
Old Michael is "treated" differently: he  
beaten to the point of blood.*

*Finley is also threatened with this. Police agents  
composed "testimonies" and demand from him that he  
signed without reading. At the same time, he is tortured with burning  
a beam of a searchlight aimed at his face, into his eyes.*

*"- Sign you finally!*

*- No! I demand that they first give me a pro honour. It is my right.*

*— Right? The agent laughed. - You have one  
right, my dear! Sign!"*

*By their "gentleman's" interrogations they drive the wife of  
engineer Baird to madness, and she  
begins to claim that her husband is a spy.*

*Summerville, a professor who has long since broken with science  
and became a lackey of the ruling classes, in everything  
agrees with the police. All testimonies written  
detectives Morton Kine, this "pundits" signs without any objections.  
Yes, they are all spies.  
all agents of Moscow! (p. 47).*

[By the way, it really "sometimes seems... that The Future  
is for Us" is not fiction, but a diary, a chronicle, however, if you  
change the names and the country - the place of action, and  
also specify the year, for example - 1937. Interest but, where  
did the author of the review get a similar experience? Traveled  
to Canada?]

And in conclusion: *"The Soviet reader will read Dyson Carter's  
novel with great interest.  
The book successfully shows the life and customs of one of the kapi  
talistic countries ruled by the American  
dollars."*

This is how a scientific and educational magazine turned out!

But a remark may arise: successfully and on a large scale to blame the United States, England and other countries in all mortal sins is possible only for unknowing people. That is, those who were not there, did not read other literature, did not go there and did not communicate with anyone who was there. That's right, this is where the demand for an "iron curtain" comes from? That is, such a policy of the country's leadership towards its citizens, as a result of which it is very difficult for people to travel abroad. And those who are you rides must be carefully controlled. This was clearly visible from the West. In particular, Churchill spoke about the Iron Curtain in his famous Fulton speech at the beginning of 1946. And although since the late 50s the Soviet leadership

tried to soften this opinion, it did not go on

abolition of control over people traveling to other countries. There are many examples, since this was one of the "hot" topics until the early 1990s.

But for our research, it is important to understand that this was a conscious state policy, including one based on laws. For example, on December 16, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Decree "On the procedure for relations between state institutions of the USSR and their officials with institutions and officials of foreign states" ("CODE OF LAWS OF THE USSR", volume 9, Moscow, 1982, p. 39). The order was established as follows: only through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs! Note: in the "CODE OF LAWS ..." there were only those that were in force at the time of the publication of "SVO YES ..." from the press. That is, the Decree "On the Order of Relations ..." of 1947 continued to operate in the 80s, being one of the few decrees of the 40s that survived until the 80s. And on June 29, 1976, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted an additional Decree "On the procedure for relations between ministries, state committees and departments of the USSR and the Union Republics,

central bodies of public organizations and their officials with foreign journalists", according to which it was possible to communicate with foreign journalists, but *"in the manner determined by the legislation of the USSR."*

Going back to the late 40s and based on all the previous information, you can do before position that not only Soviet citizens should We were to establish strong obstacles to travel abroad, but there should have been many obstacles to foreign citizens who came to the USSR. Is it fair? Are there any reminiscences on this subject? Available. For example, notes from the famous Indian diplomat Kaul T. N. "FROM STEEL ON TO GORBACHEV AND FURTHER" (Moscow, Progress, 1991). In 1947-1949 and in other years he worked in India.

embassy in Moscow.

Moreover, I believe that for our study, the opinion of a diplomat from India, a country that for a long time was considered friendly to the USSR, is of particular interest. So Kaul recalls:

*"Contacts with Soviet citizens for foreigners in general, and for diplomats in particular, were almost impossible (p. 23).*

*The Soviet side also believed that Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru represented "bourgeois reformist" tendencies that played along the policy of the Anglo-American bloc (p. 25).*

*In Stalin's Russia, all foreigners were under suspicion. Even foreign communists and those who sympathized with the Soviet Union were not trusted.*

*But even those few contacts with Soviet citizens that were possible before, after the decrees Zhdanov in 1948 were completely banned. Even Anna Louise Strong, American, staunch comm*

*ist and friend of Russia, was imprisoned on suspicion of being a Chinese spy...*

*We were followed everywhere. The more important the embassy the stronger was the Soviet surveillance on him. On*

*our telephones were tapped, our Russian employees were regularly interrogated...*

*hotel rooms were searched in our absence. There was no way to be alone. Moscow in 1947 was a gloomy city, permeated with an atmosphere of terror, mistrust*

*and disregard for human rights and dignity (p. 28)".*

What did Stalin achieve with this? If a country is really not preparing a war, then, on the contrary, it should be demonstrated to foreigners. Their isolation needed only to hide some of their activities. Such actions are also useful for reducing the scope of activities of foreign intelligence services. By the way, nebezre resultantly.

In this regard, VIZH (1997, No. 1) has an interesting article by a specialist of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of Russia, candidate of historical sciences. Sciences V. I. Batyuk "THE SUCCESSOR TO I. V. STALIN THE CIA CONSIDERED ...".

In it, the author assures that in 1948-1953 *"American intelligence did not have sources of information close to the party and state structures of the USSR."* For example, he notes that 11 months before the first test of the Soviet atomic bomb, US Secretary of Defense J. Forrestal made an entry in his diary in which he expressed his

opinion in the ability of the Russians to create such a weapon. *"And this was affirmed at the time when the implementation nuclear project has already included hundreds of the largest enterprises of the Soviet heavy industry!..*

*Such ignorance of the Minister of War is, of course, on the conscience of US national intelligence" (p. 27).*

And with these data Ph.D. V. I. Batyuk discredits own statement in VIZH (1996, No. 5) in the article "WHY TRUMAN 'SPARED' THE USSR" when he stated that *"there is evidence that intelligence reports*

*The United States of this period wore a fairly objective character and did not at all contribute to forcing military psychosis. In 1950, due to their distorted*

*interpretation by a number of representatives of the military-political leadership of the United States, the CIA turned to responsible officials with a special message, which stated that neither in 1945,*

*nor later did the Soviet Union actually have aggressive plans against the United States.*

*reaction to it. Thus, the State Department replied that*

*"the absence of evidence of the existence of Soviet plans to use military force against the United States cannot be regarded as*

*evidence of the absence of such Soviet intentions" (pp. 71-72).*

But excuse me, dear Ph.D., if American intelligence did not have sources of information, then where did the "objective nature" of the US intelligence reports come from? From what sources did the CIA draw its objectivity? From Stalin's speeches "trust me"? Conclusions cannot be drawn only on the basis of intelligence data, which can be slipped into misinformation. And why should the US Department of Foreign Affairs (State Department) believe the CIA if something was also observed through its own channels? (It has already been discussed above how diplomats were treated in the USSR at that time.)

A clear example of the attitude to intelligence there is also in the Soviet history of the period of the first half of 1941. Recall what Stalin wrote in the reports about the preparation of Germany for war with the USSR? Where did he propose to send their authors? And how did it end?

In the history of the post-war "Iron Curtain"

There is another fact that does not quite fit into Stalin's desire to isolate Soviet society from communication with foreign countries - this is the requirement for the allies to return to the USSR those former Soviet citizens who ended up in European countries. For some reason, this topic turned out to be important for the Soviet leadership and took a certain place in the ideological struggle in the post-Stalin era.

For a long time there was no complete clarity on this issue. The Soviet media reported that the Allies tried to prevent the return of interned Soviet citizens to the USSR, urged them to stay in the West, and recruited agents. Occasionally, information appeared that some of the returnees were hostile to the Motherland and sent to their camps. But in the West there was an amateur historian (Nikolai Tolstoy), who decided to explore this topic and wrote the book VICTIMS OF YALTA (Paris, 1988). Its magazine version was published in the magazine "YUNOST", No. 5, 6, 1991.

The main conclusion of the book is that in 1944-1947 the Western allies (especially the British, apparently bound by a friendship treaty with the USSR of 1942) forcibly handed over to Stalin more than two million Russians, most of whom suffered a terrible fate. In particular, terrible examples are given of how those who did not want to return to the USSR were forcibly herded onto steamboats, what desperate steps some of the returnees were forced to take in order not to sail to the Soviet Union. And also the testimonies of officers from the teams of those ships are given about what happened

went to the ports of unloading:

- replacement of clothes and things issued upon departure;
- filtering returned and executions of which

then groups right at the port.

Strange. And what was the interest of the department of Be



rii to natural English pants? What threat could arise if the interned Soviet citizens remained abroad? How could they interfere? On the contrary, after returning to the USSR, they would be inconvenient in that they could refute the reports of the Soviet mass media about life there. It turns out that all of them should be isolated. Why extra expenses?

Indeed, under a peaceful policy, it did not make much difference whether they remained abroad or not. But in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the latter will have a demand for specialists who know Russian. In particular: to groups of saboteurs, to front-line reconnaissance groups, translators to the front, translators to prison camps, etc. Of course, not everyone would go into the service of a future enemy, especially women. Most likely, they could be former military personnel. Here they are

in the first place and shot at the ports of unloading.

**Conclusion: during the Yalta negotiations and even earlier, Stalin worked out plans for the preparation new world war.**

Okay, let's say isolation measures advice Russian citizens in the first post-war years were carried out. Foreign contact is kept to a minimum. But this is not an end in itself. Something must have happened next. And it happened.

From the middle of 1949, for some reason, the leadership of the USSR I really wanted the peoples of the country to get used to the idea that the USA and England are the worst enemies, "fascists". That they are preparing a new war that could start very soon. Let us recall what Stalin wrote to Beijing in October 1950 in connection with the offensive of American troops in Korea:

*"... the United States, because of prestige, can be drawn into a big war, will, therefore, be drawn into the war by Ki*

tai, and at the same time the USSR, which is connected with China by a pact of mutual assistance, will also be drawn into the war. Should we be afraid of this? In my opinion, it should not, since together we will be stronger than the USA and England, and other capitalist European states without Germany, which cannot now provide the USA with any help, do not represent a serious military force. If war is inevitable, then let it be

Now..."

Thus, Stalin himself considered the USA and England to be his first enemies. But since they were just recently listed as allies of the USSR, it was necessary to do a lot of work to change this opinion. And the shorter the deadlines were allotted for it, the more carefully and responsibly it had to be organized. Which is what was done.

But you can't just call it for a very long time some country as an enemy and tell that it is about to attack. The people can simply put up with it, and "noble rage" will not work. The effectiveness of such propaganda has a time frame. And there is meaning only if the war is really being prepared, but not by an attack from the side of the accused country, but, on the contrary, against it.

It turns out that this was part of some big plan? War preparations?

For comparison, I. A. Kan's memoir can be cited here (OGONEK magazine, 1991, January, No. 1, pp. 25-27). Here is what he says about 1950 in the DPRK:

"Shortly before the start of this fratricidal During the war, all the media of the North once again launched a broad propaganda of the efforts of the leadership of the DPRK in the cause of the peaceful unification of the country, those supposedly peaceful proposals with which Kim Il Sung repeatedly addressed the administration of South Korea

yards. At the same time, not a day passed without indignant reports of armed provocations by the South Koreans. The newspapers said that Syngman Rhee was trying to unite the country by force of arms... Thus, the entire population, including myself, were convinced that an imminent war could not be avoided and that it would undoubtedly begin at the initiative of the South, which had sold out to the Americans. tsam.

...I was working as Vice Chairman of the WPK Committee of Gangwon Province (Gangwon-do?) at that time. In May 1950, I went on a business trip to Yeongcheon County. (Icheon?). Here, in the immediate vicinity of the 38th parallel, two divisions, consisting of military personnel exclusively of Korean nationality. I naturally decided that this was a preventive measure by the North Korean guidance in case of military action. In June I fell ill and ended up in the central hospital in Pyongyang. At the same time as me, several high-ranking party and government officials were lying there. We often met together and discussed the situation in the country in connection with the clear signs of the approach of war. And suddenly, on the eve of the discharge at two midnight they call me to the phone. Called 1st secretary of the WPK Central Committee, who offered me an immediate appear before the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, i.e. To Kim Il Sung. When I entered the office, the entire Council of Ministers and a number of invited persons had already gathered there. Kim Il Sung immediately announced that that two hours ago, at one in the morning, a South Korean the army opened fire along the entire 38th parallel. In connection with this attack, he, as supreme commander in chief, ordered a counteroffensive. All voted unanimously to approve this orders."

Let's analyze this evidence. at three o'clock but

chi on Sunday, June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung convenes a meeting and declares that the enemy (South Korean troops) opened fire. It looks like the beginning of a war ("without its declaration").

Of course, you can believe that someone started a war on the shortest summer Sunday night. But it's hard to believe at the time of the beginning - "one in the morning." The fact is that you can't just open shelling from cannons. The shelling may indicate that after it tanks with infantry will go on the attack. That is, it is called "artillery preparation of a (subsequent) attack." Accordingly, it cannot continue indefinitely. And the attack of tanks and infantry, although it can begin late at night, is very risky. It may not be the desired efficiency. The advancing troops can confuse directions, fall under their own artillery fire or into very inconvenient territory (minefields, etc.). In short, in a night attack on fortified positions, very heavy losses are very likely. Therefore, the offensive is usually planned at dawn. Moreover, it is necessary to conduct artillery preparation

visually control, i.e. and it must be performed under illumination. Night shooting is usually illuminated either by illuminating projectiles or by aircraft dropping illuminating bombs. But this is very difficult and less efficient, at least when

long time.

In this regard, we can recall "June 22 exactly at 4 am" or the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, and many other battles of the Second World War began in a similar way. By the way, you can also quote on the Korean War from the book of Colonel M. P. Tolchenov "VOORU

THE WOMEN'S FIGHT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE (Review of military operations. June 1950 - June 1952) "(M.: Voenizdat, 1952, p. 22):

*"Exactly following ... the plan, the South Korean troops on dawn on June 25, 1950 launched an offensive, crossing the line of the 38th parallel.*

Dawn in the summer of June 25 comes around 4 am. It turns out that the guns of the South Koreans fired for more than three hours? It is hard to believe!

Artillery preparation is very difficult to carry out for a long time - for hours. Firstly, a very large consumption of shells is required. For example, with four shots per minute, one cannon can fire  $4 \times 60 \times 3 = 720$  shells in 3 hours. Modern artillery batteries usually have 8 barrels. Artillery divisions have 3 batteries. In one artillery regiment, 3 artillery divisions. Etc. If all

multiply, you get tens of thousands of shells. And this, in turn, is mountains of boxes. Moreover, all these stocks can be released to empty places, i.e. aimlessly! In addition, it is necessary to leave shells for carrying out artillery support for the attack!

And also it is necessary to take into account the complexity of firing at night with a large amount of illuminating battery-powered equipment and artillery fatigue. For three or four hours to transfer "blanks" of 15-20 kg in the dark at a rate of 3-4 per minute, as well as boxes of 50 kg - a very difficult task (in the sense of a purely physical, and, as experience shows, the rate of fire of guns with prolonged shooting, it gradually decreases - the soldiers get tired, however!).

Therefore, if the offensive is planned for the morning, then artillery preparation should begin at the very beginning of dawn. And it should last as little as possible.

And if in June 1950 the offensive was planned by the troops of the DPRK, then everything converges. Suppose that the beginning of the artillery preparation is scheduled for 4 o'clock in the morning. And for this, you also need an order. From its formal approval (at the Council of Ministers) to entry into the troops

some time is required. Time is also needed for the Council of Ministers to meet. In addition, some time must pass from the beginning of the shelling of the South Koreans until the moment when a message about this must reach the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and also until he makes a decision and

government members.

Here is another proof that the offensive of the DPRK troops began on Sunday, June 25 at exactly 4 am. Nine years have passed since 1941, but the attack tactics have remained the same. And the start of the war in Korea

calls one of the possible options for the start of the Soviet operation "Thunder" on July 6, 1941.

And, as it turned out, all this is no longer necessary to prove. In the already mentioned magazine of the parliament and government of the RSFSR "RODINA", 1990, No. 5, in the article by S. Volovets "PROHIBITED WAR" about June 25 he says like this:

*"At four o'clock in the morning on June 25, 1950, red rockets from the north of the 38th parallel, which divided into two parts of Korea after the war, gave a signal and indicated targets for artillery preparation. Thousands of guns and mortars fired for two hours. And then 100,000-strong North Korean army supported by tanks T-34 began to move quickly to the south, chasing the randomly retreating enemy."*

But this information is already from the period of the late 80s, and in Stalin's time everyone would not have done a detailed analysis. Moreover, if for a long time only various provocations and violations were reported, that the neighbor on the border is an enemy, and in general, that

the war is about to begin.

In 1949 there was practically no mass television in the USSR. Radio receivers too. In these mustaches loviya important place in the ideological education

have lectures. An interesting example of lecture work at that time in Moldova is given in the journal OGONEK 1991, January No. 5, p. 13 (excerpt from the article "APOTHEOSIS"):

*"... Overcoming difficulties, Chernenko took up improvement of party training. During 1949 he organized over 45,000 propaganda meetings attended by over 9 million people, i.e. for every inhabitant of the republic, including infants, there were 10 visits each. The population of the republic was read 35 thousand lectures - they collected (more precisely - they collected) 6 million listeners.*

And what did they say? About the anti-people nature of the US state system? What is this all for? What role can mass indoctrination play at all? How serious is this?

There are reports that under some conditions it is very serious. In particular, in the journal "TEHNIKA - YOUTH", 1993, No. 4, an article by Rudolf Balandin "BEKHTEREV'S SECRET WEAPON" was published. In it, the author cites a recording of his conversation with a certain popularizer of science, Gleb Anfilov. He reported that a talented Russian thinker, psychologist and psychiatrist, physiologist and neuropathologist Academician V. M. Bekhterev carried out work on the collective suggestion of emotions at a distance. At the same time, he found that in the team there is an increase in the effect of suggestion. The effect on emotions is most successfully carried out. Then the science fiction writer Belyaev gave him the idea of technical amplifiers of mental signals. For this, a conventional radio network was used in the experiments. As a result, complex radio signals of a certain rhythm were established, inducing a mild hypnotic state in listeners, favoring an increase in suggestibility.

It turned out that at first the few, the most pliable, reacted to them. And then the process of mutual induction, which is characteristic of the crowd, spreads relatively quickly. Something like self-indulgence. People become truly mesmerized.

"[Balandin's question]: — *So what kind of weapon is this?*

[Anfilov's answer]; — *Ideological, of course.*

*Internal use. (It) organizes, mobilizes, directs and inspires. Let's put it this way:*

*weapons to conquer their own people. It creates not only obedient crowds, but also insanely - just insanely! - adored leader...*

*- So the cult of Stalin ...*

*- Yes. Implementation of Bekhterev's secret weapon.*

*No less successful than in Germany."*

However, it can be added here that the amplification of the zhaniya is possible only in the complete absence of doubt, other opinions. And for this you need to carry out special events, for example, under the Iron Curtain program (which was done).

However, by the beginning of the 1950s, in addition to the task of adoring the leader, the inhabitants of the USSR had to be instilled with the idea that the leaders of the United States and England were "fascists" who oppressed their peoples. And besides, they are preparing aggression against the Soviet Union, which must be thwarted and the peoples of the United States and Britain must be liberated from oppression (together with other dependent and colonial countries).

Moreover, such an understanding of the international situation was explained not only by the desires of the leaders of the USSR or "international duty", but also by the "scientific theory" of Marxism-Leninism, which supposedly scientifically proved the doom of the "bad" order and the inevitability of the "World Revolution". In other words, the inhabitants of the Soviet Union are quite



they introduced on foot the idea of a "historical planned note" of the class struggle, which allows for the possibility of a "just" war. But which is prepared, in

first of all, the leaders of those very "bad" countries that do not want to "come to terms" with their "historical defeat". The same situation was raised by Stalin in the summer of 1950 in a discussion on questions of linguistics. Thus, the cult of personality was an integral part of the preparations for the world war.

But subsequent events showed that it has a strong negative side: after the death of an adorer, a serious gap appears in the souls of people, which cannot be quickly filled. A cult of personality is possible

only with the assertion that this person is the very best (that is, that nearby personalities cannot simply replace her). But after the death of the deifier, it is impossible to quickly appoint a "replacement" from "equally related" leaders. Including the fight

for power.

Years must pass before someone comes forward (as happened with Nikita Khrushchev). But if the new leader starts criticizing the previous one and tries to realize some other plans, then a generation, "tuned" to the previous personality, it will be very difficult to reconfigure. Here we have to wait for the change of generations. And if control over the alterna is reduced

opinions, then the creation of a cult of personality in general may be an impossible task.

But it must be taken into account that Stalin's personality cult was not end in itself, but was associated with the preparation of a world revolution. However, by the end of the 50s, time for her was hopelessly lost. The United States has a nuclear-missile "shield and sword". And although the USSR had something similar, but under these conditions it became too risky to start a new world war with impunity.

And in the early 50s, nuclear missile weapons was not there yet. There was still an opportunity to carry out mobilization in days. There is only one problem: how to ensure that the conscripts in the reserve find out in time about its beginning?

This requires an extensive network of warning facilities. What? Before the war, large black loudspeakers—cymbals—were installed free of charge in most Soviet apartments, and silver bells were installed on every street. Viktor Suvorov in his book "Day-M" specifically draws attention to this and explains that one day they had to shout mobilization - "Day-M" to the whole country.

But this is about the pre-war period. And now we read excerpts from the resolution of the May Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine "ON THE STATE AND WAYS TO IMPROVE MASS-POLITICAL WORK AMONG URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION":

*"The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U decides:*

*..... 2. The most important task of the mass political*

*In the work of the working people there must be a profound explanation of the decisions of the Party and the Soviet government, the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, questions international position.*

*.....*

*23. To oblige the Committee on Radio and Broadcasting under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, authorized by the Ministry of Communications of the USSR under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the CP (b)U, executive committees of regional, city and district Soviets of working people's deputies to provide the next 2-3 years, the completion of the complete radiofication of the republic. It is necessary to organize widely socialist competition for the radio*

*acceptance, collective farms, state farms and MTS, apartments of workers, houses of a collective farmer, etc."*

Let's analyze: two years from May 1949 is May 1951. And with overfulfillment - just the beginning of 1951. If some houses do not have time to radio, it does not matter: the neighbors will raise the alarm.

Fortunately, the Soviet leadership did not dare to announce Den-M. But is it possible to imagine how events in the third world war could unfold? This is what the next chapter is about.

## THE NUCLEAR WAR THAT DID NOT HAPPEN

So we have come to the chapter where it is the right place to present information from the Soviet military plans of the late 40s and early 50s. Unfortunately, they are still

have not been declassified until now, although similar American plans have long been known.

Maybe there were no Soviet plans at all? And what, then, were the headquarters of the two Soviet military ministries doing? There were plans, but according to their contents, so far one can only speculate. Moreover, there is material for assumptions.

First, you can start with the declassified American Kansk command and staff exercises:

1) the Padron War Game, held in May-July 1948 by US Army Headquarters to test the Halfmoon work plan;

2) and the war game "Stanner", held in October-November 1948 to test another American plan of action in the third world war "Flit wood."

Information about them was published in VIZH in Nos. 3 and 5, 1996. The translation and commentary on them were made by V. I. Batyuk, senior researcher at the Institute for the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, already mentioned in the previous chapter. The article is titled "WHY Mr. TRUMAN "GOOD DIL" OF THE USSR".

However, there may be a reasonable question: how much can be trusted in any military research of the other side? I think it's possible to some extent. Rules of strategy and tactics of waging war at a certain historical moment

almost the same for generals of different countries. Another thing is what forces are at their disposal, those. what they can count on.

Here you can recall the command and staff training research institute of the Soviet military leadership, held on the eve of the war. Then the future Marshal Zhukov "fought" for the "blue" (ie, for the Germans). And he "fought" (according to his memoirs) supposedly practically in the same way as the generals of the Wehrmacht actually acted later. In the textbook "HISTORY OF THE USSR" of 1990 on p. 14 says this:

*"... a number of military leaders clearly understood imagine the possible options for the actions of the enemy (Germany) in the event of a war. This was shown by the opera active-strategic games on the maps of the highest command staff of the Red Army, held in late 1940. One side, the "blue", played for the enemy, the other, the "red", played for the Red Army. Many of her moments were repeated in real conditions. initial period of the war.*

There is another creepy (in my opinion) example. Once, in the memoirs of a Soviet prisoner during the war, I read that in the camp where he was, former teachers of the Academy of the General Staff were kept (Marshal Vasilevsky was their student). They followed the reports of the Sovinformburo, after logging in free while on the ground they plotted situations on different sectors of the front with twigs and made forecasts for the coming 2-3 months. The author of the memoirs was surprised that, firstly, their predictions, as a rule, came true. And secondly, why were such specialists kept in the camp? They wrote letters asking to be admitted to

service in the army. But for some reason they were not released. od the general, however, was then nevertheless sent to the front.

As confirmation of the reality of such a story, I can more specifically cite a fragment of a somewhat similar fate - Lieutenant General Vasilyev Vasily Efimovich. In January 1938 he was arrested and ended up in a camp. At the end of 1942 he was released, fully rehabilitated and sent to the front. The commander of the 138th Carpathian division, a corps, was mentioned 14 times before the end of the war in the orders of the Supreme Command. (Newspaper "Privatnoye Delo", 1994, October 23-29, article by Grigory Kipnis "SUCH A LONG LOVE".)

Of course, the quality and quantity of ALL available information about the enemy (and not just intelligence data) greatly affects the results of general games. But I think that the American generals had certain qualifications.

Now let's briefly discuss the question: was it relevant for American politicians to hold such games in 1948? There is only one answer - there was a need. At that time, the Berlin Crisis was in full swing, the communists came to power in Czechoslovakia, which allowed the USSR to quickly close the gap between East Germany and East Austria, where Soviet troops were stationed. By this time, the split of the world into blocks was already quite clearly defined. Anti-American propaganda was unfolding in the USSR, and so on. The Berlin crisis (associated with the monetary reform in West Germany) generally raised the issue of the use of American military force point-blank. And before

the adoption of a final decision on it, the holding of a war game was extremely necessary. So, what conclusions did American analysts come to?

In his commentary on the translation of the game "Pedron", V. Batyuk writes:

*"Despite a touch of propaganda rhetoric aimed at accusing the Soviet Union of striving for world domination and to justify the planned destruction of the largest Soviet administrative and industrial centers, the report (following the results of the game "Pedron") reveals a number of important circumstances, due to which the implementation of the above plan (air-nuclear strikes against the USSR) was presented at the Pentagon headquarters albeit a politically expedient and hypothetically possible, but extremely risky step.*

*We are talking about a whole set of closely intertwined political and military-technical problems, among which in the first place was the inability of the US ground forces to fulfill the tasks stipulated by the Halfmoon plan.*

*So, it turned out that these troops are not able to protect American bases in the Mediterranean the Middle and Far East, from which they were supposed to take to the air strategic bombers to strike targets in the USSR. In addition, Pentagon analysts concluded that the American*

*divisions will be able to resist the Soviet armies marching victoriously across Western Europe at most two weeks, after which they will leave the European allies at the mercy of the winner and evacuate from the continent.*

*... It is precisely this delicate circumstance from the point of view of allied relations, apparently, that was one of the reasons why the plan "Halfmoon" and materials carried out with the aim of checks of the staff game for a long time did not betray publicity."*

The results of the war game "Stanner" (October-but

November 1948) turned out to be about the same: *"On the fifth day of the war, Soviet troops with 26 divisions left drove to the Rhine, and on the seventh they crossed it with large forces. There was no talk of a stubborn defense of the line along the Rhine, it was concluded that "American forces must immediately leave the defended positions and retreat to the West under the cover of darkness, with in order to save at least part of the people and equipment.*

The following areas were assumed by the Americans conduct of hostilities:

- 1) continental Western Europe;
- 2) UK;
- 3) Middle Eastern oil-producing regions (Iran, Iraq);
- 4) Mediterranean countries (Greece, Turkey, Italy, Egypt);
- 5) Alaska and nearby islands;
- 6) Korea.

The following arguments were cited to substantiate the military weakness of the United States (they are also indicated as notes to the article by V. Batyuk).

1) After the war, the size of its land army was sharply reduced (to about 600,000 people). It was only from the beginning of the war in Korea (June 1950) that it began to increase and by June 1951 reached almost 2 million people. In addition, after the war in the United States, compulsory conscription into the army was abolished, in connection with which, from 1948, American generals had to seek the resumption of conscription, at least in limited sizes.

For comparison: according to US intelligence, the total strength of the Soviet armed forces in February 1948 was 2,750,000 men. Moreover, only in East Germany (according to the same American intelligence) in October 1947 there were 5 Soviet armies (3rd shock, 8th guards,



1, 3 and 4th guards mechanized), numbering 324 thousand people. (i.e. half the size of ALL US ground forces), and since 1949

year, the Soviet army began to increase again.

2) Up to half of the strategic bombers of the aviation command could not take off on account of anxiety due to lack of spare parts and unsatisfactory maintenance, but also those crews that took to the air, often rendered were unable to complete the assigned tasks. During exercises over Dayton (Ohio) in 1948, none of the strategic bombers involved completed the combat training mission.

3) In the middle of 1948, the US Air Force was armed with only 32 B-29 aircraft as a carrier of atomic bombs. In December 1948 their number reached 60, and by June 1950 - 250.

4) In 1947, the total number of nuclear bombs in the American arsenal did not exceed two and a half dozen, and even those had to be assembled over a long period of time. Only after the Berlin Crisis

In 1948, the American atomic arsenal began to grow at an accelerated pace. By May 1949 it had grown to 140, and by the summer of 1953 it had reached a thousand bombs.

5) The US Air Force had problems with maps of the USSR, especially on a small scale. Due to the fact that geographic maps in the Soviet Union had been classified since the mid-1930s, the Pentagonists had to rely on maps preserved from the pre-revolutionary times, as well as on the data of captured German aerial photography.

6) The problem of interaction between the commands of various branches of the military was a certain concern for the political leaders of the United States.  
etc.

Did the Soviet leadership know about this? Eat information that Soviet intelligence in the United States worked much better than American intelligence in the USSR. There are many publications about this, for example, the already mentioned Ph.D. V. Batyuk in his article "THE SUCCESSOR OF I. V. STALIN CIA CONSIDERED" ("VIZH", 1997, No. 1). He cites data that Soviet intelligence officers mined dock cops that existed even in one copy, in including the American nuclear project.

As for the military command of the Soviet Union, in No. 5 "VIZH" for 1996 on p. 72 admits that it did develop plans for a "just" attack on others: *"Regarding ground operations by Soviet armed*

*forces against states on whose territory American forward-based assets were located, it should be noted that it was with the Berlin crisis of 1948 that the revision of the passive defensive strategy adopted after the defeat of the fascist aggressors began. At the turn of the 40-50s*

*years, the concept of offensive operations began to take shape, which American analysts from the very beginning attribute to the Soviet side - the suppression of US military (primarily air) bases in Eurasia and the interception of communications*

*between North American and Eurasian mothers kami."*

It was precisely the "passive defensive strategy" of the Soviet leadership after the war that Soviet historians spoke of when it was necessary to say something about Soviet post-war army planning. It was the defensive plans of 1946-1948 that they usually cited as an example, as if 1948 was the last year in which any military plans were drawn up.

plans.

And as all the previous chapters of this study have shown

Accordingly, the Stalinist leadership of the USSR was not going to recklessly start a new world war. It CAREFULLY AND CONSISTENTLY PREPARED her. True, Hitler set an example that too thorough preparation is not required. You can stop at

The minimum, for example, of submarines in the German fleet in September 1939 was about 50. And this number was enough to unleash a world war. For comparison: according to American intelligence, the Soviet Union had 335 submarines in the late 1940s. What is this for? To fight for peace?

It has already been said above that Stalin could have been thinking about a new war since 1943. And the most visible steps towards its approach were his great efforts already in 1945 to create a future Far Eastern hotbed of tension (Korea, China, the island of Hok Kaido). Why there?

To answer this question, it is useful to move from flat maps to a round globe. By the way, Nikita Khrushchev once remarked that Stalin "led the globe", hinting at his superficial approach to solving many problems. I think the conclusion is wrong. It's not about being superficial. It's just that flat maps with a curved surface are no longer suitable for preparing some plans. We need a GLOBE!

And he was in Stalin's office in the Kremlin! In his memoirs "GENERAL STAFF DURING THE WAR" (1968), General of the Army Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko describes not only the tasks being solved at that time, but also the relationship with Stalin, including: the regime of the day established by him, the order of reports and the atmosphere of his office (p. 117). Reports to the Supreme were usually made three times a day. The first two - by phone, and the final one for the day (with showing the situation on

maps at a scale of 1:200,000) was made at night in Stalin's Kremlin office, ending at 3-4 o'clock in the morning.

The cards were unfolded on a long rectangular table, behind the end of which, in the corner, stood a large globe. However, Shtemenko notes that in his hundreds of visits to the Kremlin, he never saw operational issues being considered there. But this does not prove that they were not used at all. A large globe cannot be in the OFFICE as furniture: you cannot sit on it, put or put something on it - too. For beauty, an aquarium, paintings or sculpture are better suited. Some of this list was in Stalin's office: plaster

the death mask of Lenin, large portraits of Suvorov and Kutuzov, and oak paneling of the walls. And why did the big globe take its place?

First, it allows you to accurately calculate the far distances in dealing with global strategic issues (to which Stalin increasingly had to address from 1945). As for Korea, when it is day in Europe it is night, and vice versa. Is the hint not clear? Will explain.

Imagine: 23:00 midnight Central European time. Unexpectedly, the officers of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany are raised on alarm, moreover, after two or three months of conducting exercises in conditions of high combat readiness and with a propaganda campaign about provocations from a possible enemy. By 0000 hours the officers were gathered and they were told that in the Far East the Americans had attacked Chinese and Soviet territories. Apparently, this is to be expected here as well. As

counter-training, the Soviet leadership decided to take preventive measures. In particular, for pilots: to carry out the bombing of predetermined airfields

mov; tankers: bring equipment to a predetermined

nye (source) areas and be ready for an attack; gunners: readiness to open fire - 4.00! Etc. And someone would try to refuse! And here, for some reason, the warehouses turned out to be ready to issue ammunition! Only one thing remains: forward to the impregnable enemy! But how to check whether there was an American attack or not? And no way to check. Everything was set up for this occasion. By the way, on October 8, 1950, the shelling of the Soviet airfield in the Dry River area near Vladivostok by American aircraft took place! But then the Soviet Union had its troops in Europe, fortunately

for all progressive and other mankind, did not move IN ANSWER. They limited themselves to a note of protest. (Moreover, American diplomats refused to accept it, advising them to contact the UN command. I had to send a note by mail.)

I will not give a more detailed analysis of the possible course of the war here. With regard to the directions of hostilities, it is quite possible to agree with the information of the American war games (only by clarifying it with other regions of the Arctic). Moreover, the list of possible theaters available in it is almost completely

matches the list of "enemy" or "occupied territories, which Zhdanov brought at a meeting of representatives of some communist parties in Poland as early as the end of 1947.

But it turned out that in Soviet literature there is a kind of "memoirs about the failed atomic war", written by the Strugatsky brothers in the late 60s - this is section 17 of their story "INHABITED MY ISLAND" (M.: Publishing House "Children's Literature", 1971, with note: **"For middle and senior**

**school age**). In these "memoirs" the methodology for preparing a "just" invasion is given in sufficient detail, morals in the Soviet Army

those years, and, in addition, artistically shown,

what is hidden behind the new tactics adopted in 1949 to break through the defenses of an atomic enemy.

In general, here is the time to present the ENTIRE 17th section of the Strugatsky story, it is written superbly! But for a number of reasons, unfortunately, cuts and changes have to be made. The advantage of the section is a large number of "transparent" allusions to reality. For example, a train with a penal tank brigade is moving to the front even before the start of hostilities and without tanks. Some years ago, the future enemy was an ally in some world war, and after it he set up a line of mine-atomic fields on his border. Penal boxes are made up of former prisoners, who are divided into criminals and political. They are transported in freight wagons with frames, crookedly knocked down from unplanned boards. There is almost no food on the road. The most affordable of pita

columns with boiling water remain at intermediate stations. Instead of boots, they have boots with windings.

The brigade was unloading in the early morning, when fog and drizzling light rain. The first attempts to build it were unsuccessful. But soon guards appeared with machine guns at the ready. Under their "cover" the brigade was built, and its commander (a former colonel, demoted for selling state-owned fuel on the black market) delivered a parting speech:

*"- Soldiers! .. I was not mistaken, I am addressing you as to the soldiers, although all of us - including myself - are still that the ordinary dregs of society ... Be grateful that you are allowed to go into battle now. In a few hours, almost all of you will die, and it will well, but those of you who survive will heal like a god in his bosom. Soldier soldering, alcohol, etc. Now we will move into position, and you will get into the cars. Absolute nonsense - to walk on tracks one and a half hundred*

*not kilometers ... Tankers from you, like from a bottle  
a hammer, you know yourself, but everything you get to is  
yours ... There is no way back, but there is a way  
forward. Who moves back - I will burn on the spot! This is  
especially true for drivers... No questions! Brrrrga yes! Right!...  
Deal with four!.. Listen to the team! Step-gom ... ma-a-rsh!  
Three hells in hell! .. "*

The protagonist of the story (Maxim) for some time ended up next to the ex-colonel. He was drunk. The battalion commanders were also drunk. The brigade moved along a broken track rolled with caterpillars to the place where the tanks had been assembled in advance. All the way along the edges of the road, every 50-100 meters, black figures of guards with submachine guns at the ready could be seen. The penalty box walked silently, obediently, like cattle. When on the slope of the ravine appeared those standing in three rows of tanks, then someone in front of the column shouted cheerfully and loudly: *"Here are our coffins!"*

To this, the platoon commander (himself a former guard) said to Maxim: *"Look what they give us, it's the same pre-war cars, tin cans! Listen, Mac, are we going to die here? 'Cause it's death imminent..."* Maxim tried to calm him down. But one of the penalty boxers remarked: *"Aha! Wet your pants? It's not for you to count the teeth of convicts ... "*

Loudspeakers stood between the tanks right on the grass, from which a tape-recorded voice explained that there, beyond the crest of the ravine, was an insidious enemy. *"Therefore, leverage on yourself and forward! On the enemy! Only forward!"*... When the column was drawn into the gap between the rows of tanks and stopped, a voice the moat stopped for a short time, and instead the ex-colonel began to shout: *"Soldiers! Stop building a base! Everyone in the cars!.. Who will be left,"* and he began to wave his pistol. (The colonel stood on his own everywhere, and the battalion held him by the legs.)

But for a short time there was a crush, even a fight, since most of the penalty boxers wanted to occupy only the tanks of the back row. But then the guards appeared and began to shoot from machine guns. Maxim with his crew quickly ran to occupy the tank in the front row. They were joined by a driver, a criminal nicknamed Hook. When everyone fit into the tank, Maxim squeezed into the tower and leaned out.

*"There was no one else between the tanks except the guards. All engines were running, there was a terrible roar, a thick, stuffy cloud of exhaust filled the slope.*

*Some of the tanks were moving, in some places their heads were sticking out of the towers: a paratrooper from a neighboring car gave Maksim made some signs and twisted his face. Suddenly he disappeared: the engines roared with redoubled force, and all the tanks with noise and howl simultaneously rushed forward and up the slope.*

*"Began?" - thought Maxim ... His tank, shuddering, climbed onto the ridge, piles of earth flew from under caterpillars. Behind the bluish smoke, nothing could be seen, and in front a gray clayey plain suddenly opened up and flat hills could be seen in the distance on enemy side. The tank avalanche, without slowing down, rushed there. There were no more rows, all the vehicles raced, hitting each other, pointlessly turning their turrets... One tank had full*

*a caterpillar flew off the course: it spun around in place, turned over ... And Maxim looked and looked, not*

*having the strength to look away from this majestic*

*its criminal senselessness of the spectacle ... People, wind-up dolls, animals... People..."*

The protagonist of the story decided to take control and take the tank somewhere to the side, behind a shelter from a possible atomic explosion. He removed the driver from the levers and sat behind them himself. But there is not enough in the inspection hatch



what was visible. And he continued to move somewhere forward towards the hills, and there they reached and crossed the border with a neighboring country:

*"The drooping border sign emerged from the smoke and disappeared, followed by torn, crumpled wire barriers. For a moment a man in a marvelous white helmet looked out of an imperceptible trench, violently waved his raised fists, and at the same instant*

*disappeared, as if dissolving into the earth. Smog ahead gradually dissipated. Maxim saw brown round hills quite close and the tank's muddy stern, which for some reason crawled obliquely towards the general movement, and another burning tank.*

Maxim turned left, trying to drive into the hollow between the hills, but at that moment someone's shell hit the tank. As it turned out, his tank drove into the enemy firing line of some guns. Maksim Pokru

teel the tank in place and moved on, where he decided to stop curl.

*"He opened the hatch, leaned out to the waist and looked around. The location was right. From all sides tank surrounded by high brown slopes. Maxim drowned out engine ... He got out of the tank and ran up hillside. Somewhere engines roared, caterpillars squealed, cannons fired from time to time. A shell whistled high in the sky. Maxim, crouching down, ran out to*

*top, squatted down in the bushes and once again off wholeheartedly praised himself for such a good choice places.*

*Below - within reach - there was a wide passage between the hills, and this passage, emerging from the plain filled with smoke, huddling together, the caterpillar to caterpillars, tanks moved in a continuous stream - low, flattened, powerful, with large flat towers and long cannons. These were no longer*

*penalty box, it was the regular army. For several minutes, Maxim, stunned and dumbfounded, watched this spectacle, terrible and improbable, like a period film. The air shook and trembled with a wild roar and roar, the hill trembled under feet like a frightened animal, and yet it seemed to Max that the cars were moving in a gloomy, threatening in total silence..."*

When the last cars passed, Maxim looked at his "obsolete" tank, remembered the threat of atomic explosions and hurried down. When he approached his tank, such an explosion occurred.

*"And at that moment, that other FORCE made counter attack. Maxim caught his eye. He screamed in pain, closed his eyes with all his might and fell down..."*

*When the surrounding world again became possible for human perception, consciousness returned. It must have been a very short time, a few seconds, but Maxim woke up, covered in copious sweat, with a dry throat. And his head rang as if he had been hit in the ear with a plank.*

*Everything around has changed, the world has become crimson, the world was abandoned with leaves and broken branches, the world was filled with hot air, uprooted bushes fell like rain from the red sky, flaming bushes, heaps of hot dry earth. And there was a painfully ringing silence. Alive and the dead were scattered in all directions.*

When Maxim woke up, he tried to help his comrades, but some of them were dead, some were wounded. And he decided to climb to the top of the hill.

*"Here, too, everything has changed. The bushes were no more the sintered clay smoked and crackled, the north-facing hillside burned. Crimson in the north the sky blended into a solid wall of black and brown*

*smoke, and under it grew, swelling before our eyes, bright orange oily-fat clouds. And there, where thousands of tons of red-hot ash rose under the firmament, which was split from impact, incinerated to atoms of hope to survive and live, in*

*this incinerated furnace, arranged by unfortunate fools for unfortunate fools, was stretched from the south, as if in a blower, by a light, damp wind ... "*

I remind you once again that I read the message about the adoption of just such a tactic of breaking through the defense of the atomic enemy by Soviet generals by 1949 after I had read the book by the Strugatskys. And it struck me. But in addition to the option of starting an atomic war, there are other interesting situations in the story "INHABITED ISLAND": flying on an abandoned strategic bomber of the Tu-95 type; visiting a nuclear submarine stuck aground; life in a radioactively contaminated area (more powerful than Chernobyl); oversaturation of some areas with automated weapons systems; disarmament attempts; the inability of the government to effectively solve problems in the economy; the inability of the opposition to suggest better ways of development; ecological problems; inflation, etc. As far as I understand, in this work the Strugatskys depicted their vision of the future life in the USSR in the conditions of continued confrontation with the West and an arms race based on the scientific and technological revolution. Indeed, understanding the falsity of the slogan "the decay of capitalism" and the appearance of the stability of the socialist ideology in the absence of reform could well lead to such a future.

And as it turned out, on the Internet in May 2002, on the official page of the Strugatsky brothers, one of the readers posted his question regarding the "INHABITED ISLAND":

*Question:*

*Hello Boris Natanovich!*

*This is banal and not at all arriginal;), but it important to me personally. And so, thank you for your books, for the worlds created in them, for moral impearations, which then significantly influenced attitude towards life and people. Thank you.*

*Now the actual question. As you surely you know, a clever novelist is now very popular V. Rezun. He bakes his books like pancakes, trying to prove that the USSR was the only instigator of World War II. There is a lot to argue here.*

*but I'm not talking about that.*

*Now his like-minded person has appeared (ech;), who is trying to prove that the USSR unleashed the Korean war as a pretext for starting the 3rd world (nuclear) war. As one of the arguments, there is next passage: "But it turned out that in the Soviet fiction there is a kind of "memoirs about the failed atomic war", written by the Strugatsky brothers in the late 60s - this*

*Section 17 of their story "INHABITED ISLAND" (Moscow, publishing house "Children's Literature", 1971, with a note: "For middle and senior school age") ...*

*What follows is partly retelling, partly quoting the relevant chapter. And the conclusion: "Once again I remind you that by 1949 I read the message about the adoption of just such a tactic of breaking through the defense of the atomic enemy by Soviet generals after reading the book by the Strugatskys. And this I was amazed..."*

*Could you comment on the flight of thought the author of these quotes?*

*Neither the name of the author of the quotes, nor the address of the site where his book is located, I do not quote - I do not want to make an advertisement).*

*PS I apologize for the long quotes.*

*Sarmantai Kasenov*

*Almaty, Kazakhstan - 09/05/02 04:57:39 MSK*

*B. N. Strugatsky's answer :*

*What exactly should I comment on? The author's idea about the causes of the outbreak of the Korean War? Or the use of quotes from The Inhabited Island? I will note immediately that, while working on OO, we least of all thought about the Korean War (we didn't think about it at all), and everything that we have described there, as it seemed to us, is a typical picture of the deployment of military operations by a totalitarian state against its neighbors. We could not even imagine that all this it could look something different.*

*As far as the Korean War itself is concerned, Rezun's idea is neither new nor original. All this is for Stalin's thoughts, his role in deploying the military actions of the North against the South, its role in the subsequent involvement in the events of "Chinese volunteers" - all this was discussed (in a whisper, in the kitchens) already in the fifties, and in later times in one or another was confirmed to some extent in numerous this topic in monographs that appeared in the West (and in modern times appeared in Russia, I remember, material about it). So add me to everything there is simply nothing to it - the question has long and unambiguously been scoop."*

However, Soviet science fiction writers rarely addressed the topic of nuclear war or the topic of a sober economic forecast. The fight against spies was more often developed. But the "atomic future" is much

Writers in the West were more widely used, especially since the end of the 1940s under the conditions of the flaring Cold War. A good overview of this topic is given in the book by V. Gakov "ULTIMATUM: NUCLEAR WAR AND A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD IN FANTASIES AND REALITY" (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989). I give the titles of some American books

Russian authors:

Murray Leinster - "KILLING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" (1946).

Leonard Engel and Emmanuel Piller - "WORLD ON FIRE (Russian-American War of 1950)" (1947).

Judith Merrill - "SHADOWS OVER THE HOUSE" (1950) (Canada).

Theodore Dubois - "SOLUTION T-25" (1951).

The famous special issue of the magazine "KOL EPC" for 10/27/1951.

Guy Richards - "TWO RUBLES TO TIMES SQUARE" (1956)

Similar tales and stories in the countries of the bloc during led by the United States printed a lot, a lot. In terms of plot, most of them are similar to each other: after armed border incidents ("provocations"), a large-scale war breaks out with atomic bombings, massive offensives, and the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As a result, Western civilization perishes, "Russians come" to the Western Hemisphere and arrange a totalitarian regime, the collapse of the economy, special camps, general and

persistent shortages of food and manufactured goods. All authors cited the Cold War as the main reason for the appearance of such literature. And before laughing at their "paranoia", I think it would be useful to know that preparations for a new world war were in full swing. And not only technical. People died in various local "preparatory" conflicts. Losses, as in World War II, can be counted in the millions.

And in conclusion of the chapter, I would like to quote from the book of the former correspondent of the newspaper "PRAVDA" in France, Y. Zhukov, "USSR-USA: A ROAD LONG FOR SEVENTY YEARS, or A STORY ABOUT HOW SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS DEVELOPED" (M.: Politizdat, 1988):

*"The situation in Europe quickly heated up. Working in Paris, I clearly saw how the universal fear of the possibility of these local armed conflicts (Korea, Southeast Asia) escalating into a third world war. This fear*

*fueled by the bourgeois press, which continued to inflate the myth of the "Soviet threat". The weekly CARRE FOUR went so far as to conduct a survey on the topic "What you will do when the red army enters Paris?". The faint-hearted couldn't resist. When the war in Korea began, every day a long queue of frightened people lined up at the Spanish embassy, hurrying to get visas in order to take refuge beyond the Pyrenees" (from a New Year's article by Yu. Zhukov, 1951).*

Speaking of France. In the journal "AVIATION AND COSMONAUTICS", 1990, No. 12, on p. 33 has a color drawing showing a Soviet MiG-15 with stars on its sides shooting down a twin-engine jet with a French flag on its tail. Actually, the drawing was made as an illustration of the memories of the participation of Soviet pilots in the Korean War. So the artist accidentally depicted Soviet stars instead of the identification marks of North Korea.

And another big proof that the new world war was actively prepared by the Soviet Union in 1945-1953, the events after March 5, 1953, which can be classified as "post-war" can serve. Incidentally, General Shtemenko explicitly states in his memoirs that the Soviet General

the headquarters worked in wartime until Stalin's death (p. 119) (i.e., the working day began at 10-11 o'clock in the afternoon and ended at 3-4 o'clock in the morning). In other words, for the Soviet General Staff, the "post-war" time came ... as early as March 1953. And not only for him, but also for Soviet peasants, diplomats, police, prisoners, etc., which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.



## **"POST-WAR" TIME**

To begin with, let us recall in chronological order some of the events that have occurred since March 5, 1953.

On March 5, 1953, I. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, died. On March 14, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was appointed. On March 15, it adopted the Law on the Transformation of Ministries. Many of them were liquidated by merging, including the Military Ministry and the Naval Ministry were merged into a single Ministry of Defense. And although from 24.08.1953

the ministries gradually began to separate again, the Ministry of Defense remained united until the end of the existence of the USSR.

In connection with the formation of a single Ministry of Defense, the Naval General Staff was abolished in March.

In March 1953, the Council for Collective Farm Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was abolished. On August 8, 1953, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law "On Agricultural Tax", which eased the situation of the Soviet peasants.

On April 23, 1953, the Ministry of Defense held reorganization of the military command structure in the Far East, in particular, the command of the Commander-in-Chief of all troops was eliminated, and the Far Eastern military districts were merged into

one. At the same time, the 5th and 7th Pacific Fleets were merged into one Pacific Fleet.

In May 1953, the East Siberian and Gorky military districts were disbanded. In November, the Donskoy was formed.

On May 30, 1953, the Soviet government renounced its claims to Turkey.

On June 6, 1953, the Soviet government came up with a proposal to exchange ambassadors with Yugoslavia. The organization of Yugoslav emigration was dissolved in the USSR and anti-Yugoslav propaganda was stopped. On May 26, 1955, the party leader of the USSR N. Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade.

On July 27, 1953, an armistice was signed in Korea.

In September 1953, the "Special Meeting" of the NKVD (MVD, MGB) was abolished - an extrajudicial punitive organ.

In December 1953, the political sky departments of MTS in the Western regions of Ukraine.

On March 18, 1954, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council ratified the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9-12, 1948).

On April 17, 1954, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council ratified the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 on the protection of victims of war.

On July 12, 1954, the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the abolition of personal ranks and insignia for employees of civilian ministries and departments" was issued. He abolished the introduction of personal titles in 11 civilian branches (in state control, procurement, finance and banking, geology, coal, oil and gas industries, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, and some others). For 10 industries

personal ranks and insignia were introduced with  
09/10/1947 to 05/24/1951.

In 1954, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR became members of UNESCO (UNESCO) - the United Nations organization for education, science and culture.

On January 25, 1955, the USSR Supreme Council adopted a Decree to end the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany.

On May 15, 1955, the State Treaty on the Restoration of an Independent and Demilitarized Austria was signed in Vienna. The withdrawal of troops was completed on October 25, 1955. On July 31, 1955, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal G.K. Zhukov issued an order to reduce the strength of the USSR Armed Forces

*troops withdrawn from Austria.*

On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was finally signed on the creation of a military bloc of Eastern European countries.

On August 13, 1955, the Soviet government decided to reduce the number of troops by 12/15/1955 by 640,000 people (some explain that it was Marshal Zhukov who decided to dismiss the political officers of the company). In addition, decisions to reduce troops were also made by other Eastern European countries. In total, the troops of different countries were reduced by 808,000 people.

In 1955, the Soviet government recognized the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War, adopted in The Hague in 1899 and 1907.

In May 1955, the USSR withdrew its troops and returned the naval base in Luishun (Port Arthur) to the government of the PRC free of charge.

In 1955, the USSR refused ahead of schedule, and in January 1956 returned to Finland its naval base on the Porkkala-Udd peninsula, taken in 1944 for 50 years. (Raid Porkkala-Udd with depths of 14-26 m

allows to receive a significant number of warships and large displacement ships).

December 1955 - 4th and 8th Navy merged into unified Baltic Fleet.

In 1955, the USSR joined the Inter-Parliamentary Union (founded in 1899 and encouraging contacts between the parliamentarians of the participating countries in order to strengthen *"democratic institutions, as well as in the cause of the defense of peace and cooperation among peoples"*).

In December 1955, the members of the UN finally mutually agreed to accept into their ranks Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, as well as Austria, Spain, Italy, Porto

gallium.

April 1956 - the Tauride and White Sea military districts were disbanded.

On April 19, 1956, the unconstitutional terrorist decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of December 1, 1934, issued the day after Kirov's assassination, was cancelled. In accordance with it, cases of "acts of terrorism" were ordered to be conducted expeditiously, petitions for pardon to be rejected, and sentences of capital punishment to be brought immediately. By the way, there is information about the loss of life caused by various "legislative initiatives" of Stalin, for example, in Robert Conquest's book "GREAT TERROR" (volume 2, Riga, "Rakstnieks", 1991, pp. 369-370):

*"With all caution, taking for the average for the period 1936-1950, a figure of 8 million prisoners and a figure of 10% of annual mortality, we We end up with 12 million deaths. To these must be added another million executed; number by no means exaggerated. There were losses before ezhovshchina, in the period 1930-1936, covering three and a half million victims of collectivization plus the same number of conclusions and special translations*

*Lenetsy, who practically died out in subsequent years;  
Again, this is the bare minimum. In the end everything  
this is 20 million, and this figure is likely  
but, underestimated ... "*

On May 14, 1956, the Soviet government decided to reduce its armed forces by another 1,200,000 men by May 1, 1957 (up from 640,000 in 1955). Part of the military schools was also disbanded, and 375 warships of the navy were mothballed. In the summer of 1980, during a construction practice, I heard from one veteran an officer saying that existed at that time: *"Three to two hundred, a court of honor and*

*one million two hundred"* (in the sense - "drank three glasses of vodka, 200 grams each, passed the court of honor on the consequences of a drunken brawl and ended up in the front ranks for dismissal as a punishment"). On January 15, 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted another Law "On a new significant reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR", in accordance with which the Soviet Army and Navy were reduced once again by 1,200,000.

On October 19, 1956, the Joint Declaration on the cessation of the state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed.

In 1956, political agencies were liquidated on the same rail transport.

The production of gas generating cars was discontinued bills and diesel locomotives.

And there were other events that are typical only for the period after the war. It can also be considered in detail, it also has a lot of interest

but, apparently, this is a topic for another conversation.

Although one point here should be considered in more detail. It is about repression and rehabilitation. Based on materials from the open press of the late 50s - early 60s, as well as the late 90s, it is known that in the period of the 30s - early 50s, "re

press" against Soviet citizens. This was expressed in the mass arrests of civilians and military people on trumped-up charges. In the late 50s, many of them (especially those who had survived by this time) were "rehabilitated." Here we can recall the different stories presented in Chapter 8 of this study. And although this topic, one might say, was widely considered in the media, there was no intelligible explanation for "repressions", and especially for "rehabilitations". They still tried to somehow explain the "repressions" by the "bloodthirstiness" of the Stalinist regime, its desire for absolute power, and so on. And the topic of "rehabilitations" was hardly touched at all, as if they saw in it only a completely "normal" process after the "going into the past of the totalitarian regime." Only sometimes attention was drawn to the inconsistency of some "rehabilitations", in the sense: such and such rehabilitations

rovali, and some others associated with them - no.

But I would like to draw attention to something else: WHO carried out the work on "rehabilitation"? For example, the future professor, doctor of geographical sciences Yu.

On May 28, 1954, with the removal of a criminal record in accordance with the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 27, 1953. But this was forgiveness under an amnesty. Moreover, many witnesses of those years pay attention to the fact that according to the Decree of March 27, 1953, first of all, criminals were amnestied, and the turn of political ones came later (since 1954). But on December 8, 1955, Chirkov was "completely rehabilitated due to the lack of corpus delicti." His rehabilitation was carried out by a review of the case by the MILITARY TRIBUNAL of the Moscow Military District.

Strange. Why was the MILITARY TRIBUNAL dealing with the case of a CIVIL? By the way, rehabilitation

the other amnestied persons (men, women, civilian or military) were also taken care of by the military three bunals. Why not civil courts? First, let's look at the time: judging by the memories, the rehabilitation was massively carried out in 1955-1956, having been started in 1954.

Now let's remember what are the consequences  
have a person's criminal record expunged by a civil court? First, restoring him to his former place of work. Secondly: such a citizen had the right to receive monetary compensation for the entire time

equestrian conclusion, based on the average monthly earnings.

The release of people "just like that", and even by military authorities, is carried out only in the period AFTER THE END OF THE WAR and only in relation to the MILITARY

CAPTURED! Is the hint clear? I don't want something

discuss this situation in detail. The heart becomes eerie. But what the military tribunals did, on

clearly shows how the Stalinist leadership treated its own citizens - as enemies in the war! As an illustration, below are duplicates of the standard certificate received from the tribunal Yu. Chirkov during rehabilitation.

*MILITARY TRIBUNAL*

*MOSCOW*

*MILITARY DISTRICT*

*December 10, 1955*

*ŷŷ-4102/OS*

*Moscow, Arbat, 37*

#### *REFERENCE*

*The case on charges of Yury Ivanovich CHIRKOV,*

*Born 1919, reviewed by Military Tribunal*

*Moscow Military District December 6, 1955.*

*Resolutions of special meetings under the NKVD of the USSR  
dated July 20, 1935, July 10, 1938 and at the MGB  
USSR dated August 22, 1951 in respect of CHIRKO VA Yu. I.  
were canceled and the case was dismissed for lack of  
I eat corpus delicti.*

*ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE MVO  
COLONEL OF JUSTICE  
(seal) (signature) /N. GURINOV/*

Let's analyze: a civilian Chirkov Yu.I. at the age of 16 was convicted FOR ANYTHING by some extrajudicial body. He spent most of the next 20 years in prison in an environment where every day could be his last. And then he received a certificate from the MILITARY TRIBUNAL that he was free. Not even an apology. But

if we consider him as a prisoner of war, then the logic observed.

Thus, it turns out that in the USSR, in the 1930s and early 1950s, not only ideological weapons were used against their own, but also quite ordinary ones. (But for the bulk of the citizens, light small arms were enough - pistols, rifles and machine guns.)

There is another fact that confirms the above thought about the attitude of the Stalinist leadership of the USSR towards its own: in December 1941, Stalin severed relations with the International Red Cross. All Soviet servicemen who were captured by the Germans automatically became traitors to the Motherland. On December 27, 1941, a GKO decree was issued on checking former Red Army servicemen in special special camps (i.e., maximum security prisons). Somehow I came across the memory of a former Soviet intelligence officer. He cited the case of their group being captured by the Germans. To the question "how were they captured?", he replied: "As we took, so they took us." But they put them in some house and assigned them as a guard



"old man". They managed to "take it off" and return to their own. So he specifically emphasized in his memoirs  
yah, that they swore an oath to each other, not a word anywhere  
to say that they spent several hours in captivity with him  
tsev.

According to the newspaper "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" (April 4, 1995, p. 5), there were 5,300,000 Soviet prisoners of war in Nazi captivity. So, in 1956 they were also amnestied, but not rehabilitated. The decree on rehabilitation was signed by the President of Russia on January 31, 1995.

One can also recall the restoration of the rights of some peoples who were massively evicted in the 30s - at the beginning of the 50s (Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, etc.). However, in the second half of the 1950s, full rehabilitation with the restoration of administrative formations (autonomous republics and regions) was not carried out for all previously repressed peoples. Only two and a half months before the August "coup" of 1991, the government of the USSR adopted Decree No. 336 (06.06.1991) "ON RESPONSE OF THE DECISIONS OF THE FORMER STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE USSR AND THE DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET PEOPLES WHO HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED  
REPRESSION AND FORCED RESETTLEMENT". os

its new meaning: "... *The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR post*

*Updates: repeal the regulations..., according to the appendix*

*fucked up list.*" Signature: Prime Minister V. Pavlov. And the attached list (with the removal of the secrecy stamp) contained 47 resolutions by date, starting from 01/23/1936 and ending with the beginning of the 50s.

But this act can be attributed to the end of the legal process of rehabilitation of the repressed peoples. It began in the mid-50s, being a sign of the POST-WAR PERIOD

Engage in amnesty and rehabilitation

wine-convicted citizens, entire peoples and prisoners of war (both their own and others), the Soviet government was OBLIGED since 1955 after the ratification of the Geneva and other conventions. And it was doing it. Moreover, citizens were rehabilitated through military tribunals. As it should be AFTER THE WAR.

By the way, the return of German prisoners of war also ended around this time, for example, Field Marshal von Paulus (1953) or the former Soviet intelligence officer, the German Johann Wentzel (May 1955). Only in 1955 did the Soviet government adopted a special decision on the return to their homeland of all German military personnel who were in the USSR more than 9,000 prisoners, except for those convicted of war crimes (on which an agreement with the government of the FRG was reached only in 1957).

Question: When is the time after the war? Answer: usually after the Day of Victory or the Day of Defeat (Surrender). What can be attributed to March 5, 1953? From the point of view of common sense, universal human interests, the interests of each individual inhabitant of the planet, this is Victory Day. But from the point of view of the "World Revolution", the tasks of spreading the communist ideology, March 5, 1953 is the Day of Defeat (although not yet capitulation, but a strategic defeat, as the further course of history showed). Communism will win in a peaceful competition

could no longer, adhering to the very end dead end path of confrontation with the rest of the world. But that is another story. Now it's time to move on to the Conclusion.

## CONCLUSION

I don't know how the reader feels after reading this entire book. Personally, for periods I felt terribly and sorry for the lost mass of various material resources and the crippled destinies of millions of people, although I received information about that time in portions and over many years. But it's time to sum up. Concluding a detailed story about the actions of only one side in the Cold War, I would like to note that Stalin treated the implementation of the main goal of the Communist Party, the accomplishment of the World Revolution, which was reflected in all party programs, very qualitatively. And although in

while in the first two the main focus was on seizing and consolidating power in one country, Russia, in the third it was to be the main goal. But why make assumptions if this program was actually adopted? Indeed, she was accepted

but the process of its adoption for some reason dragged on for many years and included the development of several options.

One version was prepared in 1948, but at the end of that year it was sent to the archive. Moreover, there is information (magazine "QUESTIONS OF THE CPSU HISTORY", 1990, No. 7, article by Yu. Aksenov "THE ROAD TO COMMUNISM: UTOPIAS AND REALITY") that the 19th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1952, was planned to be held earlier (in 1947 or in early 1948). Reasons for postponing

kov are not indicated in the journal, but it is said that in 1948 a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the norm of representation and the procedure for elections at the XIX All-Union Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" was prepared. However, even then it was not carried out. About the reasons for the refusal to hold a congress, a conference and adopt a new program of the CPSU (b) at that time, the journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU (!) Expresses only some tory assumptions.

In particular, the relationship of the new party program with the development of a draft general economic plan of the USSR for 1946-1965, the implementation of which was supposed to mean the entry of the Soviet Union into communism. This work was supervised by N. Voznesensky, Deputy Chairman of the Government of the USSR (i.e. Stalin). But it was not completed (in 1948 the plan was sent to the archive). And Voznesensky himself suffered a terrible fate - from August

In 1949, various accusations began to be brought against him, on 10/27/1949 he was arrested, and at the end of 1950 he was executed. He was executed according to the results of the so-called. "Leningrad case", according to which she was sentenced to death a whole group of senior civilian leaders of the USSR, including the former secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the head of the Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee, A.-A. Kuznetsov (who was relieved of these posts at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on February 15, 1949 - information from the collection "THEY WERE NOT SILENT", compiled by A.V. Afanasiev, M.: Politizdat, 1991). For a short time, A. Kuznetsov was chairman of the newly created Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Far East. But at the beginning of March 1949, the decision to create it was cancelled. At the beginning of March 1949, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. A. Bulganin left the post of Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR and completely switched to work as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (replacing N. Voznesensky). On March 5, 1949, Stalin met with Kim Il

Sen, after which the training of North Korean troops is intensified. By this time, factories under the combat atomic program were already operating in the Soviet Union, and preparations for the first atomic explosion reached fi lower stage.

So why, then, did they refuse to accept the new program of the CPSU (b)? (As well as from a new long-range forward plan?) References to the war and post-war economic recovery are not entirely convincing. For comparison, we can recall that his second

The Soviet communists adopted the program in the terrible conditions of the Civil War and devastation - in March 1919 at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b). At that time, the troops of the tsarist general Denikin had not yet been defeated. And nothing, they found both transport and time, gathered 403 delegates and solemnly adopted the new program! And what could interfere in 1948?

More recent comments on this subject  
They called for a new party program with an economic plan for building a communist society in the USSR. Actually, this connection manifested itself in 1961, when the XXII Congress of the CPSU finally adopted it. But is the connection between the third program of the CPSU and the economic plan for building communism in the USSR so obvious? Weird question? And if it is clarified as follows: is the connection of the third program of the CPSU ONLY with the economic development plan of the country obvious? With what else? Let's read a quote from the book "BANNER OF THE FIGHTING PARTY (Essay on the History of the Program of the CPSU)", Moscow: Politizdat, 1986, p. 131:

*"The 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1930), which discussed the report of the delegation of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the ECCI, wrote in its resolution:*

*"The Congress instructs the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to revise the program party on the basis of the VI World Congress programs of the Communist International and successes in socialist construction in the USSR.*

*This was the first decision to prepare a new Pro party grams.*

*In 1939, at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) was formed commission for the revision of the Party Program. She was instructed to present at the next party congress draft of a new program of the CPSU (b).*

*The outbreak of the Great Patriotic War for a long time to postpone the preparation of this document ta..."*

By the way, in this book there is no mention of the preparation of a draft of a new program in 1948, based based on an unaccepted long-term economic plan. And there is also no explanation why, after Stalin's death, they did not continue work on a new program, the decision on which was made at the 19th Congress of the CPSU (1952). Strange, but it turns out that from 1930 to 1953 they tried several times to rework the pro

gram of the party, but something constantly interfered, something broke. What?

I think before answering this question, first It should be noted that the first decision to prepare a new program of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks connected it with the successes of socialist construction in the USSR in the second place! The first was the program of the Communist International! And he was engaged in the "World Revolution", the military prospects of which were observed until the mid-1950s! That's when they

reduced to hypothetical, then the third program from 1956 was developed and adopted in 1961 as a program for building communism in the Soviet Union. But, again, secondarily. The plan for building communism in the USSR constituted the second (most) half of the third program and had the heading: *"Part Two, TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY*

*OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE BUILDING OF COMMUNITY CZECH SOCIETY"*. First (slightly smaller) half

program ("*Part One*") was dedicated to the same WORLD REVOLUTION (!), Only it was called more peacefully: "TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM - THE WAY OF HUMANITY DEVELOPMENT". (Moreover, if you read it more soberly, then the thought will arise that this is not a program in the strict sense, but a set of facts, wishes and "scientific" spells, akin to shamanic ones.)

What, then, COULD BE the third program of the CPSU(b) of the early 1940s? Judging by the plans developed, in 1941 the "liberation" campaign of the Red Army was to begin, as a result of which the power of communist parties could be established in almost all countries of Europe, including France. Accordingly, all its colonies fell into the camp of socialism. Then the countries of Asia, especially the colonial ones, could have been "liberated". This can be guessed, for example, from the already cited memoirs of the former worker of the General Staff, General Shtemenko, in which he writes that he spent the end of May and most of June 1941 in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Tbilisi, he participated in the command-staff game to deploy the front (it is not specified against whom). In the role of commander was Lieutenant General P. I. Batov, chief of staff - Major General F. I. Tolbukhin. After debriefing the exercises, Shtemenko went to Turkmenistan, where he also held some kind of staff game, during which he "*managed, in order to study the theater (of military operations), drive along the border from Serakhs to Ashgabat and beyond.*

*through Kizyl-Atrek to Gasan-Kuli*". (And this is almost the entire border of the USSR with Iran east of the Caspian Sea.) In addition, Shtemenko openly declares that before the war there was a "plan for covering the Transcaucasus", which, apparently, had Turkey as an enemy, since after the introduction of troops into Iran in 1941 it was specified. It was possible to clarify it only in the direction of Tour

tions. At that time, there was no talk of atomic weapons. Thus, the prospect of America's "liberation" could arise. In other words, the world revolution could well spread throughout the globe. And this case cannot be left without a theoretical justification. And during the successful "liberation" campaign naturally calls for the holding of a congress of the "winners" already on a world scale with the adoption of an appropriate program.

But it all fell apart. Stalin had to repeat the preparation one more time. And until his death, he did not refuse to "push" the World Revolution. However, his heirs were forced to slow down their activity in such a policy in the face of the threat of thermonuclear destruction of mankind. But the need remained

the opportunity to adopt a new party program, since the old one had long since been carried out. I had to somehow bring it to its logical end. However, even in the adopted version, the idea of the World Revolution remained on the agenda.

first place, although the prospects for its accomplishment were no longer visible. And it is quite logical that in the memory of the Soviet people the third program of the CPSU was remembered for the content of its second part - the program for building communism in one country - the USSR. It ended like this with the phrase: "THE PRESENT GENERATION

SOVIET PEOPLE WILL LIVE UNDER COMMUNISM!" (by 1980). But the deadlines have passed, communism has not appeared. I had to redo the program again. And in its new edition, adopted on March 1, 1986 at the XXVII Party Congress, the phrase about life under communism was omitted. I think in vain. In the light of the newly discovered facts, it would be useful to leave it in a modified form: "THE PRESENT AND OTHER GENERATIONS OF SOVIET PEOPLE WILL LIVE!" Although you can see that leaving her is no longer

where - appeared after repeated painful



attempts, the third program of the CPSU ultimately turned out to be stillborn.

And even the very fact of its rewriting proves that that in the first place it had a focus on the international situation. The collapse of capitalism, declared "natural," did not come about. The arms race, on the origins of which Stalin spent enormous efforts, hit like a boomerang on the economy of the Soviet Union itself. The emergence of new, socialist-oriented countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America did not resolve the issue. On the contrary, it increased the expenses of the USSR. As a result, the implementation of the first part of the third program was pushed back into a completely indefinite future. And along with this, the "arrival" of communism in the Soviet Union became problematic. All this made it necessary to "scientifically" substantiate "the need for a long stage of developed socialism" (which, however, could only last a few years after the adoption in 1986 of its substantiation in the new version of the third program of the CPSU).

Thus, from the history of its adoption and rewriting, one can judge its main goal - the World Revolution. With great difficulty, peace on earth found a place in it, and then with various reservations, and already without Stalin! Even after his death, for some time the ideologists continued to call for increased vigilance of the Soviet people. For example, here are the names of some

books from that period

1) ON THE POLITICAL VIGILANCE OF THE COMMUNIST, Gospolitizdat, 1953.

2) N. Zubov. TO BE WARNING IN ANY SITE AND IN ANY SITUATION, Gospolitizdat, 1953 (50,000 copies), 1954 (100,000 copies).

3) M. Smirnov and P. Sharikov. ABOUT THE VIGILANCE CO

VETA PEOPLE. ZNANIE Publishing House, 1953. Signed for publication on August 27, 1953, circulation 200,000 copies.

And a quote from the book:

*"Expanding peaceful construction," wrote*

*I. V. Stalin in the order of May 1, 1946 - we are not on one minute we must not forget about the intrigues of international reaction, which is hatching plans for a new wars..."*

What is this? Remains of some process carried out "by inertia"? By the way, there are a number of memoirs that speak of an attempt in 1953 to repeat the events of 1937. For example, in his book "FOR A LONG RECOVERY (1953-1985)" (1991, M.: International relations), G. A. Arbatov cites the words of one of his former colleague journalists - B. M. Afanasyev, who until 1948 and a short time after the death of Stalin served in the intelligence agencies. He told Arbatov that *"from his short "second" job in the KGB he knows for certain: in early 1953*

*year, instructions were received to increase in connection with the upcoming "influx" of prisoners "capacity" prisons and camps and to prepare for the transport of prisoners an additional amount of mobile railroad train ... In a word, in recent months Stalin's life, the punitive apparatus was preparing for new wave of mass repression.*

For what? Maybe to increase the number of "black jackets"? After all, to increase the number infinitely army in peacetime is impossible without frightening the enemy. In addition, the economy will not survive, and in connection with atomic weapons, most of the troops still turn into suicide bombers, especially the first echelon (so why spend money on them?). And if the next "Day-M" Stalin was really preparing for 1954, then such an explanation may well take place.

There is also evidence of Stalin's desire

organize another "shake-up" with repressions among your surroundings. At the same time, the names of Molotov and Mikoyan were called. Did not have time...

What did he seek? He owned unlimited power on 1/6 of the land. After 1945, he added a number of countries to it. And he could well capture Western Europe. What stopped him?

Earlier we spoke about the crisis of strategic bombers. But they were required only for the war with the United States! It turns out that simply supplementing the USSR with some countries after 1945 was not enough for Stalin. It turns out that he was not interested in the "extra" tens of thousands of square kilometers! He needed something more!

In the book "The LAST REPUBLIC" V. Suvorov about analyzed the main goal of the World Revolution: to admit the "last republic" into the USSR. And in the early 50s, such a prospect could arise only in one case: if it were possible to "fill up" the USA! Not

happened...

By the way, who stood in the way of whose expansionist aspirations? And where does the opinion come from that it makes no sense to study that period of history in too much detail? I think that all of the above material shows the very important need for such a study. And I want to pay attention to the title of G. Arbatov's book: "FOR A LONG RECOVERY (1953-1985)". And also to remember that since 1985 the term "socialism with a human face" has been used. In this regard, I would like to ask the question: "What was the face of socialism before? Animal grin?

But some readers may notice that during the "stagnation" in some ways life was better than now. Agree. Somewhere I even read such a definition: "Since the 60s, the standard of living of socialism has tried to

get up, but could not resist and fell face down in the mud.

Why did it happen? Would it really be impossible to create the best vacuum cleaner or refrigerator in the world, for example? After all, the world's best tank or front-line bomber - the products are much more complex and expensive! Moreover, they were able to create the best object in the world, less complicated than a refrigerator - a Kalashnikov assault rifle!

But the quality of military products is shown in battle. And the quality of civilians is in the competitive struggle for the consumer, when there is something to compare with. And this is pre lays down the openness of the economy, currency regulation, production efficiency, minimum military nye expenses, etc. etc., that is, something that was denied for a long time by the theory of the class struggle and already existed before 1917. It can be objected that in 1917 the "benefactors of the people" decided to eliminate social inequality. In other words, they promised to make social protection a top priority. The idea is tempting! And millions responded! But why

Mu about raising the standard of living was remembered only after 1953? For a long time this was explained by the need to create a powerful industry. Let's say, but why until the very end of the USSR the highest quality were peaceful goods or their components purchased abroad? What then was the "most peaceful in the world" Soviet industry doing?

As history has shown, the elimination of social inequality on the basis of the idea of class struggle and total leveling is a dead end path. At least - with ki view of the world's best quality and economic costs. And social protection can, it turns out, be carried out without fomenting a world revolution. But the return to the already achieved world level of relations cannot be easy and painless.

But this topic is for another conversation. And this time for

finish, although some questions still remain. From my point of view, the problem of covering the course of the war from June 1941 to January 1943 in the light of "newly determined circumstances" remains a very big one. Particularly interesting should be the analysis of the events of the Kharkov operation in May 1942. Some participants in those battles believed that there could not have been without betrayal. But that's from their point of view. There are suggestions that the whole tragedy and the whole magnitude of the feat that took place at that time have not yet been fully appreciated. Moreover, there is a hypothesis that it was at this time that Stalin gained a very important experience as a strategic player in the international arena, which he used after the war. Yes, this cannot be taken away from him - Stalin really turned out to be an unsurpassed player on a planetary scale, whose actions

you can dedicate more than one book.

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# Виктор Суворов представляет!

«О подготовке в тридцатых годах нашей промышленности к войне я написал книгу «День-М». Но чем глубже погружаешься в события предвоенного периода, тем более очевидным становится мысль, что и после 1945 года политика Сталина оставалась прежней. После Второй мировой войны он продолжал готовиться к Третьей...

Тема эта огромная и интересная, как детектив. Она меня всегда влекла, но знал: мне ее не поднять. У меня просто не хватит времени. Я раз и навсегда погрузился в 1941 год, исследовать который не хватит и десяти жизней. И было жалко: неужели никто не займется изучением подготовки Сталиным новой мировой войны?

Но один нашелся. Он написал великолепную книгу по теме «М-2». По духу и замыслу это как бы продолжение моей книги, развитие той же идеи, но с другой стороны... У нас с ним много общего. Он бывший офицер, я тоже бывший. Он учился в Москве и служил рядом с ней, я тоже прошел через это. Он служил в «придворной» дивизии, и в моей биографии есть подобная строка. Я рад, что такое исследование сделал не профессор-историк, а наш брат офицер. Его книга, несомненно, заслуживает самого серьезного внимания как специалистов, так и широкой читающей публики. В ней открыта еще одна, никем ранее не прочитанная страница нашего прошлого...»

**Виктор Суворов**

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